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In the past 30 years, China has achieved phenomenal economic growth,
an unprecedented development “miracle” in human history. Since the
institution of its reforms and Open Door policy in 1978, China’s gross
domestic product (GDP) has been growing at an average annual rate of
more than 9 percent. In 2010, it is poised to surpass that of Japan and
become the world’s second-largest economy. 
How did China achieve this rapid growth? What have been its key driv-
ers? And, most important, what can be learned from China’s success? Policy
makers, business people, and scholars all over the world continue to debate
these topics, but one thing is clear: the numerous special economic zones
(SEZs) and industrial clusters that emerged after the country’s reforms are
without doubt two important engines of China’s remarkable development. 
The SEZs and industrial clusters have made crucial contributions to
China’s economic success. Foremost, the SEZs (especially the first sev-
eral) successfully tested the market economy and new institutions and
became role models for the rest of the country to follow. Together with
the numerous industrial clusters, the SEZs have contributed significantly
to national GDP, employment, exports, and attraction of foreign invest-
ment. The SEZs have also played important roles in bringing new tech-
nologies to China and in adopting modern management practices. 
Foreword
The key experiences of China’s SEZs and industrial clusters can best
be summarized as gradualism with an experimental approach; a strong
commitment; and the active, pragmatic facilitation of the state. Some of
the specific lessons include the importance of strong commitment and
pragmatism from the top leadership; preferential policies and broad
institutional autonomy; staunch support and proactive participation of
governments, especially in the areas of public goods and externalities;
public-private partnerships; foreign direct investment and investment
from the Chinese diaspora; business value chains and social networks;
and continuous technology learning and upgrading. 
Given the vast number of SEZs and clusters in China, it is impossible
to cover all of them. For the purpose of illustration, this volume focuses
on three SEZs (Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Kunshan) and on two industrial
clusters (the Wenzhou footwear cluster in Zhejiang Province and the
Xiqiao textile cluster in Guangdong Province). 
The volume begins with a summary piece that briefly reviews the
development experiences of China’s SEZs and industrial clusters and
then follows with the five case studies. Together, they are intended to
benefit developing countries in particular and the global development
community in general. There is, however, no silver bullet for develop-
ment: what is important is that each country must find the model best
suited to its own unique situation. 
Justin Yifu Lin Sanjay Pradhan
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist Vice President
Development Economics World Bank Institute
World Bank World Bank
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1China’s meteoric economic rise over the past three decades is an unprece-
dented “growth miracle” in human history. Since the Open Door policy
and reforms that began in 1978, China’s gross domestic product (GDP)
has been growing at an average annual rate of more than 9 percent, with
its global share increasing from 1 percent in 1980 to almost 6.5 percent in
2008 (see figure 1.1) and its per capita GDP increasing from US$193 to
US$3,263 (see figure 1.2). Total exports have been growing at an average
annual rate of 13 percent (21.5 percent from 1998 to 2007), with China’s
share of total exports increasing from 1.7 percent in 1980 to 9.5 percent
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September 2009. 
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in 2008 (see figure 1.3). In 2007, China’s incremental growth in real GDP
actually exceeded its entire real GDP in 1979. In 2010, China is set to out-
pace Japan and become the world’s second-largest economy. China has
indisputably become an important growth engine of the global economy
and a leader in international trade and investment. Rapid growth in the
past decades has helped lift more than 400 million people out of poverty.
These results are truly impressive.
While China’s rapid rise has become a hot topic for development
debate among policy makers, business people, and scholars all over the
world, the numerous special economic zones (SEZs) and industrial clus-
ters that have sprung up since the reforms are undoubtedly two impor-
tant engines for driving the country’s growth. This chapter will briefly
summarize the development experiences of China’s SEZs and industrial
clusters, based on case studies, interviews, field visits, and extensive
reviews of the existing literature in an attempt to benefit other develop-
ing countries as well as the broader development community. 
How Do SEZs and Industrial Clusters Drive China’s Rapid Development? 3
Figure 1.3  China's Exports of Goods and Services, 1980–2008
Sources: World Bank Global Development Finance and World Development Indicators central database, 
September 2009.
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Terms and Definitions
As we begin our discussion, some clarifications on the terms and defini-
tions would be helpful. In particular, we need to differentiate between the
various types of economic zones and industrial clusters. 
Special Economic Zones
Special economic zone is a generic term that covers recent variants of the
traditional commercial zones. The basic concept of a special economic
zone includes several specific characteristics: (a) it is a geographically
delimited area, usually physically secured; (b) it has a single management
or administration; (c) it offers benefits based on physical location within
the zone; and (d) it has a separate customs area (duty-free benefits) and
streamlined procedures (World Bank 2009). In addition, an SEZ normally
operates under more liberal economic laws than those typically prevail-
ing in the country. SEZs confer two main types of benefit, which explain
in part their popularity: “direct” economic benefits such as employment
generation and foreign exchange earnings; and the more elusive “indirect”
economic benefits, which are summarized in table 1.1.
The term SEZ covers a broad range of zones, such as free trade zones,
export-processing zones, industrial parks, free ports, enterprise zones, and
others. As used in China, however, the term SEZ refers to a complex of
related economic activities and services rather than to a unifunctional
entity (Wong 1987). As a result, Chinese SEZs are more functionally
diverse and cover much larger land areas than other types of economic
4 Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China
Table 1.1  Potential Benefits Derived from Special Economic Zones
Direct benefits Indirect benefits
Foreign exchange earnings ■
Foreign direct investment ■
Government revenue ■
Export growth ■
Skills upgrading ■
Testing field for wider 
economic reform ■
Technology transfer ■
Demonstration effect ■
Export diversification ■
Enhancing trade efficiency 
of domestic firms ■
Source: World Bank staff. 
zones. In China, SEZ normally refers to seven specific zones: Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, Hainan, Shanghai Pudong New Area, and
Tianjin Binhai New Area, which will be discussed later. In this book, how-
ever, the term is used in a broad sense; that is, it refers not only to the
seven special economic zones (hereafter referred to as comprehensive
SEZs) but also to China’s economic and technological development
zones (ETDZs), free trade zones (FTZs), export-processing zones (EPZs),
high-tech industrial development zones (HIDZs), and the like. 
Industrial Clusters
An industrial cluster is generally defined as a geographic concentration of
interconnected firms in a particular field with links to related institutions.
Often included in this category are financial providers, educational insti-
tutions, and various levels of government. These entities are linked by
externalities and complementarities of different types and are usually
located near each other (World Bank 2009). Increasingly, both developed
and developing countries use cluster initiatives to promote economic
development, a concept supported by the development community at
large. Popularized through such works as The Competitive Advantage of
Nations (Porter 1990, 1998) and others (Schmitz 1992, for example),
clusters have been viewed as a mechanism for enabling firms to join their
efforts and resources and work with government toward greater regional,
national, and international competitiveness (World Bank 2010). Do clus-
ters foster innovation? Nadvi’s collective efficiency model (1999) highlights
four key variables that determine competitiveness in enterprise clusters:
market access, labor-market pooling, intermediate input effects, and
technological spillovers. Nadvi (1997, 1999) and Meyer-Stamer (1998)
recognize that clustering offers unique opportunities for firms to take
advantage of a wide array of domestic links between users and producers
and between the economy’s knowledge sector and its business sector. Such
linkages have the potential for stimulating learning and innovation. 
Clusters, however, are not necessarily innovation systems (McCormick
and Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 2007), and innovative clusters are not necessar-
ily high-technology clusters. Mytelka (2004) also emphasizes the role of
clusters in promoting the kind of interactivity that stimulates innovation
but cautions that the geographic proximity of actors does not automati-
cally lead to learning and innovation. However, there is a growing recog-
nition that cluster initiatives could be an effective means for producing an
environment conducive to innovation (Andersson et al. 2004). All these
arguments can find their roots in different cluster examples. 
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Although clusters come in several different forms and various schol-
ars have tried different typologies, all clusters share one commonality:
each comprises a multitude of firms of different sizes belonging to one
branch of industry. Markusen (1996) has classified clusters into four cat-
egories: Marshallian, hub and spoke, satellite platform, and state anchored
(see table 1.2). Others have described them by development stage, such
as agglomeration, emerging, potential, and mature. 
SEZs and Clusters: “Top-Down” versus “Bottom-Up”?
While SEZs are normally constructed through a “top-down” approach by
government policies, most clusters are formed in an organic way through
a “bottom-up” process. Some clusters, however, have emerged from or
within industrial parks or export-processing zones over time but rarely in
developing countries. A study of 11 African clusters across several coun-
tries reveals that most of them formed spontaneously, with the exception
of the Mauritian textile cluster, which evolved from an export-processing
zone (Zeng 2008). 
Because the formation of clusters takes time and needs an ecosystem
based on market forces, the purely top-down approach to cluster creation
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Table 1.2  Markusen’s Typology of Industrial Clusters
Cluster type
Characteristics of 
member firms
Intracluster 
interdependencies
Prospects for 
employment
Marshallian Small and medium 
locally owned firms
Substantial 
interfirm trade 
and collaboration
Dependent on 
synergies and 
economies provided 
by cluster
Hub and spoke One or several large 
firms with numerous 
smaller supplier and 
service firms
Cooperation 
between large firms 
and smaller suppliers 
on terms of the large 
firms (hub firms)
Dependent on 
growth prospects 
of large firms
Satellite platform Medium and large 
branch plants
Minimum interfirm 
trade and networking
Dependent on ability 
to recruit and retain 
branch plants 
State anchored Large public or 
nonprofit entity 
and related supplier 
and service firms
Restriction of 
purchase-sale 
relationships 
between public 
entity and suppliers
Dependent on 
region’s ability to 
expand political 
support for public 
facility
Source: Markusen 1996. 
should be exercised with caution, especially in low-capacity countries,
where many such efforts have failed. The challenges, however, should
not necessarily prevent governments from facilitating the formation,
growth, or scale-up of emerging clusters, especially through improving
the business environment and making appropriate interventions in the
public-goods or quasi–public-goods areas of clusters. Inevitably, it is eas-
ier to devise policies for a functioning cluster and devilishly hard to call a
cluster into existence, especially when the essential industrial nuclei are
difficult to identify (Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Yamashita 2008). In this sense,
a mixture of bottom-up and top-down approaches to cluster develop-
ment are possible, but initially clusters in developing countries are formed
mainly through market forces or for “accidental reasons” (Krugman and
Venables 1996). (An exception is those that “naturally” or “accidentally”
derive from policy-induced SEZs or industrial parks, along with a few
special cases, such as specialized industrial parks in certain countries.)
Such a “mixed” approach applies perfectly to the case of China as discussed
in this volume. 
Despite the fact that government can have more control over SEZ
development than over that of industrial clusters, an SEZ is not neces-
sarily easier to develop, and many SEZ initiatives have failed. The suc-
cess of SEZs requires a very capable government and a well-functioning
market system, at least inside the zone or park. To design an SEZ using
a purely cluster approach might be possible but can also increase the risk
of failure unless the market signals are clear and the government has a
perfect understanding of the domestic comparative advantages and mar-
ket situations (both domestic and international), which is often beyond
the government’s capacity. 
In China, while market forces are usually responsible for initially pro-
ducing industrial clusters, the government supports or facilitates them in
various ways, including setting up an industrial park on the basis of an
existing cluster (a process discussed in later sections). Meanwhile, after
decades of development, some clusters have begun to grow out of certain
SEZs, such as the information and communication technology clusters in
Zhongguancun (Beijing) and Shenzhen, the electronics and biotech clus-
ters in Pudong (Shanghai), the software cluster in Dalian, and the opto-
electronics cluster in Wuhan. The emergence of these clusters actually
hinges on the success of these SEZs, which serve as their “greenhouse,”
and on market forces over time. Furthermore, in recent years, some cities
have begun to set up cluster-type industrial parks, or “specialized indus-
trial parks,” such as the liquid crystal display (LCD) high-tech park in
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Kunshan and the Wuxi Wind Power Science and Technology Park and the
Photovoltaic Industry Park in Jiangsu Province. In these examples, two
different models are tending to converge. However, despite the fact that
in recent years SEZs and clusters in China have overlapped to some
extent, in most cases their origins, development trajectories, market seg-
ments, industry compositions, level of operations, and success factors are
quite different. Because of those differences, we will treat them differ-
ently in this volume. 
In China, generally speaking, SEZs operate in more technology- and
capital-intensive formal sectors and enjoy greater government support,
more foreign direct investment (FDI), and stronger links to the global
market. Clusters, in contrast—with the exception of the few emerging
from the existing SEZs—usually operate in the low-technology and
labor-intensive sectors with less government support. Many of them are
in informal sectors and consist of numerous small and medium enter-
prises, although some of them are gradually upgrading and moving up
the value chains. 
The following sections provide an overview of the formation of the
SEZs and industrial clusters, their contributions to the national economy,
their success factors, and the challenges they face for sustainability, as well
as some possible areas or measures for policy intervention, so that policy
makers, development practitioners, and researchers all over the world
(especially those in developing countries) can benefit from the unprece-
dented “China miracle.” 
Special Economic Zones in China: 
A Testing Lab for the Market Economy
China launched its Open Door reforms in 1978 as a social experiment—
one that was designed to test the efficacy of market-oriented economic
reforms in a controlled environment. Not knowing what to expect from
the reforms, Chinese authorities decided not to open the entire economy
all at once but just certain segments: in Deng Xiaoping’s words, “crossing
the river by touching the stones.” Therefore, besides the usual objectives
of an SEZ—such as attracting foreign investment and technologies, pro-
moting exports, and generating employment and spillovers to the local
economy—one important mission of the first Chinese SEZs was to test
the new policies and new institutions for a market-oriented economy.
Such an approach was a sharp departure from the country’s then totally
centrally planned economy. 
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The Establishment of SEZs in China
In the late 1970s—after the decade-long debacle of the Cultural
Revolu tion, which left the economy dormant and the people physically
and emotionally drained—China was in dire need of systemic change.
To answer this urgent call, Deng Xiaoping, chief architect of China’s
Open Door policy, launched economic reform in 1978—a drastic meas-
ure at that time. In November 1978, farmers in Xiaogang, a small village
in Anhui Province, pioneered the “contract responsibility system,” which
was subsequently recognized as the initial impetus for far-reaching and
ultimately successful rural reforms in China (South China Morning Post
2008). The following month, the central government adopted the Open
Door policy, and in July 1979, it decided that Guangdong and Fujian
provinces should take the lead in opening up to the outside world
and implement “special policies and flexible measures” (Yeung, Lee, and
Kee 2009). 
By August 1980, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong Province
were designated as special economic zones, followed by Xiamen in Fujian
Province in October 1980. The four SEZs were quite similar in that they
comprised large areas within which the objective was to facilitate broadly
based, comprehensive economic development, and they all enjoyed spe-
cial financial, investment, and trade privileges. They were deliberately
located far from the center of political power in Beijing to minimize both
potential risks and political interference. They were encouraged to pursue
pragmatic and open economic policies that would serve as a test for inno-
vative policies that, if proven successful, would be implemented more
widely across the country. The four SEZs were located in coastal areas of
Guangdong and Fujian, which had a long history of contact with the
outside world and were near Hong Kong,1 Macao,2 and Taiwan, China.
The choice of Shenzhen was especially strategic because of its location
across a narrow river from Hong Kong, the principal area from which
China could learn capitalist modes of economic growth and modern
management technologies (Yeung, Lee, and Kee 2009).
Because China had just reopened to foreign trade and investment,
the SEZs had an almost immediate impact. In 1981, the four zones
accounted for 59.8 percent of total FDI in China, with Shenzhen
accounting for the lion’s share at 50.6 percent. Three years later, the
four SEZs still accounted for 26 percent of China’s total FDI. By the
end of 1985, realized FDI in the four zones totaled US$1.17 billion,
about 20 percent of the national total (Wong 1987). The combination
of favorable policies and the right mixture of production factors in the
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SEZs resulted in unprecedented rates of growth in China. Against a national
average annual GDP growth of roughly 10 percent from 1980 to 1984,
Shenzhen grew at a phenomenal 58 percent annual rate, followed by
Zhuhai (32 percent), Xiamen (13 percent), and Shantou (9 percent). By
1986, Shenzhen had already developed rudimentary markets in capital,
labor, land, technology, communication, and other factors of production
(Yeung, Lee, and Kee 2009).
The initial opening to trade and investment having proved success-
ful, China resolved to open its economy further. In 1984, the central
authorities created a variant of SEZs, which they dubbed economic and
technological development zones, informally known as China’s national
industrial parks. The difference between the comprehensive SEZs and
the ETDZs is one of scale. A comprehensive SEZ often consists of a
much larger area (sometimes an entire city or province). From 1984 to
1988, 14 ETDZs were established in additional coastal cities3 and in the
following years in cities in the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River
Delta, and the Min Delta in Fujian. Meanwhile, in 1988, the entire
province of Hainan was designated as the fifth comprehensive SEZ, and
in 1989 and 2006, Shanghai Pudong New Area and Tianjin Binhai New
Area were granted such status as well. 
Subsequently, in 1992, the State Council created another 35 ETDZs.
In doing so, they sought (a) to extend the ETDZs from the coastline to
inland regions and (b) to focus less on fundamental industries and more
on technology-intensive industries. By the end of 2008, there were 54
state-level ETDZs. By April 2010, this number increased to 69: 18 in the
Yangtze River Delta, 10 in the Pearl River Delta, 15 in the central region,
11 in the Bohai Bay region, 2 in the northeast region, and 13 in the west-
ern region (see map 1.1). ETDZs are typically located in the suburban
regions of a major city. Within the ETDZ, an administrative committee,
commonly selected by the local government, oversees the economic and
social management of the zone on behalf of the local administration
(China Knowledge Online 2009). 
In addition to the special economic zones mentioned above, other
types of SEZs in China include high-tech industrial development zones
(HIDZs), free trade zones (FTZs), export-processing zones (EPZs), and
others. Each has a different focus.
High-tech industrial development zones. The establishment of high-tech
industrial development zones was to implement the Torch Program initi-
ated by the Ministry of Science and Technology in the late 1980s. The
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main objective of the program was to use the technological capacity and
resources of research institutes, universities, and large and medium enter-
prises to develop new and high-tech products and to expedite the com-
mercialization of research and development (R&D). 
In 1988, the first HIDZ was established in Zhongguancun (Beijing). As
of today, there are 54 state-level HIDZs in China—25 in the coastal and
29 in the inland regions (see annex A for a list of the state-level HIDZs).
Although these HIDZs have played important roles in promoting China’s
high-tech industries overall, their performances differ; some function sim-
ilarly to ETDZs, and the line between these two types of zones has
blurred in these cases (China Knowledge Online 2009). In 2006, the five
top performers in terms of value added were Beijing Zhongguancun,
Shanghai Zhangjiang, Nanjing, Wuxi, and Shenzhen. 
Free trade zones. Free trade zones were set up to experiment with free
trade before China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
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Map 1.1  Economic and Technological Development Zones, 2010
Source: Author’s research.
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FTZs had three targeted functions: export processing, foreign trade, and
logistics and bonded warehousing. The first state-level FTZ, Shanghai
Waigaoqiao FTZ, was set up in 1990. These FTZs may be viewed as
enclaves within China. Although they are physically inside China’s bor-
der, they function outside China’s customs regulations. Companies in
FTZs are eligible for tax refunds on exports, import duty exemption, and
concessionary value-added tax. 
Currently, there are 15 FTZs in 13 coastal cities (see annex B for a list
of the FTZs). Upon China’s entry into the WTO, the original unique
advantages of FTZs faded. To maintain their competitive edge, China has
been linking FTZs with nearby ports since 2004. This process has
expanded the size of FTZs and strengthened their logistics and warehous-
ing functions in international trading (China Knowledge Online 2009). 
Export-processing zones. Export-processing zones (EPZs) were created
to develop export-oriented industries and enhance foreign exchange
earnings. The first EPZ was inaugurated in Kunshan in 2000. So far, 61
EPZs have been set up in China; 44 of them are located in the coastal
region, while the other 17 are inland. EPZs are similar to FTZs but are
solely for the purpose of managing export processing. FTZs are the pre-
ferred locations for companies involved in export-trading and processing,
while EPZs are more advantageous locations for manufacturing compa-
nies that export most, if not all, their goods to locations outside China
(ProLogis 2008). 
The success of state-level SEZs spurred the speedy development of
new ones by different levels of governments. By 2004, there were nearly
7,000 industrial parks in China. To curb the blind expansion of industrial
parks, China stepped up its efforts to clean up unqualified industrial
parks. By the end of 2006, the number of industrial parks had been
reduced to 1,568, among which 222 are state-level zones. The total
planned area had been reduced from 38,600 square kilometers to 9,900
square kilometers (74.4 percent less) (China Knowledge Online 2009).
Contributions of SEZs to China’s Development
The SEZs have made crucial contributions to China’s success. Most of all,
they—especially the first ones—successfully tested the market economy
and new institutions and established role models for the rest of the coun-
try to follow. By 1992, the concept of openness had been extended to the
entire coastal region and to all capital cities of provinces and autonomous
regions in the interior, and various types of SEZs had begun to spring up
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throughout the country. Thus, when Deng Xiaoping made his famous
southern tour that year, the mission that had started with the creation of
the first five SEZs had in many respects been accomplished: the “special”
economic zones by that time were no longer so special (Yeung, Lee, and
Kee 2009).
Contribution to GDP. Economically, SEZs have contributed signifi-
cantly to national GDP, employment, exports, and attraction of foreign
investment and new technologies, as well as adoption of modern man-
agement practices, among others. In 2006, the five initial SEZs accounted
for 5 percent of China’s total real GDP, 22 percent of total merchandise
exports, and 9 percent of total FDI inflows. At the same time, the
54 national ETDZs accounted for 5 percent of total GDP, 15 percent of
exports, and 22 percent of total FDI inflows (see table 1.3).
Because of the large number of SEZs of various types and the difficulty
of obtaining recent data (especially from those at the subnational level),
it is hard to paint an overall picture of the contributions of the SEZs, but
some estimated aggregations could be obtained based on available data
for 2006 and 2007. In 2006, the 54 state-level ETDZs, 53 state-level
HIDZs,4 and 15 FTZs accounted for a combined 11.1 percent of China’s
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Table 1.3  Performance of Initial Five Special Economic Zones and 
National Economic and Technological Development Zones, 2006
Indicator SEZs
National
ETDZs China
Total employment
(millions) 
as % of China total
15 
2.0
4 
0.5
758 
100
Real GDP
(RMB 100 millions)
as % of China total 
9,101
5.0
8,195
4.5
183,085
100
Utilized FDI
(US$100 millions)
as % of China total
55
9.1
130
21.6
603
100
Merchandise exports
(US$100 millions)
as % of China total
1,686
22.1
1,138
14.9
7,620
100
Total population
(millions)
as % of China total
25
1.9
—
—
1,308
100
Source: National Statistics Bureau 2006.
Note: — = not available.
total GDP and 29.8 percent of exports (China Knowledge Online 2009).
The same year, the total GDP for Shanghai Pudong and Tianjin Binhai
was RMB 236.53 billion and RMB 196.05 billion, respectively; and their
exports were US$44.5 billion and US$18.5 billion (Shanghai Statistics
Bureau 2008; Tianjin Statistics Bureau 2008). If the figures cited in table
1.3 are added, then the total GDP of the majority of the state-level SEZs
(including the seven comprehensive SEZs, ETDZs, HIDZs, and FTZs)
would account for about 18.5 percent of China’s total GDP and about 60
percent of total exports. In 2007, the five initial SEZs produced a total
GDP of RMB 1,110.7 billion, and Shanghai Pudong and Tianjin Binhai
produced a total GDP of RMB 511.5 billion (Zhong et al. 2009). The
total GDP of the state-level ETDZs was RMB 1,269.6 billion (Hefei
ETDZ 2009). The contribution of HIDZs to the national GDP was 7.1
percent (Qian 2008). The total value added for the 15 FTZs was RMB 180.1
billion (Zhong et al. 2009), and the total industrial value added of 38
EPZs was RMB 562.6 billion (MOFCOM 2008a). Based on these figures,
we can estimate that in 2007 the total GDP of the major state-level SEZs
accounted for roughly 21.8 percent of national GDP. If other subnational-
level SEZs were added, the figure could be higher. 
Contribution to foreign investment. The SEZs are also a major platform
for attracting foreign investment. In 2007, the actual utilized FDI of the
five initial SEZs was about US$7.3 billion.5 The number for Shanghai
Pudong and Tianjin Binhai was about US$7.2 billion (Zhong et al. 2009),
for the ETDZs about US$17.3 billion (MOFCOM 2008b), and for the
FTZs about US$2.6 billion (Zhong et al. 2009). The total FDI figures for
the HIDZs were not available. In 2007, China’s total utilized FDI was
US$74.8 billion. Based on these figures, we can estimate that the total
utilized FDI from the major national-level SEZs (excluding HIDZs)
accounted for about 46 percent of the national total in 2007.
Contribution to employment. The contribution of SEZs to national
employment is also very significant. In 2006, the total employment of the
initial five SEZs was about 15 million, accounting for 2 percent of
national employment (see table 1.3). In 2007–08, total employment was
about 1.47 million in the Shanghai Pudong area (Shanghai Pudong
Government 2008), accounting for about 17 percent of the total employ-
ment of the municipality of Shanghai. In 2007, the figure for Tianjin
Binhai was about 0.33 million, accounting for about 5.4 percent of the
total Tianjin municipality employment.6 In 2007, total employment of
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the 54 ETDZs and the 54 HIDZs was about 5.35 million and 6.5 million,
respectively (MOST 2009). Added together, the total employment of the
seven SEZs, the ETDZs, and the HIDZs accounted for about 4 percent of
total national employment (770 million). Of course, this picture is still
incomplete, because many subnational SEZs were not included, and if we
account for only the share of SEZs in urban employment, that number
should be more than 10 percent. Currently, about half of China’s labor-
ers are still employed in rural areas. SEZs absorbed mostly the high-end,
skilled workers in China. 
Contribution to high technology. The SEZs are also the hotbed of
China’s new and high-technology firms. In 2007, the 54 HIDZs hosted
about half the national high-tech firms and science and technology incu-
bators. They registered some 50,000 invention patents in total, more than
70 percent of which were registered by domestic firms (Zhong et al.
2009). They also hosted 1.2 million R&D personnel (18.5 percent of
HIDZ employees) and accounted for 33 percent of the national high-tech
output (Qian 2008). Over the 15 years since the formation of HIDZs,
they have accounted for half of China’s high-tech gross industrial output
and one-third of China’s high-tech exports. In addition, the ETDZs are
also responsible for another one-third of China’s high-tech industrial out-
put and exports (rising from 31.3 percent in 2004 to 35.5 percent in
2005). HIDZs are also quite R&D intensive: their expenditure on R&D
in 2002 was RMB 31.4 billion and accounted for 24.4 percent of China’s
total R&D expenditure. Within the following four years, their R&D
expenditure tripled to RMB 105.4 billion, and the share rose to 35.1 in
2006 (Fu and Gao 2007). 
Although figures are not available, the seven comprehensive SEZs have
also undoubtedly contributed to the development of China’s technology-
intensive sectors. For example, by 1998 with high-tech industries account-
ing for almost 40 percent of industrial output, the Shenzhen SEZ set
the pace for moving toward a more technology-intensive, higher–value-
added stage of development, a goal since the late 1980s. Many Chinese-
patented products have a large share of the international market, for
example, Huawei, ZTE, and Great Wall computers. In 2008, Shenzhen
ranked first among all Chinese cities, registering 2,480 new patents
(Yeung, Lee, and Kee 2009). As this evidence shows, the various types
of SEZs, especially the HIDZs and ETDZs, are in fact the engines of
China’s high-tech industries and contribute greatly to its technology
upgrade.
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By every account, most of the SEZs in China, though differing in per-
formance and speed, are quite successful. Together, they have formed a
powerful engine to drive China’s reform process and economic growth.
Let us now examine how these SEZs grew out of a then severely constrain-
ing regime and succeeded beyond the most optimistic expectations. 
Major Factors for Success and Lessons Learned 
Many factors contributed to the success of China’s SEZs, and in every case,
the situations and factors might be different. However, their success draws
on some common key elements and points to some common lessons.
Strong commitment to reform and pragmatism from top leadership.
Despite the high uncertainty at the beginning, the top leaders were
determined to make changes, through a gradualist approach. Such a
determination ensured a stable and supportive macroenvironment for
reform and for the new Open Door policies to prevent political opposi-
tion and temporary setbacks from undermining the economic experi-
ment with the special economic zones. Deng’s southern tour in 1992
clearly demonstrated his determination to reassert the government’s
commitment to market-oriented reforms in the face of much opposition. 
Meanwhile, China did not simply copy ready-made models for reform
but instead explored its own way toward a market economy, incorporat-
ing characteristics that fit China’s unique situation as a country with a
civilization more than five thousand years old. At a time when the ideo-
logical wars were prevalent, China decisively abandoned such debates and
embraced a practical path toward development. This sentiment is vividly
captured in Deng’s famous saying: “No matter if it is a white cat or a
black cat, as long as it can catch mice, it is a good cat.” Such pragmatism
is crucial for achieving any successful reform. 
Preferential policies and institutional autonomy. To encourage firms to
invest in the zones, the SEZs had in place various preferential policies,
including inexpensive land, tax breaks, rapid customs clearance, the ability
to repatriate profits and capital investments, duty-free imports of raw mate-
rials and intermediate goods destined for incorporation into exported prod-
ucts, export tax exemption, and a limited license to sell into the domestic
market, among others (Enright, Scott, and Chung 2005). Favorable policies
were also in place to attract skilled labor, including the overseas diaspora,
such as the provision of housing, research funding, subsidies for children’s
education, and assistance in “Hukou”7 transfer, among others.8
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In addition, the SEZs (especially the comprehensive SEZs and ETDZs)
were given greater political and economic autonomy. They had the leg-
islative authority to develop municipal laws and regulations along the
basic lines of national laws and regulations, including local tax rates and
structures, and to govern and administer these zones. At that time, in
addition to the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee,
only the provincial-level People’s Congress and its Standing Committee
had such legislative power.9 That discretion allowed them more freedom
in pursuing the new policies and the development measures deemed nec-
essary to vitalize the economy. For instance, SEZs were the first to estab-
lish a labor market. Companies operating inside the zones could enter
into enforceable labor contracts with specific term limits, could dismiss
unqualified or underperforming employees, and could adjust wage and
compensation rates to reflect the market situation (ProLogis 2008). These
factors were critical to attracting the right talent. 
In Shenzhen, the government was very pragmatic, and its policy inno-
vations were especially successful. In 1981, the Guangdong Province
granted Shenzhen the same political status as Guangzhou, the provincial
capital; in 1988, Shenzhen was upgraded to the level of a province; and
in 1992, the central government granted legislative power.10 With that
autonomy, Shenzhen carried out many institutional innovations that
played a very important role in its remarkable success. For example,
Shenzhen was the first to adopt wage reform, in which compensation
was based on three elements: base pay, occupational pay, and a variable
allowance. It also adopted a minimum wage and a social insurance pack-
age superior to anything previously available in China (Sklair 1991).
Such a “free” labor market attracted many skilled workers. Shenzhen was
also the first city to establish the system of government approval within
24 hours, which greatly improved administrative efficiency.11 In the
Tianjin Economic–Technological Development Area (TEDA), an ETDZ,
the government also had the legislative power to experiment with vari-
ous pioneering reforms. One of the innovations of TEDA was to invite
renowned universities to establish campuses in the zone to conduct
vocational education and industry-related research.12 This was an effec-
tive way to build university-industry links.
Strong support and proactive participation of governments. The cen-
tral government had tried to decentralize its power and help create an
open and conducive legal and policy environment for the SEZs. At the
same time, the local governments made a great effort to build a sound
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business environment. They not only put in place an efficient regulatory
and administrative system but also good infrastructure, such as roads,
water, electricity, gas, sewerage, telephone, and ports, which in most cases
involve heavy government direct investments, especially in the initial stages.
In the case of Kunshan, before it was approved as a state-level ETDZ in
1992, all infrastructure in the park had been built by the local govern-
ment on a self-financing basis.13
Beyond the basic infrastructure, local governments also provide various
business services to many SEZs, especially to the HIDZs and ETDZs;
these include, among others, accounting, legal, business planning, market-
ing, import-export assistance, skills training, and management consulting.
For example, in Suzhou Technology Park, the government offers seed
money, information services, laboratories, product testing centers, tech-
nology trading rooms, and the like for start-ups (Zeng 2001). 
In addition, the SEZ governments are able to make timely adjustments
to relevant policies and regulations based on business needs and market
conditions, as well as on development stage. For example, after the zones
were successful, the governments began to put more emphasis on the
technology-intensive or high–value-added sectors and to adjust their FDI
policies to create a level playing field for both foreign and domestic firms.
In 2007, China established a common effective tax rate of 25 percent for
both foreign and domestic companies. 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Chinese diaspora. FDI and the
Chinese diaspora have played important roles in the success of the SEZs
by attracting capital investment, technologies, and management skills;
generating learning and spillovers; and ultimately helping to build local
manufacturing capacity. At the same time that the SEZs were opening up
in the 1980s, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, China, were also beginning
to upgrade their industrial structure and transfer out their labor-intensive
manufacturing sectors. The cheap labor and good infrastructure in the
SEZs, as well as the Open Door policies coupled with generous incen-
tives, provided a great opportunity for FDI to flow into China from the
diaspora. Given the culture, language, and location advantages, such
investments were dominant in the beginning stage, especially for the early
SEZs (see table 1.4 for the FDI inflows to these SEZs). 
The measures for attracting FDI included streamlined administrative
control; concessionary tax rates, breaks, and exemptions; preferential fees
for land or facility use; reduced duties on imports; free or low-rent busi-
ness accommodation; flexibility in hiring and firing workers; depreciation
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allowances; and favorable arrangements pertaining to project duration,
size, location and ownership (Ge 1999). For FDI, the corporate tax rate
was especially generous—15 percent as opposed to 30 percent for domes-
tic firms—plus exemption from local income tax.14
Empirical evidence shows that FDI inflow is indeed positively linked
with the expansion of output, employment, and labor productivity in the
SEZs. Several figures based on the Shenzhen case illustrate this relation-
ship. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show that the trend of foreign investment in the
secondary and tertiary sectors (where most of the FDI goes) appears to
be closely correlated to the changing pattern of production, with some
time lags. 
Figure 1.6 shows that the rapid expansion in labor employment, espe-
cially in the nonstate sector, where the foreign enterprises account for an
overwhelmingly large proportion, is closely associated with the upward
trend of foreign investment in Shenzhen. 
Also a study based on the 1993 data indicates that, in the Shenzhen
SEZ, foreign firms, as well as those Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, China
invested firms, are generally more efficient than their domestic counter-
parts (Ge 1999). The data on sector output after 1993 were no longer
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Table 1.4  FDI Inflows in Five Comprehensive Special Economic Zones, 1978–2008
Year Shenzhen Zhuhai Shantou Xiamen Hainan
Exports (billion current US$)
1978 0.009a 0.009a 0.251b 0.082 —
1990 8.152 0.489 0.84 0.781 0.471
2000 34.564 3.646 2.595 5.880 0.803
2006 135.959 14.843 3.484 20.508 1.376
2007 168.542 18.477 3.912 25.555c 1.838c
2008d 163.780 19.730 3.278e 26.970 —
Utilized FDI (million current US$)
1978 5.48a n.a. 1.61b — 0.10b
1990 389.94 69.1 98.09 72.37 100.55
2000 1961.45 815.18 165.61 1031.50 430.8
2006 3268.47 824.22 139.60 954.61 748.78
2007 3662.17 1028.83 171.62 1272c 1120c
2008d 3929.58 1138.49 — 1955.63 —
Sources: Yeung et al. 2008; Yeung, Lee, and Kee 2009. 
Note: — = not available. 
a. 1979. 
b. 1980. 
c. Preliminary figures. 
d. January–November. 
e. January–September.
segregated by type of enterprise ownership, so it is difficult to conduct a
similar type of analysis; but a comparison of productivity growth between
two sectors—the primary sector with very little FDI and the transporta-
tion, postal, and telecom sector where FDI is very heavy—shows that FDI
is still very positively linked to the sectoral productivity improvement
after 1993 (see figure 1.7).
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Figure 1.4  Output and Foreign Investment in Shenzhen’s Secondary Sector,
1979–2006
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, various years. 
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment.
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Figure 1.5  Output and Foreign Investment in Shenzhen’s Tertiary Sector,
1979–2006 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, various years. 
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Technology learning, innovation, upgrading, and strong links with the
domestic economy. One of the key strengths of the SEZs is that they
have a high concentration of very skilled people, including many R&D per-
sonnel, especially in the HIDZs and ETDZs. As a result, they have become
centers of knowledge and technology generation, adaptation, diffusion,
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Figure 1.6  Employment and Foreign Investment in Shenzhen, 1979–2006 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, various years. 
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Figure 1.7  Productivity of Selected Sectors in Shenzhen, 1993–2004 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 1994, 1999, 2002, 
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and innovation. The abundance of FDI provides a good opportunity for
technology learning. Governments also put strong emphasis on technol-
ogy learning and innovation, as well as on technology-intensive industries.
For example, the Shenzhen government set up an intellectual property
office and issued a number of policies and regulations to protect intellec-
tual property rights. It also implemented many preferential tax policies
and financial incentives to encourage high-tech industries, such as the
software and integrated circuits (IC) industries, R&D spending, and ven-
ture capital investment and to attract technology talents.15 By 2010, R&D
spending is expected to reach 4 percent of Shenzhen’s GDP, and the
high-tech sector is expected to grow at an average rate of 20 percent over
the next few years (Asian Development Bank 2007). In the Tianjin
Economic–Technological Development Area, great emphasis has also
been placed on technology innovation. Within the zone, the government
has built major technology innovation platforms, such as an innovation
park, an R&D center, and industrialization bases.16
In addition, the SEZs are closely linked to domestic enterprises and
industrial clusters through supply chains or value chains. This connection
not only helps achieve economies of scale and business efficiency, but also
stimulates synergistic learning and enhances industrial competitiveness.
Innovative cultures. In addition to institutional flexibility, the composi-
tion of people in the SEZs also helped nurture innovation and entrepre-
neurship. Because most SEZs were built in new areas or suburbs of cities
and were open to all qualified workers, they have attracted a large number
of immigrants from across the country and, recently, from overseas, who
hope for better jobs and new opportunities. Such a strongly motivated
migrant community tends to generate an innovative and entrepreneurial
culture. For example, in Shenzhen, migrants account for 83 percent of the
total population. Among its permanent citizens, 21 percent are under 16,
and 62 percent are between the ages of 17 and 44 (Asian Development
Bank 2007). Such a young and innovative culture makes Shenzhen one
of the most dynamic SEZs in China. Besides the many innovative policies
mentioned above, Shenzhen was the first city in China to set up a center
to monitor currency exchange rates, to privatize a portion of its state-
owned enterprises through stock-sharing plans, to permit the entry of
foreign banks, and, in 1990, to establish a stock exchange (Asian Devel -
opment Bank 2007). 
Clear objectives, benchmarks, and intense competition. In China, SEZs
were normally set up in batches—initially four—and then the number
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increased rapidly. Despite the large number of these zones, they all have
clear goals and targets in GDP growth, exports, employment, revenues,
FDI generation, and the like. These expectations put a great deal of pres-
sure and responsibility on the shoulders of the government. Meanwhile,
the hundreds of SEZs are highly competitive among themselves. Each
SEZ strives to distinguish itself in service, quality of infrastructure, and
appearance to attract new enterprises and reach the targeted development
goals. Such competition helps make them more efficient and competitive.
Location advantages. Most SEZs in China are located in the coastal
region or near major cities with a history or tradition of foreign trading
or business and thus are better linked to the international market. They
also have good access to major infrastructure, such as ports, airports, and
railways. The location advantage is especially obvious for the SEZs in the
Pearl River Delta region (close to Hong Kong, China) and the Min Delta
region (close to Taiwan, China). Hong Kong, China has provided capital,
logistical support, access to world markets, management know-how,
technology, and management skills. The Pearl River Delta region has
provided labor, land, and natural resources. It is this interaction that has
allowed the Greater Pearl River Delta region to emerge relatively
quickly as one of the world’s major manufacturing bases (Enright, Scott,
and Chung 2005).
It is worth noting that, despite the overall success of China’s SEZs, they have
great disparities in performance and speed of growth. Given the numerous
SEZs, a broad assessment is difficult, but a preliminary comparison among
the three initial SEZs in Guangdong Province could yield some interesting
lessons. Although all three were given the same privileged status at almost
the same time, Shenzhen has been growing much faster and is much more
innovative than the other two. This superiority could be attributed to many
factors, but one could be the capacity of an SEZ to identify its comparative
advantages and bottlenecks accurately and implement the right strategy to
remove problems as well as to build a conducive business environment.
While Shenzhen was quick in identifying its industrial position and
to build a good enabling environment, Zhuhai and Shantou seemed a
step behind. With the intense competition for FDI, the first-mover
advantage is always important. Zhuhai actually overbuilt its infrastruc-
ture beyond sustainable demand, and the symbolic relationship with
Macao, China has not blossomed (Yeung, Lee, and Kee 2009). Its over-
sized airport exhausted its initial capital and became a drag on its econ-
omy (Zhong et al. 2009). Shantou has reached average rates of economic
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growth, but at various times that growth has been stalled by scandals
traced to corruption, customs irregularities, smuggling, and the like. It
also suffers from poor social credit and trust. In addition, the urban and
zone management is not well planned, and there have been some insti-
tutional conflicts (Zhong et al. 2009).
In addition, although all SEZs enjoy a flexible policy environment,
Shenzhen seems to be more innovative in designing many probusiness
policies and institutions, perhaps because of its immigrant culture, where
investors feel more accepted and have a sense of ownership. In compari-
son, Zhuhai and Shantou are historic cities with strong local customs and
culture, as well as their own languages. Such an environment might some-
times deter foreign investors and innovative approaches. This could be an
exogenous factor for the performance gap among them, although it is
hard to prove.
Industrial Clusters in China: 
A Competitive Engine for the Local Economy
The advantages of industrial clusters have been well documented in dif-
ferent literatures. Since the seminal work of Alfred Marshall (Principles of
Economics 1920), three major advantages of industrial clusters have con-
ventionally been recognized: information spillovers, the specialization and
division of labor among enterprises, and the development of skilled labor
markets. Sonobe and Otsuka (2006) further defined them into two: first,
the development of markets, which facilitates the transactions of parts,
final goods, and skilled workers among parts suppliers, assemblers, and
merchants; and second, the promotion of innovation through attracting
useful human resources. 
In general, the colocation of numerous firms can generate substantial
employment and achieve significant benefits through economies of scale.
Clusters also enhance industrial competitiveness through product special-
ization and improve the collective efficiency through business value
chains and lowered transaction costs. In addition, clustered firms also fos-
ter a high degree of networking and interconnections that encourage
knowledge and technology spillovers, thus stimulating productivity and
innovation. Such enterprises can acquire a self-sustaining dynamic arising
from a resilient comparative advantage in a specific range of products and
services. Furthermore, innovative clusters are able to diversify and transi-
tion to a fresh line of products if demand for the existing product mix
declines (Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Yamashita 2008).
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Without a doubt, one of the reasons for China’s spectacular industrial
dynamics in the past decades is the agglomeration of specialized enter-
prises that sprang up since the reforms in extremely varied forms and
deeply affected the development of certain regions (Ganne and Lecler
2009). These agglomerations of enterprises make up an important part of
the competitive power of the country, especially in the traditional indus-
tries, although some of them are also operating or are gradually upgrad-
ing into technology-intensive sectors. They are an important driver of
China’s rapid export-led growth. 
Given the large magnitude of industrial clusters in China, it is virtually
impossible to examine all of them. Here we intend to give a brief overview
of their formation, success factors, challenges, and lessons learned through
several case studies. 
A Brief Overview of China’s Industrial Clusters
As in many other countries, most of the industrial clusters in China have
emerged spontaneously, but government (especially local governments)
has given all kinds of support to their development process.17 These clus-
ters operate mainly in the labor-intensive manufacturing sectors, that is,
at the lower end of the global value chain. In recent years, some high-end
clusters have also grown out of SEZs, such as those in Beijing, Shanghai,
and Shenzhen, whose success is inseparable from the success of the SEZs
studied above. Such clusters, however, are not within the scope of this
volume. 
The majority of the industrial clusters in China are concentrated in
the coastal region, especially in Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, and
Jiangsu provinces. At the beginning of the 21st century, a quarter of
the 404 administrative towns in the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong
made up some 100 clusters of specialized activity. The province of
Zhejiang, for example, possesses more than 300 clusters, which, in
terms of production capacity, might have entered the world’s top 10
in their sectors, respectively, with more than 100 others in second
position (Ganne and Lecler 2009); these clusters exist in parallel with
the hundreds of SEZs. Many reports have commented on China’s
export-oriented clusters:
Buyers from New York to Tokyo want to be able to buy 500,000 pairs of
socks all at once, or 300,000 neckties, 100,000 children’s jackets, or 50,000
size 36B bras. Increasingly, the places that best accommodate orders are
China’s giant new specialty cities. . . . Each was built to specialize in making
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just one thing, including some of the most pedestrian of goods: cigarette
lighters, badges, neckties, and fasteners. The clusters are one reason China’s
shipments of socks to the U.S. have soared from 6 million pairs in 2000 to
670 million pairs last year [2004]. (Wang 2009)
Because of the difficulty in obtaining data, it is hard to quantify the
overall contributions of industrial clusters to China’s economic develop-
ment, but some examples could provide us a bird’s-eye view. In 2003,
more than 20,000 companies in the footwear clusters in China produced
some 6 billion pairs of shoes of various kinds, of which more than 3.87
billion pairs with a total value of US$9.47 billion were exported. Sixty
percent of the shoes made in China entered the international market,
accounting for 25 percent of the total turnover of the shoe industry in the
world. Currently, only Wenzhou’s footwear products account for one-
quarter of China’s and one-eighth of the world’s total, with more than
300,000 employees.18 In the Dalang apparel cluster in Guangdong
Province, nearly 2,000 woolen firms with more than 100,000 workers
produce some 200 million sets of sweaters, which account for 30 percent
of the domestic market. In the Datang socks cluster in Zhejiang Province,
nearly 5,000 firms plus 1,600 shops employ about 90 percent of the
 residents of the town. Hangji, a town of 120 square kilometers and a pop-
ulation of 35,000 people in Jiangsu Province, produce 30 percent of the
world’s toothbrushes and 80 percent of China’s (Wang 2009). In 2007,
228 clusters in Guangdong, with a GDP of RMB 765 billion, accounted
for 25 percent of the total provincial GDP and about 8 percent of the
total employment (see table 1.5); these clusters have become the main
economic driver of the provincial economy. In the town of Xiqiao
(Guangdong), the textile cluster accounted for 60 percent of Xiqiao’s
total GDP, 30 percent of the textile fabrics market of Guangdong
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Table 1.5  Cluster Employment as a Share of Total Employment in Guangdong
Province, 2001–07
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Cluster 
employees 52.95 182.29 241.74 266.74 370.71 — 431.48
Total employees 4,058.63 4,134.37 4,395.93 4,681.89 5,022.97 5,250.09 5,402.65
Cluster 
employment (%) 1.30 4.41 5.50 5.70 7.38 — 7.99
Sources: Chapter 6 of this volume and Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2009. 
Note: — = no data available.
Province, 11 percent of the domestic market, and 6 percent of the global
market, employing about 43 percent of Xiqiao’s population.19
Although the total employment in the clusters in China as a whole is
hard to gauge, employment is likely to be much higher in clusters than in
the SEZs, because most of the clusters are in labor-intensive sectors. 
Cluster Formation 
Each cluster has its own development trajectory and was formed in a differ-
ent way. By examining many of them, however, we may be able to identify
some common elements that led, in varying degrees, to their formation:
• The Open Door policy and reform. Almost all the clusters were formed
after China’s opening up. The reforms and Open Door policies pro-
vided a macroenvironment that allowed the private sector to flourish
and foreign investment to enter China. Before the reforms, all private
businesses were officially forbidden.
• Long history of production or business activities in a particular sector.
Business activity in a given sector preceded many Chinese clusters.
For example, the Wenzhou footwear cluster in Zhejiang Province has
a long history of shoemaking, dating back to 422 AD, and has built up
local production capacity over time;20 the textile industry in Xiqiao, in
Guangdong Province, first prospered during the Tang  Dynasty (618–907
AD) and peaked in the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 AD) and thus had
accumulated strong capacity in silk and yarn production before the
reform;21 and the toothbrush industry in Hangji, Jiangsu Province, dates
back to the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911 AD) (Wang 2009).
• Proximity to major local markets and infrastructure. In general, most of
these clusters are located in the coastal region, close to international
markets. In addition, they are also generally based in a town or major
city and are thus close to main roads, railways, highways, and ports. This
location advantage is especially important for export-oriented clusters. 
• Entrepreneurs with tacit knowledge and skills in production and trading.
The long tradition and knowledge passed down from generation to
generation through family and kinship ties have played important
roles in cluster formation. For example, in the Wenzhou shoemaking
cluster, it was those families with specialties in shoemaking that first
started the low-end business after the reforms and the economic
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opening up.22 In Xiqiao, almost no one from the first generation of
entrepreneurs had graduated from any textile university or college,
but most of them had had some processing experience in the past and
had acquired some professional knowledge and skills.23
• Foreign direct investment and the diaspora. Clusters benefiting from
FDI and the diaspora are concentrated mostly on the eastern side of
the Pearl River Delta region, in the Dongguan, Huizhou, and Shenzhen
areas. The economies of these clusters are driven mainly by overseas
Chinese and foreign firms because of the region’s proximity to Hong
Kong, China and the preferential development policies in 1980s.24
• Natural and human endowments. Such factors are especially important
for natural resource–based clusters, such as those in seafood process-
ing, fruits, stone carving, aquaculture, ceramics, and furniture, among
others, in Guangdong Province. The abundant low-cost but relatively
educated labor force is also an important resource that the clusters can
leverage. 
• Market pull. When China was first opened up, there was a huge shortage
of almost everything as a result of the centrally planned economy. These
desperate market needs provided a powerful reason for the existence of
the numerous clusters that sprang up in a short period of time.
• Government facilitation and industrial transfer. In recent years, because
of rising costs, limited land, and tough environmental requirements,
many coastal clusters have begun to move inland; some clusters in the
middle and western regions were formed through such transfer. In
some cases, the moves were highly influenced by deliberate govern-
ment policies; however, such transfers are still based largely on market
choice, where government plays mainly a facilitating role. An example
is the footwear manufacturing cluster in Chengdu, in Sichuan
Province, which was a result of cluster diffusion. By the end of 2005,
this region had agglomerated more than 1,200 footwear firms and
more than 3,000 related firms that produced more than 10 million
pairs of leather shoes per year, accounting for more than 50 percent of
the leather shoe exports in western China.25
Many of these factors can be found in the industrial clusters in other
developing countries, including some African countries as well (Zeng
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2008), but some factors appear to be unique to China, such as the long
history of production in many small towns, industrial transfer, and the like.
How the Clusters Succeeded and Took Off 
Clusters survive and succeed mainly because they are able to increase
the diversity and sophistication of their business activities to achieve
greater productivity and efficiency. In an export-led growth model,
this ability is especially important. Besides the well-known low-cost
labor factor, many other elements have contributed to the success of
Chinese industrial clusters. These include, among others, efficiency
gains and lowered entry barriers through business value chains, pro-
duction specialization, and division of labor; effective local govern-
ment support; knowledge, technology, and skill spillovers through
interfirm links, including those with state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and foreign firms; entrepreneurial spirit and social networks; innova-
tion and technology support from knowledge and public institutions;
and support from industrial associations. 
Efficiency gains and lowered entry barriers. In most Chinese clusters,
many firms operate in different manufacturing segments as well as in
related services, thus forming well-functioning value chains and produc-
tion networks with efficient division of labor. For example, the Datang
socks cluster in Zhejiang Province comprises 2,453 socks firms, 550 raw
material firms, 400 raw material dealers, 312 hemstitching factories, 5
printing and dyeing plants, 305 packing factories, 208 mechanical fittings
suppliers, 635 sock dealers, and 103 shipment service firms. In addition,
Datang Light Fabric and Sock City has 1,600 shops (Wang 2009). In the
Wenzhou footwear case, more than 4,000 firms operate in supply, produc-
tion, sales, and service networks. Because the production process is techni-
cally divisible, each small and medium enterprise (SME) tends to cover an
individual phase of production and is connected by specialized transaction
networks to coordinate interfirm cooperation.26 Such value chains and
production specialization reduce operating costs and greatly enhance the
productivity and efficiency of all the business activities in the clusters.
In addition, research on the Wenzhou cases also reveals that clustering
deepens the division of labor and specialization and helps lower the tech-
nological and capital barriers for new entrants, allowing a large number of
small entrepreneurial firms to enter the industry by focusing on a nar-
rowly defined stage of production. Such specialization requires much less
fixed investment. Meanwhile, small firms in clusters are able to obtain
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trade credits from upstream enterprises (Huang, Zhang, and Zhu 2008).
All these factors greatly enhance the survivability of small firms. 
Effective local government support. The success of Chinese industrial
clusters is inseparable from local governments’ strong support and nurtur-
ing. These supports often come during the middle or later stages when the
clusters have demonstrated their potential. Although the support is mul-
tifaceted, it tends to focus primarily on building a good business environ-
ment and on the “market failure” or “externality” areas: 
• Infrastructure building. Besides basic infrastructure such as roads,  water,
electricity, and telephone lines, to which the Chinese government has
given high priority, local governments have tried to build a specialized
market or industrial park to facilitate business activities. Such a mar-
ket brings suppliers, producers, sellers, and buyers together and helps
build the forward and backward linkages, thus greatly facilitating the
scaling-up of the clusters. In Xiqiao, to regulate the local market and
stimulate mass production and sales, the city government set up the
South Textile Market in 1985 to replace the original informal mar-
ket.27 In Wenzhou, the municipal government invested RMB 557 mil-
lion to build an industrial zone—the “Chinese Shoe Capital”—in
Shuangyu Town Lu Cheng City, a large industrial complex integrating
technological training, trading, testing, production, information serv-
ices, and shoe-related cultural exhibitions.28 In the Puyuan cashmere
sweater cluster in Zhejiang Province, the township government raised
RMB 580,000 from different sources and built a “cashmere sweater
marketplace” (comprising more than 4,300 square meters of building
space and more than 50 rooms). Meanwhile, it formed a shareholding
company and invested RMB 40 million in building a logistics business
center, loading dock, warehouse, and parking lot. All these greatly
enhanced the cluster’s business activities (Ruan, Jianqing, and Zhang
2008). Such examples can be found in many Chinese clusters. 
• Regulations, quality assurance, and standards setting. To facilitate busi-
ness generation and help clusters operate normally and maintain
dynamic growth, local governments often try to improve services and
the regulatory environment. In addition, they enact specific regula-
tions, especially those related to investment type, product quality, and
standards, to ensure that the products made in the clusters have a mar-
ket future. This practice is especially common in the Wenzhou shoe
cluster. In the 1980s, Wenzhou shoes experienced a rapid expansion
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of quantity without quality; as a result, they offered low prices but
suffered from a bad reputation. To correct this problem, the munici-
pal government issued strict regulations and quality standards for
Wenzhou shoes and helped firms develop branded products.29 Such
a measure actually saved the cluster. In Guangdong in recent years,
some cities set standards for investment quality to ensure efficiency,
including better use of land and less pollution, for example.30 In the
Puyuan textile cluster in Zhejiang Province, when market competi-
tion forced firms to use cheap materials at the expense of quality in the
late 1990s, the Puyuan township government issued two decrees: the
Quality Control and Inspection System in the Cashmere Marketplace
in Puyuan, Tongxiang, and the Product Quality Guarantee Stipulation
in Cashmere Sweater Marketplaces. These regulations were strictly
enforced by the Administrative Committee of Puyuan Marketplace
and ensured the quality of the products. 
• Technology, skills, and innovation support. Given the importance of
innovation and technology learning for a cluster’s survival, local gov-
ernments are increasingly emphasizing technology innovation and
upgrading. Because imitation within a cluster is easy, firms hesitate to
invest in innovation and technology upgrading, and thus government
intervention can be justified. In Guangdong since 2000, the provin-
cial government has invested RMB 300,000 in each specialized town,
with matching funds from local governments, to build a public tech-
nology innovation center (TIC) to support the clusters’ innovation
and technology activities. In the case of Xiqiao, the township govern-
ment first set up the Fabrics Sample Manufacturing Corporation in
1998 to develop new fabrics, new dyeing processes, and new printing
formulas. After initial success, and with the support of provincial and
municipal governments, in 2000 the town of Xiqiao established the
Southern Technology Innovation Center to provide technology and
innovation services to enterprises at below-market prices. With the
support of the Textile Industry Association of China and R&D insti-
tutes, the Xiqiao TIC was able to provide new products and innovation
services, such as information and technology consulting; intellectual
property rights (IPR) protection; and professional training, testing, and
certification. It has since become a platform for cooperation among
government, industry, and research institutes and a facilitator for
enterprise innovation.31 A comparison of the economic performance
of the Xiqiao cluster before and after the establishment of the TIC
reveals quite positive results (see table 1.6). In Wenzhou, the local
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Table 1.6  Performance of the Xiqiao Cluster Before and After the Establishment of the Technology Innovation Center, 1998 and 2003
Comparison of two years
1998 2003
Firm size by 
number of 
employees
Number 
of firms
Number 
employed
Output 
(US$ millions)
R&D 
(US$ thousands)
Number 
of patents
Number 
of firms
Number 
employed
Output 
(US$ millions)
R&D 
(US$ thousands)
Number 
of patents
<10 795 7,055 44.6 0 0 465 3,715 31.9 0 0
10–50 583 26,235 130.1 0 0 534 25,299 94.5 0 0
51–100 205 19,475 106.1 0 0 359 33,387 323.2 2,256.7 22
>100 7 1,094 61.5 230 0 22 6,445 339.2 3,648.2 166
Total 1,590 53,859 342.3 230 0 1,380 68,846 788.8 5,904.9 188
Firm average 32.28 0.21 0.14 0 49.86 0.58 4.28 0.14
Source: See chapter 6 of this volume. 
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government encourages entrepreneurs to set up learning institutions;
meanwhile, it invited the shoe manufacturing businesses in Italy to set
up a footwear design center in Wenzhou to help the cluster gain inno-
vation capacity. In addition, it has set up or introduced professional
shoe leather majors in local colleges and schools to foster professional
talent for the footwear industry.32
• Preferential policies and financial support. To attract qualified enter-
prises to the clusters, local governments often offer certain incentives,
including desirable land, tax reduction or exemption, and access to
credits and loans. A series of preferential policies from Foshan and
Nanhai (Guangdong Province) include tax exemption for the first two
years and a lower tax rate of 15 percent in the following three years
for high-tech firms. The town of Xiqiao has also set up an award to
encourage individuals to bring qualified enterprises into the cluster.
Meanwhile, to help SMEs update their equipment, the local govern-
ment provides a financing guarantee to assist them in gaining bank
loans.33 In the Puyuan sweater cluster, the local government set up an
industrial park and granted preferential land, tax, and credit policies to
attract enterprises with famous brands to locate in the cluster (Ruan
and Zhang 2008). 
Knowledge, technology, and skill spillovers through interfirm linkages.
In clusters, the colocation of numerous firms provides good opportuni-
ties for firms to build knowledge networks and forward and backward
linkages, which are crucial for technology learning and collective effi-
ciency. Many firms obtained help from their upstream enterprises. In
China, many clusters also benefited from state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and FDI, which provided important initial technology and a cru-
cial impetus for the clusters’ development. For example, during the
1980s, with the market-oriented economic reforms, many SOEs were
privatized or closed down. Many skilled laborers from the original SOEs
were laid off, and they either set up their own businesses or provided
their know-how to private enterprises. They also helped diffuse tech-
nologies and skills to more workers through training or coaching, as was
certainly the case in the Xiqiao textile cluster. In the Wenzhou footwear
cluster, the original SOE—Dongfanghong Leather Footwear Factory—
gave rise to three major enterprises: Jierde Footwear Co., Ltd.; China
Aolun Shoes Co., Ltd., and Wenzhou Dashun Footwear Machinery
Manufacturing Co., Ltd., as well as many smaller enterprises. Later on,
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there were many spin-offs from these enterprises as well, such as the
famous Aokang and Hongqingting groups (Huang, Zhang, and Zhu 2008).
In addition, many clusters in the coastal region, especially those in the
Pearl River Delta, were driven by FDI, especially from the diaspora in
Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; and Taiwan, China. Such examples
include clusters in Huizhou and in Dongguan, which was regarded as a
major base. Among these clusters, many foreign and domestic personal
computer–related companies such as Acer, Compaq, Founder, IBM,
Legend, and many other diaspora-invested firms have established plants
or parts processing.34 The Kunshan IT cluster in Jiangsu Province was sup-
ported mainly by investors from Taiwan, China. The volume of invest-
ment from Taiwan, China in Kunshan accounts for nearly one-quarter of
its investment in Jiangsu Province and one-tenth of its investment in the
whole country (Lai, Chiu, and Leu 2005). These foreign and diaspora
investments have become important sources of technology and skills. 
Entrepreneurial spirit and the social network. Many of the regions or
cities that host clusters had a long history of business and industry pre-
dating the formation of the clusters. Although the planned economy
interrupted the industrialization process of China, the spirit of entrepre-
neurship had lived on in the regions. Once the macroenvironment
opened up, these hidden entrepreneurial talents were rapidly released.
Such a spirit was coupled with a great drive for wealth after decades of
deprivation. The Wenzhou people are especially well known for their
willingness to take risks and to learn through trial and error, which pro-
vided an essential ingredient to their success. 
In addition, as in many other countries, the clusters in China depend
heavily on information networks and social capital for their operation.
Because many transactions involve a number of different parties in a
cluster, the use of formal contracts for each transaction could lead to pro-
hibitive transaction costs, especially where a formal judicial system is
incomplete or lacking. As a result, most SMEs prefer oral agreements
(Ruan and Zhang 2008). Although the agreements are not legally bind-
ing, SMEs tend not to break them because of fierce market competition
and informal enforcement mechanisms, such as community ties, reputa-
tion, opportunity cost of losing business, and so forth. This social trust has
significantly reduced transaction costs, and many firms actually operate
on funds borrowed from friends and relatives or on trade credits provided
by upstream or downstream enterprises. Such a model is quite prevalent
in many Chinese clusters, especially in Wenzhou. 
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Innovation and technology support from knowledge and public
 institutions. In addition to government support, institutions such as uni-
versities and research institutes also provide support for innovation and
technology upgrading in clusters. In the case of Wenzhou, Wenzhou
University has played an important role in supporting technology innova-
tion in the footwear and other clusters. In the shoemaking sector, it has
put a great effort into R&D and innovations in leather production and
cooperated with several firms in setting up the Leather Production
Technology Research Center of Wenzhou in 2004. The center has focused
on “green” product development, clean leather production technology,
and other high-tech research on leather production. In 2006, the center
became the Key Leather Project Laboratory of Zhejiang Province and
established the Service Platform for Leather Production Innovation of
Zhejiang. In cooperation with Wenzhou University, the laboratory has
made significant contributions to producing and testing leather chemi-
cals and to genuine-leather processing technology and performance tests,
as well as to environmental management and pollutant treatment.35 The
Dongguan IT cluster has also significantly benefited from its association
with Shanghai Jiaotong University, Hong Kong Polytechnic University,
and Northeast University, which have established research institutes in
Dongguan (Lai, Chiu, and Leu 2005). 
Support from industrial associations and other intermediary
 organizations. The industrial associations and other intermediary serv-
ice organizations are relatively recent phenomena in China; however,
many of them, especially those in industrial clusters, have begun to play
important roles. In Wenzhou, the shoemaking firms founded the
Wenzhou Lucheng Association of the Shoe Industry in 1991—the first
shoemakers’ association in China. It currently has 1,138 members and 26
branches. It has made important contributions to the cluster through a
number of activities: connecting the local authority and the firms, intro-
ducing new technologies and helping improve shoe quality, helping firms
enter and expand in the domestic and overseas markets through market-
ing and branding services, providing information services, promoting
trade, and providing training in partnership with national footwear insti-
tutions and Beijing Leather College. Such activities have provided consid-
erable assistance to the shoe industry in its effort to upgrade.36 In the
Yunhe wood toy cluster in Zhejiang, the Toy Industry Association has
played an important role in providing various services, and helped set up
the Yunhe Wood Toy Productivity Center, Testing Center, Information
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Center, and Research Institute, which have been in operation since 1995
(Zheng and Sheng 2006). These institutions are crucial for the cluster’s
technology innovation and learning. Such examples can be found in many
other clusters as well. 
Reflections on the Experiences of China’s SEZs 
and Industrial Clusters
So far, we have examined the success factors behind China’s special eco-
nomic zones and industrial clusters. Those factors are not necessarily all
that have contributed to their success, but they do capture some of the
key elements that might be useful to other developing countries that wish
to learn from China’s industrial experiences. Among the various possibil-
ities, we will highlight several essential points:
• Strong commitment from the top leadership, and high-level pragmatism,
flexibility, and autonomy. The unswerving determination of the top lead-
ers provided the solid assurance and policy stability needed for the
 initial SEZs, which then served as the cradle of China’s economic
reforms and Open Door policy. Such assurance was a key factor for
investors, especially for foreign investors, in an otherwise very rigid
political, legal, and regulatory environment (Zheng 2009). The
unprecedented autonomy and pragmatism enjoyed by the SEZs cre-
ated a dynamic entrepreneurial and innovative business climate. 
• A gradualist approach toward reform. Economic liberalization is a
means of promoting economic development, not an end in itself. How
to proceed effectively with economic liberalization is a question that
depends heavily on the situation in a particular economy. The Chinese
experience so far seems to suggest, among other things, that a prag-
matic, step-by-step approach works better than an attempt to change
everything overnight. The key is to minimize avoidable economic,
social, and political costs. Using SEZs as laboratories, policy makers
have been able to identify problems, sort out issues, develop measures,
and test and evaluate results (Ge 1999). 
• Proper role of the government. As Bhagwati (2004, 54) put it in dis-
cussing growth, “Growth was not a passive, trickle-down strategy for
helping the poor. It was an active, pull-up strategy instead. It required
a government that would energetically take steps to accelerate growth
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through a variety of policies including building infrastructure such as
roads and ports and attracting foreign funds.” In the success of the Chi-
nese SEZs and clusters, government at various levels has played a very
important role but one limited mostly to addressing market failures
and externalities, that is, the public goods and quasi-public goods
areas. These range from building better infrastructure—roads, water,
electricity, gas, telephone, and so forth—to establishing special market-
places, technology innovation platforms, R&D centers, and the like. In
addition, the government has tried to use the special powers given to
the SEZs to create an efficient regulatory system and a conducive busi-
ness environment, which make the SEZs attractive to investors. Such
interventions are quite necessary and also very appropriate. As Justin
Lin says, “In addition to an effective market mechanism, the government
should play an active, facilitating role in the industrial diversification
and upgrading process and in the improvement of infrastructure”
(2010, 3). Of course, these SEZs still have more to do in improving the
business environment to maintain their competitive edge.
• FDIs and the diaspora. Given the severe lack of capital and technologies
during the initial stages of China’s opening, FDI and assistance from the
diaspora were desperately needed. China successfully attracted FDI
through its SEZs and clusters, especially those in the coastal region, and
they became important sources of capital, skills, technologies, and mod-
ern management techniques. FDI also fostered many spin-offs in China.
Of course, some have argued that the incentives China gave to foreign
investors—such as lower tax rates—were too generous. While that ques-
tion is still debatable, one thing is certain: FDI policies need to be
adjusted according to the stage of development.
• Public-private partnership approach. In developing the SEZs and sup-
porting industrial clusters, the government does not necessarily
finance everything with its own resources, even in public infrastruc-
ture. Instead, government at all levels has adopted many innovative
approaches, such as public-private partnerships (PPPs), to address
capital constraints. For example, in the early stage of Shenzhen, joint
ventures and private developers from Hong Kong, helped develop
some basic infrastructure (Yeung, Lee, and Kee 2009). In the Puyuan
sweater cluster in Zhejiang, the local government formed a sharehold-
ing company with 27 private logistics and transport firms to build the
cluster’s logistics center (Ruan and Zhang 2008). In the technology
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innovation center in Guangdong, public institutions and private firms
joined forces to conduct R&D. 
• Technology innovation, adaptation, and learning. Realizing the impor-
tance of technology and innovation for the success and competitiveness
of the SEZs, the government has increasingly emphasized R&D and
innovation by increasing investment, building R&D infrastructure, and
offering special incentives to attract high-tech firms. The government
has also set up venture financing mechanisms such as the OTC (over-
the-counter) in Zhongguncun (Beijing) and ChiNext in Shenzhen—a
 Nasdaq-style stock exchange for new ventures that opened in 2009. In
addition, the government has also designed policies to attract high-
quality scientists and engineers. In many clusters, the local government
or industrial associations offer all kinds of technical and managerial
training to enhance workers’ skills. One issue linked with R&D spend-
ing is the evaluation and monitoring system, which appears weak in
China. Policy makers need to pay close attention to this area; other-
wise, huge government-driven efforts might not yield the expected
results. To become a truly innovative nation, China needs to build
stronger indigenous innovation capacity for the long run. 
• Clear goals and vigorous benchmarking, monitoring, and competition.
Despite the large number of SEZs in China, they all have clear goals
and development plans that stipulate the expected targets for GDP
growth, employment, exports, and FDI, as well as tax revenues and
the like. The central government checks these targets almost every
year. In addition, SEZs compete fiercely on performance. Such a com-
petition puts great responsibility and accountability on the govern-
ment officials in charge of SEZs. Although the clusters do not normally
have such clear development plans, the competition over GDP growth
is also quite intense, and local governments are pressed to be diligent.
Moreover, with the rapid economic growth and increasing environ-
mental challenges of recent years, greater emphasis is now placed on
“green” and social development. 
The world development community should pay close attention to the
lessons provided by China’s experience. It offers many useful ideas and
approaches for other developing countries, which can learn from them or
even replicate them. However, there is “no one size fits all” approach. All
the experiences and lessons need to be adapted to local situations. That is
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how China learned from Western countries and succeeded, and the same
should be true for every other country as well. 
Challenges to the Sustainable Development of 
China’s SEZs and Industrial Clusters
Despite the great success of China’s special economic zones and industrial
clusters, they also face many challenges to sustaining their success, espe-
cially given the current global crisis. Although challenges to the various
SEZs and clusters might differ in degree, those discussed below pose the
major threat to their continued success. 
Moving up the Global Value Chain
Although some high-tech sectors have begun to emerge in SEZs and clus-
ters, in general China still competes mainly on low-cost manufacturing,
based on cheap labor and low-tech labor-intensive sectors, that is, at the
low end of the global value chain. That position is especially true for the
hundreds of clusters. Due to the low technology capacity and the diffi-
culty in protecting intellectual property rights in clusters, thousands of
firms compete fiercely on price—a so-called “racing to the bottom”
(Wang 2009); such cut-throat competition sometimes pushes firms to
resort to illegal means, such as using fake or cheap materials, pirating, and
so forth. In the long run, such a situation will adversely affect the future
development of these clusters and could even cause them to simply
wither away. Although in the special economic zones, the situation in gen-
eral is better, many SEZs and firms are also seriously constrained by lim-
ited innovation capacity and a shortage of skills. Because economic
competitiveness increasingly hinges on knowledge, technology, and inno-
vation, how to move China’s industries to the high value–added sectors
(including services) is a real challenge. 
The Sustainability of Export-Led Growth
China’s industrialization is driven mainly by an extraordinary ability to
export. In 2009, China replaced the United States as the largest trading
nation. The heavy export orientation of China’s economy, however, also
increases its vulnerability to global market shocks. During the current cri-
sis, the clusters in the Pearl River Delta region, for example, which rely
mostly on exports, were particularly hit hard (Yeung, Lee, and Kee 2009).
In the first nine months of 2008, some 50,000 out of 1 million industrial
enterprises in Guangdong Province had collapsed, and its 30 million
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migrant workers were inevitably affected (Straits Times 2008). Meanwhile,
such a growth model often makes China a target of antidumping and
trade lawsuits. Global trade frictions will definitely increase in the future,
with the increasing global protectionism induced by the economic crisis.
All these issues raise questions about the sustainability of the export-led
strategy.
Environmental and Resource Constraints 
Related to China’s growth model based on low technology and labor- and
resource-intensive manufacturing, many SEZs and clusters face serious
environmental and resource challenges. With the increasing emphasis on
climate change problems, two aspects related to environmental chal-
lenges call for particular attention: one is the serious water, air, and land
pollution and the huge amount of industrial waste; the other is the
increasingly tough eco-standards set by industrial countries for products
exported from developing countries. These include RoHS (Restriction of
the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances), WEEE (Waste Electrical and
Electronic Equipment), and EuP (energy-using products). These chal-
lenges are even more severe for clusters, where the technology capacity is
much weaker, than for most SEZs. 
In addition, with the rapid industrial expansion, land, skilled labor, and
energy resources such as oil, water, and electricity have all become more
expensive and limited. In some cities, virtually no more land is available
for heavily resource-based manufacturing activities, which require a lot of
physical space. In many SEZs, the land cost now is several times higher
than it was when they were established. These problems have forced
some firms to move inland or abroad; however, that is only a short-term
solution. In the long run, the SEZs and clusters will need to focus more
on growth quality than on quantity. 
Institutional Challenges
China’s success began with institutional reforms within the comprehen-
sive SEZs, but now, with the market economy well established across the
country, further development will require even better and more efficient
institutions demanded by a well-functioning market economy. Such insti-
tutions include, among others, a sound regulatory and legal system,
including a well-functioning IPR regime; a participatory monitoring and
supervisory system; a good evaluation mechanism, especially for public
spending; and a sound social safety net. Meanwhile, under the balanced
national development strategy, linking the further development of SEZs
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more closely to the non-SEZ part of a city and the rural area will be an
important but difficult task. 
Lagging Social Development
While the special economic zones and clusters have achieved obvious
economic success, they are somewhat lagging behind in providing the
commensurate social services. Although some SEZs and clusters enjoy a
good living environment, many of them do not have sufficient health and
education services or public transportation to accommodate their increas-
ing population. Some SEZs are at a distance from their host cities, like an
“isolated island” with few cultural and leisure activities,37 and they worry
that once they lose more of their “special” status and preferential treat-
ment, they might not be able to attract more talent and investment. 
Challenges specific to SEZs or clusters. In addition to the challenges
common to special economic zones and industrial clusters, some are spe-
cific to one or the other. For SEZs, such challenges include 
• The diminishing of the preferential policies and privileged status. Whereas
the SEZs were “special” by virtue of the exclusive policies and other
privileges extended to them in the early years, later on those preferen-
tial policies had spread to many other parts of China. After China’s
WTO accession in 1992, these advantages were further diluted. How
they can continue to attract investment, especially FDI, in an environ-
ment of enhanced competition could be a challenge for them. 
• The homogeneity problem. Many of the SEZs or industrial parks now
competing in the same or similar sectors lack conspicuous sector or
product differentiation. While a reasonable level of competition is
good for innovation and growth, too much competition across
the country might lead to a waste of public resources, because almost
all the zones or parks are government sponsored. It would be more
desirable to concentrate the same, similar, or closely related sectors in
a few locations where they have the best comparative advantages. 
For clusters, some specific challenges include
• Fragmentation and lack of horizontal linkages. Many of the Chinese
clusters were developed on the model of “one product per village and
one sector per town.” This approach was very useful in the initial stages
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for fully mobilizing a village’s or town’s resources based on their com-
parative advantages. Once they were successful, however, they found
themselves lacking further competitive strength because of small
scale, limited human and technology resources, and high-level frag-
mentation. Towns were actually competing with other towns in the
same province or other provinces.38 How to integrate these similar
sectors throughout a city, a province, or a region into a larger value
chain so that they can achieve greater economies of scale and have a
deeper capacity for innovation is a real question. In addition, research
has found that in a cluster, the vertical links are strong, but the hori-
zontal links among similar firms are weak (Shi and Ganne 2009). This
weakness will adversely affect their collective efficiency and innova-
tion ability in the long run. 
• Lack of skilled technical and managerial personnel. In most clusters, the
percentage of employees with a college degree or graduate experience
is quite low, with the majority having only a senior secondary educa-
tion or below. Because of the low-end nature of these clusters (many of
them are family based), they have difficulty attracting skilled talent and
are thus in a disadvantageous position compared to the SEZs (although
they too have certain shortages of high-end R&D personnel). This
shortcoming constrains their future growth and ability to upgrade. 
Policy Implications
Given these major challenges, China will need to adjust its current
development strategy and move toward a more competitive and sustain-
able development paradigm. How to achieve this goal is a very complex
issue, and detailed policy recommendations are not given here, but some
general policy directions that might be useful in overcoming the chal-
lenges that China’s special economic zones and industrial clusters face
are provided. 
Gradually Moving toward a More Knowledge- 
and Technology-Based Development Model
As knowledge and technology are increasingly becoming the drivers for
growth and competitiveness and because the cost of resources and labor is
rising, along with trade protectionism, China cannot continue the old
low-cost labor and factor-based growth model in the long run. Meanwhile,
the challenges of climate change and tough eco-standards make such a
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strategy shift even more necessary. To maintain their competitive edge,
China’s special economic zones and industrial clusters need to be more
innovative and technology intensive. Of course, given the vast pool of labor,
such a shift will take time and cannot be completed hastily. 
Putting More Emphasis on Domestic Markets and 
Consumption as a Source of Growth
While the export-led growth has been very successful for China, the eco-
nomic crisis and increasing trade friction might make China consider
whether it should continue to rely on exports as the main engine for
growth. After decades of growth, the domestic market is becoming bigger
and more sophisticated, with a middle class rapidly emerging. Under such
circumstances, China might be able to gradually increase the share of
domestic consumption as a source of growth. This strategy will need a
comprehensive approach. Enterprises will need to make more products
that cater to domestic consumers, for example, and the government will
need to strengthen social security and the social safety net. Meanwhile,
opening up and strengthening the service sectors—such as education,
health, and rural services—will stimulate consumption significantly. This
idea is consistent with China’s current balanced national development
strategy and will also help move the country toward a more service-based
economy.
Upgrading the SEZs and Industrial Clusters through 
Technology Innovation and Learning
While China is gradually losing its low-cost labor advantages to other
countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam, it needs to upgrade the cur-
rent SEZs and clusters through technology innovation, adaptation, and
diffusion as well as through skills training. For China to achieve such an
ambitious goal, it will have to take a comprehensive approach that will
involve but not be limited to the following:
• Strengthening intellectual property rights protection. Such protection is
important for spurring innovation and attracting high-end FDI, espe-
cially in R&D centers. Today, China has good regulations and laws
related to IPR protection but suffers from weak enforcement. 
• Providing the right incentives or pressures for enterprise-led innovation.
In addition to fiscal incentives, certain instruments such as govern-
ment procurement and standards, as well as SOE governance reform
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and reduction of government ownership through dividend collection
and secondary share offerings and the like, could be used (Zhang
et al. 2009). 
• Improving SME innovation capacity. This improvement could be achieved
through modernizing human resources management, providing more
skills training and vocational education, and establishing certain SME-
specific programs such as innovation vouchers39 and innovation broker-
ages.40 In clusters, because of the frequency of imitation and low entry
barriers, the core technologies and skills training have the characteristics
of public goods and strong externality. Governments, therefore, need to
support such activities, ideally through professional services organiza-
tions such as industrial associations. This effort again requires further
reform of the intermediary sectors (such as associations and chambers of
commerce) to encourage more private and public-private partnership
types of providers. In addition, to overcome the fragmentation problem,
government-supported technology innovation centers could be designed
as sector-based in a province to encourage cooperation among firms,
instead of township-based as is now the case. 
• Strengthening university-industry linkages. Reinforcing these connec-
tions will require policy instruments that encourage joint R&D
between universities and industry as well as better staff mobility
between these two sectors. Meanwhile, the higher education system
should be further reformed to be more responsive to market needs
(Dahlman, Zeng, and Wang 2007). 
• Strengthening the financial sector, especially the ecosystem of the venture
capital industry. Building up the financial sector would entail improv-
ing the corporate governance of venture capital firms, encouraging
institutional investors, and expanding the exit avenues for venture
capital investors, among other things (Zhang et al. 2009).
Implementing Strict Environmental Standards
Enforcing stronger standards will not only improve the environment and
increase the focus on quality of growth rather than on quantity, but also
force firms to invest more in environmental and energy-related innova-
tions. This measure, however, also needs to be implemented with public
assistance. Because many firms in the Chinese clusters or even in the SEZs
are operating in the low-tech and environment-polluting sectors, they are
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unable to comply with certain standards due to lack of innovation capac-
ity, but simply closing them down or moving them away may be not the
best solution. Because certain “green” technologies have characteristics of
public goods, government and public institutions may need to provide
R&D and technological support to enable these firms to upgrade. 
We can see, however, that some SEZs and industrial parks have already
begun to incorporate green facilities as part of the zone design, such as in
the Tianjin Binhai New Area, where a Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City is
being developed. The eco-city is envisioned as an “economically sustainable,
socially harmonious, environmentally friendly and resource-conserving”
city, which will become a “model eco and low carbon city replicable by
other cities in China.”41
Further Deepening Institutional Reforms
Because the SEZs are gradually losing their privileged status, it is impor-
tant for them to explore new ways of cooperation and integration within
a wider territorial and regional context. Meanwhile, they need to deepen
institutional reforms and create a better legal environment, a more effec-
tive monitoring and supervisory system, a more efficient administrative
and regulatory system, and a more conducive business environment over-
all. In addition, the government will need to withdraw from many func-
tions and let the market and the public-private partnerships play a bigger
role. Such a system will be more attractive and more sustainable and will
allow the SEZs to stay competitive. 
Conclusion
China has come a long way in a short time, and its rise is the most com-
pelling economic story of the 21st century. Although it still faces many
challenges and difficulties in sustaining its rapid growth, it has launched
itself on an irreversible growth path and is poised to become a global eco-
nomic powerhouse and a key economic and financial player. And in
today’s global crisis, China has become an important engine to drive the
world out of the downturn. 
While the “China model” offers very useful experiences and lessons for
other developing countries, everything has to be put into a local context;
there is no panacea for development. I hope this volume on China’s two
most important growth engines—special economic zones and industrial
clusters—will be useful to policy makers, development practitioners, and
researchers who are interested in learning from China’s experiences. 
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Table 1A.1   China’s State-Level High-Tech Industrial Development Zones
Eastern regiona Inland Chinab
Province and zone Province and zone
Beijing
• Zhongguancun
 Fujian
• Fuzhou
• Xiamen Torch
Guangdong
• Foshan
• Guangzhou
• Huizhou Zhongkai
• Shenzhen
• Zhongshan Torch
• Zhuhai
Hainan
• Hainan International (in Haikou)
Hebei
• Baoding
• Shijiazhuang
Jiangsu
• Changzhou
• Nanning
• Wuxi
• Suzhou
Shandong
• Ji’nan
• Qingdao
• Weifang
• Weihai
• Zibo
Shanghai
• Shanghai Zhangjiang
Tianjin
• Tianjin
Zhejiang
• Hangzhou
• Ningbo
Anhui 
• Hefei
Chongqing
• Chongqing
Gansu
• Lanzhou
Guangxi
• Guilin
• Nanning
Guizhou
• Guiyang
Heilongjiang
• Daqing
• Harbin
Henan
• Luoyang
• Zhengzhou
Hubei
• Wuhan East Lake
• Xiangfan
Hunan
• Changsha
• Zhuzhou
Inner Mongolia
• Baotou Rare-earth
Jiangxi
• Nanchang
Jilin
• Changchun
• Jilin
Liaoning
• Anshan
• Dalian
• Shenyang
Ningxia
None
(continued)
Annex A
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Table 1A.1  China’s State-Level High-Tech Industrial Development Zones (continued)
Eastern regiona Inland Chinab
Province and zone Province and zone
Qinghai
None
Shaanxi
• Baoji
• Xi’an
• Yangling Agriculture (in Xi’an)
Shanxi
• Taiyuan
Sichuan
• Chengdu
• Mianyang
Tibet
None
Xinjiang
• Urumqi
Yunnan
• Kunming
Source: China Knowledge Online 2009. 
a. There are 25 high-tech development zones in eastern China. 
b. There are 29 high-tech development zones in inland China.
Table 1B.1  China’s 15 Free Trade Zones
Province Free trade zone
Fujian Fuzhou
Xiangyu (in Xiamen)
Guangdong Futian (in Shenzhen)
Guangzhou
Shantou
Shatoujiao (in Shenzhen)
Yantian (in Shenzhen)
Zhuhai
Hainan Haikou
Jiangsu Zhangjiagang 
Liaoning Dalian 
Shandong Qingdao
Shanghai Waigaoqiao
Tianjin Tianjin
Zhejiang Ningbo
Sources: China Knowledge Online 2009; Zhong et al. 2009.
Annex B
Notes
1. The historical name Hong Kong refers to the period before July 1, 1997, when
the former British colony was restored to China; Hong Kong, China refers to
any time after that date.
2. The historical name Macao refers to the period before December 20, 1999,
when the former Portuguese colony was restored to China; Macao, China
refers to any time after that date.
3. The selection of the 14 coastal cities reflected the central government’s deter-
mination to expose a much greater area to change. From north to south, they
include Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong,
Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai.
4. There is a total of 54 HIDZs, but the Ningbo HIDZ was approved only in
January 2007.
5. Figures for Xiamen and Hainan are only for the first three quarters (see
Yeung, Lee, and Kee 2009).
6. See chapter 3 in this volume for the case of Tianjin.
7. “Hukou” is China’s residential registration system.
8. See chapter 3 in this volume for the case of Tianjin.
9. See chapter 2 in this volume for the case of Shenzhen.
10. See chapter 2 in this volume for the case of Shenzhen.
11. See chapter 2 in this volume for the case of Shenzhen.
12. See chapter 3 in this volume for the case of Tianjin.
13. See chapter 4 in this volume for the case of Kunshan.
14. See chapter 2 in this volume for the case of Shenzhen.
15. See chapter 2 in this volume for the case of Shenzhen.
16. See chapter 3 in this volume for the case of Tianjin.
17. In recent years, due to the success of clusters and pressures for cluster transfer,
local governments are using cluster policies more and more deliberately. 
18. See chapter 5 in this volume for the case of Wenzhou.
19. See chapter 6 in this volume for the case of Xiqiao.
20. See chapter 5 in this volume for the case of Wenzhou.
21. See chapter 6 in this volume for the case of Xiqiao.
22. See chapter 5 in this volume for the case of Wenzhou.
23. See chapter 6 in this volume for the case of Xiqiao.
24. See chapter 6 in this volume for the case of Xiqiao.
25. See chapter 6 in this volume for the case of Xiqiao.
26. See chapter 5 in this volume for the case of Wenzhou.
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27. See chapter 6 in this volume for the case of Xiqiao.
28. See chapter 5 in this volume for the case of Wenzhou.
29. See chapter 5 in this volume for the case of Wenzhou.
30. See chapter 6 in this volume for the case of Xiqiao.
31. See chapter 6 in this volume for the case of Xiqiao.
32. See chapter 5 in this volume for the case of Wenzhou.
33. See chapter 6 in this volume for the case of Xiqiao.
34. See chapter 6 in this volume for the case of Xiqiao.
35. See chapter 5 in this volume for the case of Wenzhou.
36. See chapter 5 in this volumefor the case of Wenzhou.
37. See chapter 3 in this volume for the case of Tianjin TEDA. 
38. Findings from a field visit to Guangdong by the author in December 2010. 
39. The government provides a small number of grants to SMEs that need technol-
ogy assistance; then SMEs find the relevant universities or research institutes to
help solve their technology difficulties. Such a program was imple mented in
the Netherlands.
40. The government sponsors qualified experts as brokers or agents to help
link the SMEs with relevant universities or research institutes to help dif-
fuse technologies from the research community to SMEs, such as the
TEFT (Technology Diffusion from Research Institutes to SMEs) program
in Norway.
41. It aims to achieve this vision by taking an integrated approach to planning a
new urban area in an environmentally sustainable manner. According to the
master plan, Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City (SSTEC) promotes integrating
land use and urban transport and balancing employment and housing supply.
SSTEC promotes the “use of clean/renewable energy and reuse/recycle of
resources through innovative technologies and environmentally friendly poli-
cies and investments across various sectors,” including water, energy, land, and
transport, among others. Global climate change and social equity issues are also
incorporated into the master plan by explicitly including greenhouse gas
reduction and affordable housing targets. The development work of phase one
of the project has begun and is expected to be completed between 2011 and
2013 (see Baeumler et al. 2009).
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Located in the Pearl River Delta, Shenzhen functions as a link and a
bridge between Hong Kong, China, and mainland China. The Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was the first such zone created during the
early period of modern China’s economic reforms. On August 6, 1980,
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress authorized an
area of 327.5 square kilometers to be designated as an experimental eco-
nomic zone. The consequent promulgation of the Economic Zone
Ordinance in Guangdong Province marked the formal founding of the
Shenzhen SEZ.
Shenzhen’s SEZ has been serving as China’s “window to the world”
and “an experimentation field” ever since the nation’s opening up. It is the
great passion, creativity, initiative, and diligence of Shenzhen’s people
that have enabled the city to take the lead in implementing a series of
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important reforms such as the selling out of state-land-use rights, the
stock-exchange pilot, the personnel system reform, and the minimizing of
administrative approval procedures. In 2007, Shenzhen was ranked first
in comprehensive municipal competitiveness among all the cities in
mainland China (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 2008). 
Shenzhen’s gross domestic product (GDP) reached RMB 780.65 bil-
lion1 in 2008, a 12.1 percent increase over the previous year. The city’s
total economic output is equivalent to a medium-sized province in China
and ranks fourth among major cities nationwide. Shenzhen has become
one of China’s most productive cities, with the highest per capita income
of RMB 89,814 in 2008 (rising from RMB 606 in 1979), and has topped
all China’s cities for the past 16 years in international trade; its interna-
tional container port has ranked fourth globally for 11 consecutive years.
Shenzhen has also developed into an important transport hub on
China’s southern coast and is considered an important economic base for
high-tech industries, financial services, exports, and maritime transport
services. In the coming years, the city will continue to play an experimen-
tal and modeling role in a number of aspects in China’s further institu-
tional reforms and its ever-wider opening to the world.
Background on the Shenzhen SEZ
Shenzhen, a traditional fishing village that has rich land resources and the
geographical advantage of bordering the well-developed economy of
Hong Kong, China, was chosen as China’s window to the outside world
and as the field of experimentation for the nation’s reform of its economic
system. One of the main reasons for the selection was that this formerly
remote fishing village had the least resistance to any new institutional
change. 
In the late 1970s, the Chinese government made the historically signif-
icant decision to open up and reform the old system. Within this frame-
work, establishing special economic zones was an important step. These
reform initiatives occurred, firstly, because the domestic economy was at
a standstill as a consequence of the 10-year long Cultural Revolution and,
secondly, because some economies, especially those in regions nearby,
were experiencing rapid growth resulting in sharp contrasts to the slow
pace of China’s growth and its low living standards. To change the situa-
tion and catch up with the development of the world, China chose a pol-
icy of institutional reform and opening up to the outside world.
Shenzhen’s Unique Geographic Location 
On the coast within a 45-minute drive from Hong Kong, China,
Shenzhen is the only mainland city bordering this well-developed, mod-
ern island city, which had been an international financial center, shipping
and regional trading center, and the world’s freest market. Shenzhen
enjoys a geographic advantage because it has long been the most impor-
tant channel between the mainland and Hong Kong, China, in commod-
ity circulation and factor imports. More important, Hong Kong, China, has
profoundly influenced Shenzhen in its efforts to establish a market-
oriented system.
Shenzhen has a total area of 1,985 square kilometers, with a long, nar-
row coastline of 230 kilometers. It has rich marine resources, an excellent
port, and open access to the gulf, all of which contribute to its superior
advantages for sea transport. The special economic zone is now an inte-
gral part of the city. Except for Hainan Province, Shenzhen is the largest
SEZ created in the early stages of reform in China. Its abundant land
resources provide potential for further industrial development.
Both the east and the west coastal zones of Shenzhen are also rich in
marine resources. Around the city, some  160 streams belong to the East
River and Pearl River water system, and 24 reservoirs have a total storage
capacity of 5.25 billion cubic meters. The Shenzhen reservoir, on the
city’s east side, has a storage capacity of more than 4 billion cubic meters
and serves as the main water source for the city and for Hong Kong,
China.
Openness and Reform 
For various reasons, after 1949, southern coastal provinces such as Fujian
and Guangdong (to which Shenzhen belongs) did not receive much
attention in development within the planned economic system. In the
late 1970s, the region had almost no state-owned industries and its pro-
duction still heavily depended on agriculture. Most of the area’s 31.41
million residents were engaged in fishing and farming before China’s
reforms, which began in 1978. Shenzhen’s GDP was only US$2.87 mil-
lion in 1978, and per capita GDP was only US$88.86 yearly; the popula-
tion in the city had low levels of education and living standards. Overall,
the society was equal but poor, and its social structure was simple, with
no severe conflicts involving different social and economic interests. In
this context, given the strong motivation for reform, there was little resist-
ance to the introduction of new economic institutions.
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Moreover, people in nearby Hong Kong2 and Macao,3 who shared
almost the same natural endowments, were enjoying very different living
conditions. This sharp contrast created strong incentives among
Shenzhen’s residents to improve their living standards through changing
the prevailing economic institutions and opening up their economy and
society to the outside world.
Development Achievements
After 29 years of development, Shenzhen has become one of China’s
most important high-tech research and development (R&D) and manu-
facturing bases. It is now the world’s fourth-largest container port, has the
fourth-largest airport in China, and draws the fourth-largest number of
tourists among Chinese cities.
Rapid Economic Growth and Industrialization
From 1980 to 2008, Shenzhen’s GDP increased from US$4 million to
US$114.47 billion, with an average annual growth rate of 26.9 percent. Per
capita income increased dramatically from US$122.43 to US$13,196.21.
In 1978, Shenzhen had only 174 factories, with a total industrial out-
put value of less than US$10.25 million. The city’s industrialization began
in 1980, when the SEZ was announced and implementation began.
Shenzhen’s industrialization process experienced several stages, with the
scale of its industry increasing from small to large, its products from rela-
tively lower value to higher-tech products, and its factor use from labor-
and land-intensive to technology intensive. The city has been emerging as
a new high-tech industry center.
From 1980 to 2007, the average annual growth rates of the three sec-
tors (agriculture, industry, and services) were 3.3 percent, 37.8 percent,
and 24.8 percent, respectively. Starting from a tiny industrial backwater
in 1979, Shenzhen’s industry has experienced three large leaps in value
of industrial output: the RMB 10 billion (US$1.46 billion) increase in just
nine years, the RMB 100 billion (US$14.64 billion) increase in the next
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Table 2.1  GDP and Per Capita GDP of Shenzhen, Selected Years, 1980–2008 
US $
GDP 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008
US$ billions 0.04 0.57 2.52 12.35 32.07 72.60 85.25 99.74 114.47
Per capita 122.43 705.13 1,279.18 2,866.57 4,809.38 8,915.10 10,183.28 11,678.15 13,169.21
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 2008, 2009.
seven years, and the RMB 200-billion (US$29.28 billion) increase in the
most recent five years. In 2008, Shenzhen’s gross industrial output value
grew another 12.4 percent and reached US$521.49 billion.
Since the 1990s, Shenzhen’s industrial growth has been the most
important driving force in its economic development, contributing half of
the growth in GDP. In 1994, industry’s contribution was 43.0 percent
compared to 11.8 percent in 1979; and since 1994, this number has never
been lower than 40 percent (table 2.2).
With rapid industrialization, the proportion of agricultural production
has been decreasing steadily. In 1980, tertiary industries were providing
mainly basic services. At that time, these basic services and simple assem-
bly industries formed the major part of the economy. Thirty years later,
the percentage contribution of the three sectors had changed to 0.1, 48.9,
and 51.0 (table 2.3), with secondary and high-tech service industries hav-
ing become the main sources of economic growth.
Meanwhile, the employment structure has also changed drastically. By
the end of 2007, total employment amounted to 7.7 million: some 7,000
in primary industries, about 4 million (roughly 54 percent) in secondary
industries, and about 3 million (roughly 46 percent) in tertiary industries.
Foreign trade. After 30 years of economic reform and opening up,
Shenzhen has developed an export-oriented economy. From 1979 to
2007, total trade volume increased from US$17 billion to US$287.5 bil-
lion. Even in the face of the global financial crisis in 2008, total imports
and exports of Shenzhen still grew by 4.3 percent and totaled US$299.95
billion, with exports of US$179.7 billion (see figure 2.1). Since 2007,
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Table 2.2  Contribution of Industry to GDP Growth in Shenzhen, 1979–2008
Year
Industrial added 
value (US$ millions)
Industrial 
growth rate (%)
Contribution to GDP
GDP proportion 
accounted for (%)
Contribution to 
GDP growth (%)
1979 3.37 32.45 11.80 —
1980 5.43 34.90 13.80 6.46
1985 149.71 41.39 26.20 61.92
1990 945.60 29.28 37.60 58.90
1995 4,942.08 26.08 40.01 44.61
2000 14,116.57 31.34 44.01 61.06
2005 36,419.21 24.41 50.16 63.35
2008 53,054.55 12.40 46.40 —
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 2008, 2009. 
Note: — = not available.
Shenzhen has ranked first in total trade value among all cities in mainland
China for more than 10 years. 
Foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has made a
tremendous contribution to Shenzhen’s industrialization. When the
Shenzhen SEZ was established in 1980, FDI amounted to only US$0.73
million. Over the 30 years of China’s reform and opening up to the
world, together with the implementation of a variety of investment poli-
cies, the average growth rate of foreign capital in Shenzhen has been
around 28.6 percent per year. In 2008, the inflow of foreign capital was
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Table 2.3  The Changing Economic Structure of Shenzhen, Selected Years, 1980–2008
Year
GDP
(US$ billions)
Primary
industry
(RMB billions)
Secondary
industry
(RMB billions)
Tertiary
industry
(RMB billions)
% primary, 
secondary, and 
tertiary industry
1980 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.12 29.6, 25.9, 44.4
1985 0.57 0.26 1.94 2.01 6.2 , 46.1, 47.7
1990 2.52 0.70 7.69 8.77 4.1, 44.8., 51.1
1995 12.35 1.24 42.21 40.79 1.5, 50.1, 48.4
2000 32.07 1.56 108.61 108.58 0.7, 49.7, 49.6
2005 72.60 0.97 263.34 230.74 0.2, 53.2, 46.6
2006 85.25 0.70 304.95 275.71 0.1, 52.5, 47.4
2007 99.74 0.69 340.48 338.99 0.1, 50.1, 49.8
2008 114.47 0.67 381.58 398.41 0.1, 48.9, 51.0
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 2008, 2009.
Figure 2.1  Growth Rate and Total Value of Exports in Shenzhen, 1979–2008
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 2008, 2009.
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US$4.03 billion, a growth of 10.1 percent from 2007 (table 2.4).
Manufacturing accounted for 37.5 percent of total FDI; transportation,
storage, and postal services for 7.5 percent; tenancy and business services
for 9.4 percent; and real estate for 10.6 percent.
In recent years, most foreign capital has gone to service industries, and
the actually utilized FDI has been growing rapidly (figure 2.2). In 2008,
Shenzhen approved 3,046 new FDI projects, with an actual utilized
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Table 2.4   Growth of Shenzhen’s Foreign Direct Investment, Selected Years,
1979–2008 
US$ billions
1979 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008
Amount of
foreign 
capital
actually 
utilizeda 0.005 0.028 0.18 0.39 1.31 1.981 2.969 3.662 4.03
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 2008, 2009. 
a. The total amount of FDI is the contracted number; actually utilized FDI is part of it.
Figure 2.2  Actually Utilized Foreign Capital in Shenzhen, 1979–2007
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amount of US$7.28 billion. Among these projects, 355 were in the man-
ufacturing sector with US$1.53 billion (actually utilized) and 2,691 in
service industries with US$4.94 billion (actually utilized). Of total FDI,
secondary industry and tertiary industry accounted for 11.65 percent and
88.35 percent, respectively.
In secondary industry, the foreign capital flowing into textiles and
general equipment manufacturing grew by 36.4 percent and 47.0 per-
cent, respectively. In the service sectors, the foreign capital flowing into
scientific research, technical services, and geological prospecting grew by
201.7 percent. In wholesale- and retail-sales sectors, the inflow grew by
159.5 percent.
In addition, the world’s top 500 multinational companies have
invested enthusiastically. By the end of 2008, 164 of them had invest-
ments in Shenzhen. Their investment activities brought an inflow of
US$4.3 billion in foreign capital. Among the economies of origin of these
multinationals, the top three were the United States, Japan, and France,
followed by the United Kingdom; Germany; the Republic of Korea; Hong
Kong, China; Taiwan, China; Switzerland; Canada; Australia; Singapore;
and Finland. 
Development of high-tech industries. After establishment of its SEZ,
Shenzhen began its expansion mainly through processing, trade, and
assembly activities. From 1995, Shenzhen’s municipal government pro-
moted technological innovations and the development of high-tech
industries to encourage the upgrading of the city’s production capacity
and the transfer of new technologies to associated industries. After 15
years of effort, the high-tech industries of Shenzhen have developed rap-
idly, and the city has become one of the most important bases for high-
tech industry development in China.
From 1991 to 2007, the total output of Shenzhen’s high-tech indus-
tries increased from US$0.34 billion to US$111.42 billion (table 2.5),
more than 300 times. Compared with Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and
Tianjin, Shenzhen’s high-tech industry ranks first in both its value added
and its contribution to GDP.
Meanwhile, high-tech exports grew continuously. From 2001 to 2008,
the value of Shenzhen’s high-tech exports increased from US$11.37 billion
to US$79.37 billion (the growth rate in 2008 was 9.4 percent), accounting
for 44.2 percent of the total value of exports in 2008 (table 2.6).
The number of patent applications in Shenzhen is also growing rap-
idly. From 1999 to 2008, the proportion of independent innovations in
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high-tech industry increased steadily, with the major high-tech industries
changing from importing technologies to independent innovation. By
the end of 2008, the output value of high-tech industries with independ-
ent intellectual property was as high as US$75.49 billion, growing by
15.6 percent over the previous year and making up 59.1 percent of the
total output value of high-tech industries (table 2.7).
Shenzhen’s Contribution to the Nation
In terms of economic size, Shenzhen is the fourth largest city in China.
Its contribution to the nation, however, reaches beyond what can be
measured by a mere GDP figure. In such areas as economic system
reform, social system reform, market competitiveness, and industrial rela-
tions, Shenzhen has set an outstanding example for other cities and
regions to follow.
System reform. The fundamental source of the development of the
Shenzhen SEZ is found in the transformation from a planned economy to
a market-based system. Adopting market mechanisms has enabled the
SEZ to create a new mode of economic development. More generally,
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Table 2.5  Output Value of High-Tech Industries in Shenzhen, Selected Years,
1991–2008
Year
Gross output value 
(US$10 million)
Growth 
rate (%)
Gross industrial 
output value (%)
Share in Guangdong’s 
total (%)
1991 33.52 50.39 7.43 27.96
1995 331.11 54.46 20.33 33.54
2000 1,560.78 29.84 36.08 37.39
2005 7,163.12 49.51 51.06 45.74
2006 9,246.89 29.09 54.02 40.56
2007 11,141.88 20.50 54.90 —
2008 12,772.65 14.60 — —
Annual 
growth 
rate(%) — 43.98 — — 
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 2008, 2009. 
Note: — = not available.
Table 2.6  Value of High-Tech Exports from Shenzhen, 2001–08 
US$ billions
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
High-tech
exports 11.370 15.689 25.143 35.057 47.092 61.352 72.545 79.372
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 2008, 2009.
Shenzhen has played an important demonstration role in leading China’s
successive reforms and urban reconstruction, which include land tenure,
price system, labor market, financial system, and enterprise reform: 
• Land tenure reform. Shenzhen was the first city in China to open up the
land market and commercialize residential land. Over the period 1980
through 1984, She Kou Industrial Park, one of Shenzhen’s industrial
 areas, introduced commercialized housing for employees, the first
 attempt of this type of housing reform in China. Subsequently, Shen-
zhen introduced a “cash transfer” policy to compensate residents while
raising rents and house prices to reflect the building costs of the housing
provided. Ever since then, Shenzhen has served as a test field for China’s
housing system reforms and has furnished the original prototype of
what has been implemented all over the country in recent decades.
• Price system reform. In 1980, Shenzhen began to loosen price controls
on capital goods to ease restrictions on the pricing and fees associated
with some commodities. The intention was ultimately to set up a mar-
ket mechanism through which supply and demand decided commod-
ity prices. In 1984, Shenzhen abolished the use of the voucher quota
for purchasing food, including edible oil, pork, vegetables, and for pur-
chasing clothing and thus abandoned the administrative allocation sys-
tem for distributing daily goods. By 1994, food vouchers were no
longer in use in China, a national reform that came 10 years later after
Shenzhen’s initial experiment.
• Labor market reform. After the establishment of its SEZ, Shenzhen
 began carrying out progressive reforms in wage, labor mobility, and
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Table 2.7  Output Value of High-Tech Industries with Independent Intellectual
Property, 2000–08
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Production
(RMB billion) 53.45 74.56 95.45 138.66 185.31 282.42 365.33 445.44 514.82
Growth rate 39.37 39.49 31.00 45.25 33.35 33.35 29.40 21.90 15.60
Percentage 
of total high-
tech industry
production 50.22 53.67 55.82 55.85 56.73 57.81 57.90 58.62 59.10
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 2008, 2009.
 labor contracts, among others. Since the 1990s, reforms in labor use,
wage determination, and pension insurance have been implemented. In
1984, Shenzhen began to reform the government procedures determin-
ing employees’ wages that had been integral to the planned economy. In
the new system, wages were linked to employees’ contributions by
 dividing the wage into a fixed part (post wage) and a floating part (effi-
ciency wage). By mid-1985, this structural wage reform had been
 widely accepted and applied in other parts of the nation. To protect
low-income people, the municipal government implemented a mini-
mum wage policy in 1992.
• Financial system reform. Shenzhen was the first city in China to allow
the presence of foreign banks. In 1982, the Nan Yang Commercial
Bank, a foreign financial institution, set up its first branch in Shen-
zhen, which marked a major breakthrough in China’s financial
 reform. In 1987, the Shenzhen Development Bank was set up as the
first regional shareholding commercial bank jointly owned by the gov-
ernment, enterprises, and individuals. Such events signaled an end to
China’s state monopoly over the financial system. 
In 1987, the first securities company in China was registered in
Shenzhen, followed in 1990 by the establishment of the nation’s first
stock exchange, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Against the back-
ground of tight foreign exchange control in China, Shenzhen went on
to establish the first foreign exchange transaction center, a move that
greatly encouraged and extended foreign exchange transactions.
• Reform of state-owned enterprises. In October 1986, Shenzhen munici-
pal government selected several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to
 pilot reform, transforming them into joint-stock enterprises. In the fol-
lowing year, the city’s Investment Management Corporation was
 established and took charge of the management and operation of state-
owned assets. July 1988 brought the ratification of the overall planning
of state-owned assets management in Shenzhen, and market-oriented
state-owned assets management was tested. Finally, in 1990, Shen-
zhen took the initiative and allowed domestic and foreign investors to
invest in former state-owned enterprises. By then, the legal status of
joint-stock companies was formally confirmed.
Creating jobs for rural labor. As the front-runner in China’s reform,
Shenzhen has attracted a huge number of immigrants from inland
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regions. This large volume of immigrant labor has been not only a major
force in the city’s ongoing construction and economic growth, but also an
important and innovative solution to the employment problems in the
less-developed inland areas (table 2.8).
Development Stages
From the perspective of economic reform, the 30 years of the Shenzhen
SEZ can be divided into four stages. The one-by-one measure break-
through stage spanned 1980–85, comprehensive reforms occurred over
the 1986–91 period, the market framework reform stage took place in the
1992–97 time frame, and the thorough reforms stage began in 1998 and
continues into the present.
Initial Breakthrough Stage
The one-by-one measure breakthrough stage is called the “initial break-
through stage.” The initial breakthrough stage lasted about five years,
from 1980 to 1985, and featured partial reforms and breakthroughs in
limited areas. In this stage, the Shenzhen municipal government focused
mainly on reforms in the management of infrastructure construction and
in pricing, two systems that were heavily influenced by the planned econ-
omy and that seriously restricted the development of the special eco-
nomic zone. The main measures in these reforms included the following: 
• Promoting competition in design and construction. For infrastructure
construction, Shenzhen began piloting project bidding and gradually
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Table 2.8  Labor Employed in Shenzhen, Selected Years, 1979–2007
10,000 persons
Year
State-owned 
units
Urban 
collective-owned
units
Other
ownership
units
Urban 
self-employment
Migrant workers
from towns 
and villages
1979 3.37 0.65 1.00 0.41 9.52
1984 14.14 2.15 2.04 0.50 8.43
1989 30.34 4.85 13.05 2.19 43.22
1994 38.71 8.28 35.30 54.63 135.73
1999 32.94 4.17 55.41 120.86 213.22
2004 31.94 1.66 102.28 204.16 220.97
2006 39.85 1.57 142.83 267.40 193.91
2007 40.03 1.50 151.51 283.74 176.76
Source: Shenzhen Statistics Bureau 2008, 2009. 
Note: A unit is the business that provides employment. 
cemented it as a required procedure. The bidding system changed the
old management model, which featured administrative allocation of
projects, and formed a market system in the construction industry.
• Transferring land rights using compensation and land-use fees. In 1980,
the Shenzhen Real Estate Corporation was the first in China to open
up a land market, taking the initiative to promote housing commer-
cialization. Later, the Shenzhen government pushed the reform
throughout the city. The reform broke the conventional housing sys-
tem and accelerated the turnover of housing construction capital. Liv-
ing standards in Shenzhen dramatically improved.
• Breaking down the planned price management system. Shenzhen led the
way in loosening price controls on capital goods. In 1980, Shenzhen
began easing restrictions on the prices of some commodities and promot-
ing market-oriented prices. It abolished voucher quotas and abandoned
the administrative allocation system from the planned economy. China
discontinued the food voucher quota in 1994 all over the country, ten
years after Shenzhen.
• Implementing a new labor contract system and reforming labor contracts,
wages, and pension insurance. From the pilot labor-contract system, which
accompanied experiments in wage reform, to the implementation of the
structural wage system, Shenzhen made great efforts to  adjust the labor-
contract system required by a market economy. At the same time, Shen-
zhen instituted a major pension reform by establishing a labor insurance
company and providing social labor insurance for employees with labor
contracts.
• Adjusting the administrative management system. Since 1981, Shen-
zhen has been reforming its administrative management system by
simplifying and adjusting economic management departments and es-
tablishing industry economic management departments.
• Reforming the finance and investment system. Following the establish-
ment of the first foreign bank in Shenzhen in 1982, the Joint Invest-
ment Corporation of Bao An County issued the first stock in July
1983. In 1985, Shenzhen set up the Shenzhen Foreign Exchange Cen-
ter, opening up a new way of allocating foreign exchange in China’s
highly centralized foreign exchange management system. In addition,
Shenzhen unified the rate of income tax. 
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These “market-oriented” reforms broke the shackles of the planned econ-
omy, clearly laid out the direction of reform, changed the way of allocat-
ing resources, and successfully completed the preliminary experiments
with a market economy. 
Comprehensive Reforms
Between 1986 and 1991, the Shenzhen SEZ adjusted its investment and
industrial technology policies. It carried out a series of measures in such
fields as enterprise contracting, shareholding, property rights transfer,
bankruptcy, financing, banking, taxation, international trade, foreign
exchange, state-owned assets management, land use, and housing: 
• Reforming use of state-owned land and commercializing housing. Shen-
zhen implemented remarkable reforms in land management, allowing
it to become the experiment field for bidding on the use of state-owned
land. Shenzhen’s first public auction for rights to use state-owned land
was known as the “first” revolution in the reform of China’s land man-
agement system. The municipal government transferred the possession
of state-owned land through an auction, bidding, and contracting
process, and thus Shenzhen became the first city in China with com-
pensated land use. Shenzhen commercialized the provision of housing
and laid the basis for the formation of the city’s real estate market.
• Pursuing additional price reforms. To break the traditional rigid pricing
system, Shenzhen used various measures to limit, adjust, or relax
prices and to strengthen price management. Land management and
pricing reform were the two areas in which the Shenzhen SEZ broke
the old planned economic system and realized market-oriented resource
allocation.
• Establishing a personnel system and pension insurance. Shenzhen took
the lead in reforming the personnel system in China by abandoning
government job allocation for graduates of Shenzhen University. Later,
China adopted the measures taken by Shenzhen and issued regulations
on personnel system reform, replicating the labor-contract system
nationally.
• Instituting a civil service system. Shenzhen issued the first plan for set-
ting up a civil service system and conducted pilots in such depart-
ments as personnel, commerce, taxation, finance, and audit. Detailed
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regulations on recruitment, evaluation, reward, and discipline were
ratified, forming a relatively competitive system.
• Carrying out comprehensive reforms of the administrative management
system. Shenzhen municipal government put in place substantial
 reforms by reducing administrative layers and forming the three major
systems known as comprehensive management, administrative man-
agement, and asset management. Later, the municipal administrative
structure and the management system were further reformed, with
the aim of completing the administrative management system with
comprehensive functions including trade, traffic management, invest-
ment attraction, and city management.
• Encouraging entrepreneurship. Shenzhen encouraged high-tech profes-
sionals to become shareholders of private enterprises by investing in
cash, physical goods, individual patents, specially owned technology,
brands, and the like and by promoting technologies in production.
These measures inspired a number of high-tech professionals to set up
private technology ventures. 
• Privatizing state-owned enterprises. The focus of reform in the second
stage was to privatize SOEs. In 1986, Shenzhen  became the first city
in China to carry out such privatizations. In 1987, Shenzhen set up the
Investment Management Corporation to manage and operate state-
owned assets. In 1990, Shenzhen became the first city in China to let
SOEs go public both at home and abroad.
• Establishing a securities market. Shenzhen set up the Securities Corpo-
ration of Shenzhen SEZ, which issued stocks to the public and became
the pioneer in China’s securities market. The first bank set up by
 enterprises, China Merchants Bank, also was founded in Shenzhen. In
1988, the public debut of the Shenzhen Development Bank marked
the birth of the Shenzhen’s stock exchange. In July 1990, Shenzhen
officially established the Securities Registry Corporation and the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange and moved to legalize and standardize the
Shenzhen securities market.
• Creating a foreign exchange transaction center. After establishing the
first foreign exchange transaction center in China in 1985 (which sta-
bilized the foreign exchange market and enhanced international
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trade), Shenzhen instituted a free trade zone, the Shatoujiao free trade
zone, together with the first capital goods market and the future
 exchange, the Shenzhen Nonferrous Exchange. In addition, the central
bank set up a system of credit certificates for enterprises in Shenzhen.
These reforms finally established a market economy in Shenzhen. 
A Market System Framework
During the five-year period from 1992 to 1997, the Shenzhen municipal
government put forward a series of institutional reforms. Those reforms
affected project bidding; labor, wage, and social protection; public utility
management; and further SOE privatization: 
• Improving project bidding. Since 1993, Shenzhen had been implement-
ing changes to the bidding mechanisms in government construction
projects. To simplify transactions relating to construction projects and
solve the thorny problems of corruption related to project bidding,
the city founded the Construction-Project Transaction Service Center. 
• Innovating in the labor, wage, and social protection system. Shenzhen also
initiated innovations in labor, wage, and social protection by breaking
the tradition of government job allocation and establishing the so-
called two-way selection system, in which employers and employees
choose each other in a job market, and adopted a minimum wage and
other worker protections. Moreover, the municipal government im-
proved the social security system involving pension, medical insur-
ance, and housing subsidies. All these measures helped promote re-
form of the allocation of domestic labor.
• Establishing a modern public utility management system. The city car-
ried out a series of institutional reforms to strengthen the manage-
ment of public utilities. These included establishing and improving the
structure of corporate governance and experimenting with modern
public management methods that met international standards.
Further reform of state-owned enterprises. In 1992, the Shenzhen
municipal government also expanded the scale of privatization reform
of SOEs and created two typical models for privatization. One was to
follow the pattern of modern corporations through governance reforms
in SOEs. Another was to separate enterprises from the government
and then separate the ownership from management. SOE reform 
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was not limited to SOE privatization, but also included reforms of
related agencies and systems. For instance, the border management
system was improved; the taxation system was modified; the social
security system was strengthened; and the scale, structure, and opera-
tions of asset-operating corporations were dramatically adjusted to
improve the operation and supervision of state-owned assets. 
Thorough Reform
After 1997, the country’s reform and opening up entered a new histori-
cal period. The remarkable economic growth in China has significantly
increased per capita income, and Shenzhen has continued to deepen its
ongoing institutional restructuring: 
• Establishing a land trading market. Shenzhen was the first city in
Guangdong Province to sell industrial land. The city government stip-
ulated that the transfer of land-use rights must take place in the open
land transactions market. This requirement helped strengthen the reg-
ulation of land use and deepened the reform of the land system
through building an open, fair, and just market.
• Providing pensions for workers in the labor-contract system. In 2001,
Shenzhen became the first city to provide pensions for workers in the
labor-contract system. Subsequently, this measure was applied all over
the country, and the national social security system was established
based on the experience of Shenzhen.
• Establishing a high-tech equity market and a securities market. To stim-
ulate high-tech industries, in October 2000, Shenzhen established the
International High-Tech Equity Transaction Center, which provides a
platform for high-tech equity transactions for the whole nation. Later
on, the “SME board”4 was set up in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
• Reforming public service units. The Shenzhen government carried out a
three-step reform of the government-owned public service units (PSUs).
First, the government classified these PSUs into three categories: inspec-
tion and supervision, business service, and public service. Second, the
government deepened reforms of personnel, budget, and materials
 acquisition for the three different categories of PSUs, respectively.
And third, in accordance with the principle of separation of govern-
ment  administration from business operation, PSUs with government
administrative power were converted into administrative organiza-
tions. These reforms accelerated the corporatization and marketiza-
tion of PSUs.
• Increasing efficiency of the government authorization system. In 1998,
Shenzhen began to reform the government authorization system. To
increase efficiency and the role of the market in resources allocation,
the government streamlined examination and approval procedures and
restrained administrative intervention. For better supervision, Shen-
zhen launched an electronic monitoring system for administrative
 licensing. In addition, some supervision systems were prepared for
 important investment projects, and information technology for real-
time supervision was applied. Shenzhen also established a unified online
platform for government procurement to increase transparency and ef-
ficiency and prevent corruption. These measures have all contributed to
the improvement of the investment environment in Shenzhen.
• Evaluating the performance of the audit system. Shenzhen took the initia-
tive in forming local legislation that required the government to carry
out performance audits to improve administrative efficiency. Following
this requirement, Shenzhen established an evaluation system for ad-
ministrative performance and a series of specific auditing regulations
on the performance of government-invested projects. For example, the
regulations were imposed on the audit of the 12 public hospitals.
Shenzhen has been continuing its efforts to improve the market system.
Through these stages of structural reforms and innovations, Shenzhen has
preliminarily established an export-oriented market system. 
Roles of the Government
The Shenzhen SEZ came at a critical moment in China’s reform and
opening up to the outside world. The central government played a
leading role in authorizing such SEZs and the associated decentraliza-
tion of power. The Guangdong provincial government was also promi-
nent in promoting the demand for an SEZ, in taking the initiative in its
planning, and in facilitating its establishment. And, finally, the
Shenzhen municipal government played a key role in implementing
the reform and showed great courage in breaking down the traditional
institutions.
72 Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China
Central Government’s Promotion
At the third plenary session of the 11th Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee (CCPCC), the central government decided to imple-
ment the reform and Open Door policies. It must be credited with tak-
ing many unprecedented and groundbreaking steps toward the approval,
promotion, and construction of the Shenzhen SEZ.
In mid-1979, the CCPCC and the State Council approved reports
written by Guangdong and Fujian provinces asking for special policies
and flexible measures relating to foreign economic activities in the
provinces and decided to authorize the operation of special zones in
Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen, and Zhuhai. These were officially named
special economic zones. 
The SEZs were given more special authority than the rest of the econ-
omy. First of all, because the central government considered the develop-
ment of Guangdong of great importance, it allowed the province to take a
first step in implementing special and more flexible policies in the reform
and opening up process. Except for the railway, post and telecommunica-
tions, banking, civil aviation, and national defense, all other management
authority was delegated to the provincial government. Local governments
were granted more flexibility in carrying out foreign trade, increasing for-
eign exchange, and accelerating the development of local economies. In
addition, the central government extended the authority of the Guangdong
provincial government and the special zone government in such areas as
planning, pricing, labor wages, business management, and foreign economic
activities. The central government not only encouraged policy innovation
but also granted full recognition to well-functioning policies. 
In 1992, the central government duly conferred legislative power on the
Shenzhen SEZ and provided the Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress
as well as its Standing Committee with clear authority to make rules in
accordance with specific situations and actual needs, under the provisions
of the Constitution, the basic laws, and administrative regulations. At that
time, besides the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee,
only province-level governments had such power. Even the provincial cap-
ital cities were granted only partial legislative authority. All this special
treatment by the central government was crucial to maintaining the
momentum of policy innovation and ensuring development.
The Provincial Government’s Initiatives
In the process of establishing the SEZs, the Guangdong provincial govern-
ment has continually reported to the State Council, expressing its strong
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support. In addition, the provincial government has carried out a series of
investigations intended to solve existing problems and to ensure further
progress. 
During the founding process of the SEZs, the Guangdong provincial
government carried out a series of field studies, solicited views of local
people, and then submitted the report of the Special Administrative
Region to the State Council. The report suggested that Zhuhai and Baoan
could be made into high-level bases for industrial and agricultural pro-
duction and export and had the potential to become resorts for tourists
from Hong Kong and Macao. The report also proposed altering the two
counties to become medium-sized cities and expressed the hope that the
central government would allow Guangdong to implement more special
policies and flexible measures and allow it to take the initiative in rezon-
ing Shantou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai as outward trading areas. 
Meanwhile, the Guangdong provincial government asked the central
government to further loosen restrictions on opening up wider, to allow
more flexibility at home, and to assign more power to local governments.
After a series of conferences and discussions, the Guangdong government
made the following decisions: 
• Given that the provincial government was directly responsible for the
political system and economic development in Shenzhen, economic
planning was also to be in the hands of the provincial government. 
• Powers would be appropriately decentralized to promote international
trade: for assembling or processing projects that did not need imported
equipment or whose imported equipment was less than US$1 million,
the project could be approved by the local government of Shenzhen. If
the project were more than US$1 million, the approval power rested
with the provincial government. 
• According to central government guidelines for establishing special
processing zones in Shenzhen and the agreement that Shenzhen could
pursue more open approaches than the inland area, the provincial
 departments were to act promptly on issues related to the establish-
ment of the SEZ. The provincial government was to unify relevant
regulations and procedures. 
Decentralization of the Guangdong government was successful in
increasing the pace of opening up in Shenzhen. And the expansion of
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local authority helped Shenzhen attract more foreign investment and
expand its international trade. 
The Mission of Local Government
The local government expended a great effort to make the SEZ work.
Some of the specific measures included: 
• Cultivating a sound investment environment. The local government of
the Shenzhen SEZ spared no effort in development planning and in
constantly improving the infrastructure to ensure a favorable invest-
ment environment. It also established special fund-raising institutions
to guarantee funding for the development of the SEZ.
• Promoting foreign investment. In 1979, Shenzhen began introducing three
types of foreign-funded enterprises (joint venture, Chinese–foreign
 equity joint ventures, and solely foreign-owned enterprises) and ap-
proved 37 investment projects. In December 1986, Shenzhen ratified
the Provisional Regulations on the Approval of Projects Applying to
Foreign Investment to reinforce the management of foreign-funded
projects. In 1987, Shenzhen set up the Office of Foreign Investment
Promotion to take charge of the planning, coordination, approval, man-
agement, and provision of services for foreign investment–related proj-
ects. In 1996, the Office of Foreign Investment Promotion was
 replaced by the Shenzhen Investment Promotion Bureau. From 2000
on, Shenzhen has encouraged qualified domestic enterprises to
 expand to international markets under a “going out” strategy. In 2006,
Shenzhen enacted the Scheme for Shenzhen’s Strategic Expansion and
the 11th Five Year Plan of Shenzhen’s Foreign Economic Cooperation.
It was regarded as the leading strategy of Shenzhen’s development. In
the meantime, the Shenzhen Bureau of Trade and Industry held a series
of promotional activities for investment both at home and abroad.
In addition, in 1987 Shenzhen established the Shatoujiao Bonded
 Industrial Area, the first bonded area in the country, to attract foreign
investment. So far, the city has established three such areas, Futian,
Shatoujiao, and the Yantian Port Tariff-Free Zone and Bonded Logis-
tics Park. The Futian Tariff-Free Zone with its bridge linking Shenzhen
to Hong Kong, China, includes high-tech and modern logistics indus-
tries. The Yantian Port Tariff-Free Zone and the Yantian port have
facilitated collaboration between the bonded area and the port.
They specialize in modern logistics and interact intensively. 
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• Creating an orderly market. Shenzhen also issued a number of policies
and regulations concerning intellectual property rights (IPR). Later,
the government established the Intellectual Property Office and a spe-
cific court dedicated to IPR protection. This move was part of the
 effort to set up specialized criminal law enforcement agencies with
particular jurisdiction over intellectual property rights. In the mean-
time, a series of policies and measures was enacted to ensure that
 intellectual property protection was embedded in the laws, regula-
tions, policy formulations, and implementation processes relating to
SEZ operations. In 2002, Shenzhen set up the WTO Affairs Center to
provide professional services such as consulting, training, forums, and
legal counseling related to WTO issues.
• Continuously improving infrastructure. Shenzhen has always followed
international standards in its urban infrastructure development. The
municipal government has invested heavily in developing sea, air, and
land transportation networks, including the establishment of a con-
venient and highly efficient integrated public transportation system
consisting of bus and subway services. 
• Encouraging industrialization through industrial parks. To enhance the
potential for economic development and optimize industrial struc-
ture, the Shenzhen municipal government gave the Shenzhen Export
Processing Zone Management Committee management authority at
the municipal level. It is responsible for establishing the Shenzhen
Major Industrial Zone, which is located in the northeastern part of
Shenzhen and has a planned central area of 39.57 square kilometers.
This zone previously had export-processing bases and a national bio-
industry park.
Since the 1990s, the high-tech industries in Shenzhen have experi-
enced rapid development. At the same time, there have been many
demands for upgrading infrastructure and for more space to cope with
the increasingly fierce external competition. To promote high-tech in-
dustries, Shenzhen set up industrial areas that were to specialize in
high-tech production. As a result, several high-tech industrial districts
were established under the leadership, management, and planning of
the municipal government, which was responsible for selecting the in-
dustries, making policy, improving the investment environment, and
providing services.
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• Strengthening the legal system. A series of legislative innovations was
coupled with the establishment of the Shenzhen SEZ. Since June 30,
2007, the Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress and its Standing
Committee have adopted 296 regulations and made decisions relating
to all aspects of the city’s economy and society. Among these regula-
tions and decisions, about one-third were modeled after those in Hong
Kong, China and foreign countries; one-third were ratified with neces-
sary modifications, additions, and refinements of existing laws and reg-
ulations based on the economic development needs of the Shenzhen
SEZ; and one-third were adapted with the purpose of reinforcing the
administrative system, environmental protection, urban management,
and cultural development. 
Preferential Policies
The Shenzhen SEZ implemented a series of preferential policies to
attract foreign and domestic investments.5 The main ones involved for-
eign enterprises, high-tech industries, high-tech venture capital invest-
ment, human resources, and land policies.
Foreign Enterprises
Foreign-invested enterprises enjoy a number of preferential policies,
including those applying to taxation. For example, the corporate income
tax rate is 15 percent, much lower than the 30 percent applied to domes-
tic enterprises. In addition, these enterprises are exempt from the local
income tax levied at the rate of 3 percent. Foreign-funded manufacturing
enterprises have a two-year exemption from corporate income tax and a
half-tax rate for the ensuing two years.
At the expiration of their tax exemption and reduction period, certi-
fied export-oriented enterprises have a reduced rate of 10 percent for
corporate income tax, provided their export volume accounts for 70 per-
cent or more of their total industrial output. At the expiration of their
tax exemption and reduction period, certified manufacturing enterprises
using state-of-the-art technologies are entitled to a reduced tax rate of
10 percent during a three-year extension. Foreign-invested enterprises
engaged in the services sector with an investment of more than US$5
million and an operational duration of more than 10 years are granted a
one-year exemption from corporate income taxes starting from the first
profit-making year and a half-tax rate for the ensuing two years.
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High-Tech Industries
For integrated circuits (IC) manufacturing enterprises, from their time of
certification until the end of 2010, a refund will be applied to the part of
the value-added tax (VAT) exceeding 6 percent for sales of self-produced
IC products. General taxpayers will pay VAT at the statutory rate of 17
percent. The refunded tax shall be used by the enterprises for R&D
related to IC products and expanded production and shall not be subject
to the levy of corporate income tax. IC design enterprises are regarded as
software enterprises and enjoy the same tax policies.
As for certified new software enterprises, they may enjoy two years of
corporate income tax exemption from the first profit-making year and a
half-tax rate reduction for the ensuing three years. Software enterprises
recognized by the state, provincial, or municipal governments may enjoy
five years of corporate income tax exemption and a half-tax rate for the
ensuing five years. 
High-Tech Venture Capital Investment
If venture capital investment agencies invest in the projects listed in the
Guide to Venture Capital Investment in Hi-Tech Industries (published by the
municipal government of Shenzhen) and the total investment exceeds its
registered capital or accounts for 70 percent of its total investment and no
less than 30 percent is invested in the startup of enterprises, then the ven-
ture capital investment agencies can benefit from the preferential policies
that apply to high-tech enterprises.
Starting in 2000, the Municipal Finance Bureau has allocated
RMB10 million (US$1.46 million) and the Funds for Technologies has
allocated RMB 20 million (US$2.93 million) each year to encourage
overseas students to start their own businesses in Shenzhen. First, the
special-purpose fund is to be used to set up and improve the Overseas
Students Venture Park in the high-tech industrial park. And, second, the
fund will be used to subsidize loans for high-tech enterprises set up by
overseas students.
To support the development of incubators, a maximum of RMB 3 mil-
lion (US$0.44 million) will go toward subsidizing technological enter-
prise incubators certified by the technological authority of the municipal
government. The intention is to support the construction of public facil-
ities for the technological enterprise incubators, such as public service
platforms, network communications, facilities, and instruments for pro-
fessional laboratories. 
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Human Resources 
To attract talented people, Shenzhen has undertaken a series of construc-
tive initiatives. These include establishing labor and personnel services com-
panies and setting up a human intelligence market, a senior corporate
manager recommendation and evaluation center, and a foreign-related
labor market, as well as hosting “talent meetings.” The implementation of
these initiatives has attracted talented people from China and abroad. 
Special policies are in place to attract high-tech talents as well.
Software development personnel with university or college educations or
above, those with mid- to senior-level professional titles, and those with
important inventions, along with their spouses and children (if minors),
are allowed to settle in Shenzhen as registered residents and are
exempted from the city’s infrastructure expansion fee. Furthermore, the
municipal government will subsidize postdoctoral scientific research
workstations approved by the central government and will subsidize each
postdoctoral researcher through a grant of RMB 50,000 (US$7,320.64)
for each year after he or she enters the postdoctoral scientific research
workstation.
In addition, the Shenzhen government also set up several awards to
recognize outstanding talent:
• The Award for Talent in Industrial Development and Innovation of
Shenzhen has been set up to acknowledge people who have made
outstanding contributions to industrial development and independent
innovation in the city’s economy.
• The municipal government designates RMB 200 million (US$29.28
million) for these awards as part of its fiscal budget.
•The municipal government has set up specific awards for science and
technology, including the Shenzhen Mayor’s Award, the Shenzhen
Scientific and Technological Progress Award, and the Shenzhen Tech-
nological Invention Award. Each year, a sum of RMB 8 million
(US$1.17 million) is granted to those technological personnel who
make outstanding contributions to the development of the city’s high-
tech industries.
Land Policies
To attract investment, certified export-oriented and high-tech enter-
prises need to pay only half the industrial land-use fees for the first five
years. In addition, high-tech enterprises, research projects, and production
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sites are exempt from transaction fees charged for the transfer of land-use
rights, registration fees, trading fees, and charges relating to production and
operation facilities and properties. Finally, newly purchased properties for
establishing production facilities and operations for high-tech enterprises
and projects are exempt from property tax for five years starting from the
date of completion of the purchase. 
Key Experiences
Shenzhen has become a model for the reform and opening up process in
China, and its experiences have proved to be valuable examples for the
rest of the nation. The key experiences include creation of a sound busi-
ness environment, institutional reform, authority for local decision mak-
ing, and preferential policies.
Creating a Sound Business Environment
To ensure orderly economic and urban development and to build investor
confidence, the central government and the Shenzhen municipal govern-
ment have gone to great lengths to produce a sound business environ-
ment. That environment includes a good legal system, policy support, and
infrastructure provision. Government authorities have also provided
effective planning for the SEZ development and have established institu-
tions that protect property rights to ensure a fair market.
Focusing on Institutional Reforms
As the first city in China to establish an SEZ, Shenzhen has concentrated
on the institutional reforms required to build a new market-oriented eco-
nomic system. Its experiments in reform began at a time when the whole
country was still a planned economy, and Shenzhen tried all available
means, including learning from foreign experience, to establish a good
legal and regulatory environment, an efficient administrative system, a
flexible labor market, and the like. Its 30 years of fast development have
proved the importance of institution building. 
Granting Sufficient Freedom for Local Decision Making
A special aspect of the Shenzhen SEZ was its authority to trying all kinds
of economic experiments. For instance, Shenzhen was the first city to
establish a required 24-hour turnaround time for project approval and to
shift the personnel system from designated to open hiring. Integral to this
special status was the legislative power granted by the central government.
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In addition, the SEZ has been granted the privilege of determining its own
economic management strategies. All such autonomy is crucial to
Shenzhen’s success. 
Granting Proper Preferential Policies
The Shenzhen SEZ enjoys great flexibility in the application of foreign
funds, the introduction of foreign technologies, and the undertaking of
foreign economic collaboration. Preferential policies were granted in such
areas as taxation, customs, staffing, land use, and the like. For instance, the
profits of foreign firms sent abroad have been exempted from income tax,
and such firms are also not liable for property taxes for three years after
their establishment. 
Challenges and Recommendations
Despite the tremendous success of the Shenzhen SEZ, it faces many chal-
lenges to its future development:
• Policy changes after WTO accession. Preferential tax policies for foreign
investment led to conflicts of interest relating to foreign investment
and domestic investment. First, the overall cost of implementing
 foreign-investment preferential tax policies is extremely high.
 According to data released by the National Statistics Bureau, China’s
FDI  accounted for 18 percent of the country’s total fixed-assets in-
vestment, while the average tax rate of foreign-funded enterprises is at
least 4 percent lower than that applying to domestically funded enter-
prises. Second, because state-owned enterprises, collective companies,
and private and personal business have been unable to enjoy the same
tax benefits as foreign-financed businesses, they have endeavored to
find ways to avoid their tax burden by setting up fake foreign-linked
joint ventures. Under such a situation, the FDI policies have to be
adjusted based on the WTO requirements. 
• The diminishing effect of institutional reform. The Shenzhen SEZ is the
result of China’s pursuit of a change from a planned economy to a
market-based economy. It is the product of the necessary system ad-
justments and an integral part of China’s step-by-step reform strategy.
In the beginning, the newly established market economy increased
people’s economic incentives significantly. For a time, Shenzhen en-
joyed the positive effects of the institutional reform that brought
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about the new market system. As the market economy gradually
 became entrenched, however, this “inspiration effect” decreased.
• Unsustainable development patterns. In the early 1980s, China put
forward the idea that its economic development mode should be
transformed from extensive to intensive. In 2005, the shift from an
 extensive economy to an intensive economy was again listed as the
most severe challenge and the most urgent task in China’s 11th Five
Year Plan. In Shenzhen, the rapid development of the economy in its
early stages depended mainly on small and medium capital investments.
Later on, the city’s capacity to accumulate funds began decreasing, a
trend that posed a direct threat to its capital growth and economic
 development. After the 1990s, its average capital accumulation
growth rate was 36 percent, lower than the 38 percent of Guangdong
Province and also significantly lower than the rates in Beijing, Shanghai,
and Tianjin that had reached almost 50 percent. The extensive use of
 resources and the slowing down of the capital growth rate in Shenzhen
were alarming calls for a shift to an intensive growth model.
• Lagging social development. For a modern nation, economic prosperity
and social development comprise two of its most important and mu-
tually reinforcing aspects that should advance in a balanced way. At
the early stage of China’s reform and opening up to the world, it was
necessary to focus more on economic development. In later stages,
such economic development needs to be accompanied by an equal
emphasis on social development. In the SEZ, for various reasons, eco-
nomic development has long been the main goal, with social improve-
ment and environmental quality sacrificed to achieve economic
growth. As a result, education, science and technology, culture, health
care, environmental protection, social security, urban transport, and
other important social undertakings have been lagging behind.
• Increasing resource constraints. The availability of resources is an im-
portant factor in economic growth. With the development of the
SEZ and the associated increase in urban populations, the scarcity of
 resources has become increasingly noticeable. As a consequence,
ever more pressure is placed on the natural environment, thus
threatening the sustainable development of the economy. Although
scientific and technological progress can improve the effectiveness
of the use of natural resources, the problem of resource constraints
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remains largely  unsolved. The gaps between supply and demand in
relation to land, water, electricity, and other resources have become
increasingly apparent.
• Environmental degradation. With economic growth as the centerpiece
of development, endeavors to raise incomes have received the most
prominent attention. At the same time, though, the environment has
suffered to a considerable extent, and its quality has been declining
rapidly as a result. Moreover, since SEZs have limited natural resources
and capacity, their economic growth cannot depend exclusively on
such sources. Reliance on external resources therefore becomes an im-
portant factor in achieving such growth. Because maintaining environ-
mental quality directly affects the city’s ability to attract external re-
sources, the availability of resources has become an important variable
for the further development of SEZs. Improving environmental quali-
ty has thus become one of its top priorities.
• Cultural conflicts. An influx of people from areas with different cultur-
al backgrounds can cause conflicts within society that take time to re-
solve and can demand considerable coordination efforts. During the
development process, building a harmonious society represents a sig-
nificant challenge for the municipal government.
The Future of the SEZs
During China’s three decades of reform and its opening up to the world,
the nation’s economy has successfully maintained an astonishing growth
rate. Today, the basic framework of the market economy has been estab-
lished across the entire country. Because of China’s special situation as a
large developing country, however, problems such as inequality, informa-
tion asymmetries, and immature institutions still exist. As a result, its
market system is far from perfect and signals that the mission of the SEZs
as “experiment fields” for economic reform is still important.
The mission of the SEZs has been to resolve emerging problems in
the process of China’s economic development. The Pudong New Area
was established in Shanghai to serve as the stimulus for development
in regions such as the Yangtze River Delta and across the country.
Similarly, the Tianjin Binhai New Area was launched as China began
to integrate into the world economy, which demanded a development
strategy with combined planning for land use, effective design of
global logistics, and human resources and information flows. China
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chose the Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan triangle area, Chongqing, and
Wuhan as experimental areas for national urban and rural coordina-
tion and associated comprehensive reforms. This is China’s major
strategy in the development of the central and western parts of the
country. Such areas are also regarded as test areas for building a har-
monious society by applying a scientific development concept. In the
processes of modernization, China may still encounter more prob-
lems. Given that the Shenzhen SEZ is the most important experiment
field in China’s economic development, the larger the role it is able to
play, the more development opportunities the city will have.
China’s reform began with changes in its economic institutions. A mar-
ket economy requires a well-functioning legal system, fair competition,
and incentives that balance competing interests. This kind of economic
system also calls for a suitable political environment, and it is for this rea-
son that reform of the political system plays such a vital role in advancing
China’s economic development. Nonetheless, reforming the political sys-
tem clearly involves a wide range of interests, and it is difficult to start
such reforms at the national level. Under such circumstances, the SEZs
surely become the most appropriate test fields for such reform. This new
task for Shenzhen and the other SEZs also grants them new development
opportunities at the same time. 
Policy Recommendations
Some broad policy recommendations should be considered, which enable
the special economic zones to overcome these challenges and to continue
on the path of success. Among them, institutional reform and adjusting
the focus of reform from growth to development are particularly impor-
tant. The SEZs have to focus more on some specific key aspects.
New reform incentives. Institutional reform is the key factor behind the
success of the Shenzhen SEZ, and local government has been an impor-
tant player in the required institutional reforms. As a consequence, it is
apparent that the incentives provided to the government have served as
the original engine of the reform program and have later become the driv-
ing force for economic development. For that reason, the Shenzhen SEZ
has become the most successful SEZ in China. In the future, this logic of
success will continue to hold. During this crucial period of China’s mod-
ernization, institutional reform is the single most important factor in
enabling the Shenzhen SEZ to continue to lead in social and economic
development over the next 10 or 15 years. Only if Shenzhen carries on
its in-depth reform and opening up further to the world, in the process
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of building a well-functioning market mechanism, can the city maintain
its established front-runner role in China. One precondition for this out-
come is to create stronger incentives for government officers to carry on
further institutional innovation. 
Adjusting the reform focus. At this stage, it is also of great importance
to deepen the needed administrative reform to ensure the formation of a
highly efficient and flexible administrative system that can effectively
support economic development and the burgeoning market economy. At
present, the administrative bodies of the SEZ are relatively large. The
coordination of different departments has become ever more difficult and
has resulted in lower efficiency. It is evident, therefore, that the change of
government functions has not yet been effectively implemented and
much unnecessary administrative intervention in economic activities still
occurs. Reforming the government management system by learning from
international experiences to ensure that the economy develops sustain-
ably, rapidly, and healthily has become an urgent task.
From economic growth to broader development. In the past 30 years,
economic growth has been the top priority in China. So far, this goal has
been well met through the introduction of foreign capital, advanced man-
agement methods, and technologies. In recent years, industries relying on
domestic investment have experienced rapid development. As their com-
parative advantages have slowly faded away and labor and land supplies
have decreased, however, the conflicts between social development and
economic development, between income generation and environmental
degradation, and between economic growth and unequal income distri-
bution are becoming more severe than ever. In the coming years, these
aspects need to be taken into account, and the main objective must be
shifted from a sole pursuit of economic growth to a wider one that
encompasses social development. If this transformation is successfully
achieved, then a new development path consistent with given constraints
can surely be worked out. Shenzhen can then continue to set an example
for China’s further development in the new era. 
Notes
1. RMB is the Chinese currency; the yuan is the currency unit.
2. The historical name Hong Kong refers to the period before July 1, 1997, when
the former British colony was restored to China; Hong Kong, China refers to
any time after that date.
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3. The historical name Macao refers to the period before December 20, 1999,
when the former Portuguese colony was restored to China; Macao, China
refers to any time after that date.
4. This is an equity exchange system for small and medium enterprises.
5. This part is largely derived from relevant documents and regulations of the
Shenzhen municipal government. Thanks to Dr. Ziling Cai for his valuable
help with these materials.
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The Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA), estab-
lished officially on December 6, 1984, by the State Council of China, is one
of the earliest state-level development areas in China.1 The past 24 years of
growth and experience in TEDA have proved to be a huge success.
This case study starts with a brief summary of the area’s development
and accomplishments. The second section tells how TEDA was established,
C H A P T E R  3
A Case Study of Tianjin 
Economic–Technological
Development Area
Xiaoxi Li, Ruijun Duan, and Huanzhao Zhang
Xiaoxi Li is currently the director of the Institute of Economic and Resources
Management, Beijing Normal University; he was formerly the director-general of
the Macroeconomic Research Department, Research Office of the State
Council. Ruijun Duan and Huanzhao Zhang are research fellows of Nankai
University pursuing postdoctoral research. A special acknowledgment should be
made to Daihong Xu, minister of the Policy Research Office of TEDA, and to
Dr. Bing Sun from Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University. The
author’s special thanks should also be given to the translation group for this case
study, including Ph.D. and master’s students in our institute, who have accom-
plished the translation work with efficiency and great dedication. They are Ran
Ren, Huixin Sun, Yimeng Liu, Yi Zhang, Miao Chen, Yamin Du, with Huixin
Sun being the chief organizer. 
88 Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China
and the third section analyzes the role of government. The fourth section
outlines the favorable fiscal policies implemented for the development
area, and the sixth section summarizes the successful experience of
TEDA’s development and opening-up process. The major challenges
faced by the development area are summarized in the sixth section. The
paper then concludes with lessons learned. 
TEDA’s Accomplishments
TEDA is the largest, the fast-growing, and the most profitable among the
57 state-level economic and technology development areas. Covering 40
square kilometers with a residential population of 143,000, TEDA had a
2007 gross regional product of RMB 93.87 billion, a gross industrial out-
put of RMB 335.067 billion, tax income of RMB 19.816 billion, a total
import and export value of US$335.01 billion, and a total social invest-
ment of RMB 25.577 billion in fixed assets. With per capita disposable
income of RMB 41,700 and per capita consumption of RMB 26,100,
TEDA has become the flagship of the Binhai New Area and has con-
tributed significantly to the economic growth of the city of Tianjin
(http://gaige.chinareform.net/index.html).
Since its inception in 1984, TEDA has seen rapid growth in its econ-
omy, trade, investment, and high-tech industries, thanks to favorable local
endowments as well as preferential economic policies. It has experienced
three development stages. The first stage, from 1984 to 1994, was charac-
terized by investment predominantly in primary goods with little value
added or technological content. During the second stage, from 1994 to
2004, with continuous upgrading and restructuring, the high-tech indus-
tries became the leading force in TEDA. Since 2004, TEDA, as part of the
Binhai New Area, has been focusing on specialization and cooperation
across regions. In particular, the reform experiment zone established in the
Binhai New Area in 2006 has provided new development opportunities
for TEDA. 
Economic Growth and Efficiency
TEDA has maintained outstanding economic performance since its estab-
lishment 24 years ago. In 1986, TEDA’s gross domestic product (GDP)
was only RMB 9.35 million. About 20 years later, in 2007, TEDA’s GDP
had reached RMB 93.87 billion and in 2008 RMB 106.5 billion, main-
taining an annual growth rate of 20 percent. Its gross industrial output
grew rapidly as well: that number for 1986 was RMB 38.72 billion 
compared to RMB 335.067 billion in 2007 and RMB 373 billion at the
end of 2008 (see figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
Output per capita was RMB 13,700 in 1987 compared to RMB 285,100
in 2007. Labor productivity has kept growing, increasing from RMB 59,500
per capita in 1987 to RMB 564,700 per capita in 2000 (see table 3.1).
Although productivity has declined slightly since 2000, partly because of
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Figure 3.1  Gross Regional Output and Gross Industrial Output of TEDA,
1986–2008 
Sources: Li Yong 2004; Economic Bureau of TEDA 2001–07; 2008 data from the statistics of www.bh.gov.cn. 
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Figure 3.2  Growth of Gross Domestic Product and Gross Industrial Output of
TEDA, 1996–2008 
Sources: Li 2004; Economic Development Bureau of TEDA 2001–07; 2008 data from the statistics of www.bh.gov.cn.
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higher labor costs and industrial restructuring, TEDA’s productivity has
remained relatively high, at RMB 299,200 per capita in 2007.
Trade Growth
Since its establishment, TEDA has emphasized foreign trade. The volume
of export has grown continuously, through higher value-added and more
high-tech products. 
Fast-growing exports. The export trade of TEDA, initiated in 1986,
began with just six export enterprises, but by 2007 that number had
grown to 783, with the value of exports increasing from US$2.02 million
in 1986 to US$18.5 billion in 2007 (see table 3.2). The leading enter-
prises of TEDA have played a significant role: in 2007, 98 individual
enterprises achieved an export value of more than US$10 million. Their
total exports were valued at US$17.556 billion, accounting for 94.9 per-
cent of regional exports. Twenty-three enterprises had exports exceeding
US$100 million, and their total export value was US$15.199 billion,
accounting for 82.2 percent of regional exports.
Export products have been continuously upgraded. In the early years
of foreign trade, the exported products of TEDA consisted mainly of pri-
mary goods, such as special local products, plastic, garments, hardware,
and daily supplies, with a low technology level and added value. Since
1992, more technology-intensive products have been exported, and the
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Table 3.1  Performance of Employees of TEDA, 1987–2007
Year
GDP per capita 
(RMB 10,000)
Productivity
(10,000 per 
person) Year
GDP per capita 
(RMB 10,000)
Productivity
(10,000 per
person)
1987–97 1998–2007
1987 1.37 5.95 1998 10.75 46.09
1988 2.23 7.58 1999 11.58 49.52
1989 2.30 7.01 2000 13.46 56.47
1990 1.73 8.81 2001 15.64 35.04
1991 3.13 14.73 2002 18.10 21.08
1992 3.38 15.09 2003 19.23 22.10
1993 4.61 19.14 2004 20.08 25.62
1994 5.79 24.36 2005 22.28 24.11
1995 7.10 31.19 2006 24.72 26.45
1996 10.08 39.40 2007 28.51 29.92
1997 10.17 43.54
Sources: Li 2004; Economic Development Bureau of TEDA 2001–07. 
percentage of fine finishing products was 72.7 in that year. In 1994,
export products were concentrated in 24 categories, primarily in electron-
ics, electrical industry, machinery, chemical industry, pharmaceutical
industry, clothing, and food, shifting from labor-intensive to technology-
intensive products. With further structural upgrading in 1996, electronic
and electric products took the lead, accounting for 64.62 percent of the
total export value in that year. Since 2000, more technology-intensive
products have been added, such as mobile phones, integrated circuits,
semiconductors, li-ion batteries, color televisions, digital cameras, and the
like. In 2007, the value of high-tech exports was US$13.21 billion,
accounting for 80.4 percent of TEDA’s total, and the export value of
mechanical and electrical products was US$17.09 billion, accounting for
92.4 percent of regional exports (see table 3.3). 
Foreign trade and growth. In its start–up period, TEDA exported mainly
to Hong Kong,2 Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. It
expanded its market to Europe in 1988. In 1994, export trade to Hong
Kong, Japan, the United States, Korea, the United Kingdom, and Taiwan,
China accounted for 90.3 percent of the total. By 2007, TEDA had estab-
lished trading relations with 188 countries and regions, among which the
United States ranked as the leading partner with an export value of
US$5.24 billion, accounting for 28.3 percent of total foreign trade in the
area (see table 3.4).
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Table 3.2  TEDA’s Number of Exporters and Value of Products Exported, 1986–2007
US$ millions
Year
Exporter
(company)
Export value
(US$ millions) Year
Exporter
(company)
Export value
(US$ millions)
1986–96 1997–2007 
1986 6 2.02 1997 263 2,004.15
1987 23 16.16 1998 285 2,081.35
1988 38 37.80 1999 385 2,553.80
1989 56 46.04 2000 397 3,266.91
1990 75 63.70 2001 446 4,035.00
1991 99 113.48 2002 396 5,706.00
1992 137 160.22 2003 466 6,886.00
1993 151 292.35 2004 481 11,175.00
1994 184 544.26 2005 575 13,971.00
1995 221 901.03 2006 604 17,145.00
1996 253 1,450.20 2007 783 18,500.00
Sources: Li 2004; Economic Development Bureau of TEDA 2001–07. 
Growth of Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a crucial role in the devel-
opment and construction of TEDA. Today, the volume of FDI in TEDA
continues to grow and to produce better-quality investment projects. 
TEDA was challenged by slow investment growth in its start-up period.
From 1985 to 1990, 217 projects were approved, valued at only about
US$400 million. Since 1992, FDI has grown significantly, and at the peak
in 1993, 909 projects were approved. After 1993, the number of invest-
ment projects has declined, but the total value is rising, as well as the aver-
age investment size (see table 3.5). At the end of 2007, there were 4,485
foreign enterprises from 74 countries and regions with an investment value
of US$40.33 billion,3 contracted foreign capital of US$30.04 billion, actu-
ally utilized foreign investment of US$16.93 billion, and an average
project size of US$8.99 million. Some 657 enterprises had an investment
value of more than US$10 million, and 31 enterprises had an investment
value of more than US$100 million. 
Changing trends in foreign investments in TEDA. Before 1987, none of
the foreign-funded enterprises in TEDA had increased their investment,
92 Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China
Table 3.3  Value of TEDA’s High-Tech Exports and Their Share of Total Export Value,
2001–07 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Export value of high-tech
products (US$ millions) 2,344 3,335 3,405 9,011 11,281 13,777 13,213
% of high-tech products 
in total exports 58.1 58.4 49.5 80.6 80.7 94.1 80.4
Source: Economic Development Bureau of TEDA 2001–07. 
Table 3.4  Value of Exports to Six Countries, Economies, or Regions and Their Share
of Total Export Value, 2007 
Country, economy, or region
Export value 
(US$ millions)
Percentage of total 
export value
United States 5,243 28.3
European Union 3,151 17.0
ASEAN 2,707 14.6
Republic of Korea 1,556 8.4
Japan 1,112 6.0
Hong Kong, China 1,019 5.5
Source: Economic Development Bureau of TEDA 2007. 
but the situation changed in 1988. Before 1993, enterprises increased
investment at a smaller scale, with the maximum only around US$50 mil-
lion. After 1994, enterprises took a more active approach, and the invest-
ment increased both in total value and in average value. The increased
investment on average reached a high of US$41.96 million in 2000 (see
table 3.6). As of 2007, altogether there were 1,666 foreign-funded enter-
prises that had increased their investment in TEDA, for a total investment
of US$16.67 billion.
Improving quality of foreign-invested projects. Initially, the investment
projects in TEDA were mainly low technology, with a maximum individ-
ual investment of US$5 million. Since 1992, as foreign funding has signif-
icantly increased, foreign investment from multinational companies
began to move out of the initial medium or small investment. The level of
technology rose remarkably, and some even filled the technology gaps in
China. Many products manufactured in TEDA became brand names and
market leaders. As of 2007, 137 companies from 10 foreign countries
and regions were investing in TEDA, 62 of which were multinational
companies in the Fortune 500. TEDA has attracted a great number of
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Table 3.5  Foreign Investment in TEDA, by Number of Approved Projects and Total
Investment Value, 1985–2007
US$ millions
Number of
approved
projects
(company)
Total 
investment
(US$ 
millions)
Average
size
(US$ 
millions)
Number of
approved
projects
(company)
Total 
investment
(US$ 
millions)
Average
size
(US$ 
millions)
Year 1985–96 Year 1997–2007 
1985           14           31.92       2.28   1997         172       1,495.76       8.70
1986           27           43.42       1.61   1998         194       1,482.07       7.64
1987           34           22.80       6.70   1999         106       1,428.84     13.48
1988           48           84.82       1.77   2000           99       2,779.02     28.07
1989           40         105.69       2.64   2001           94       1,204.00     12.81
1990           54         122.37       2.27   2002         109       1,537.00     14.10
1991         121         185.65       1.53   2003         161       1,122.00       6.97
1992         462         702.61       1.52   2004         165       2,551.00     15.46
1993         909       1,235.36       1.36   2005         223       2,553.00     11.45
1994         487       1,522.78       3.13   2006         232       3,186.00     13.74
1995         361       1,811.29       5.02   2007         186       3,725.00     20.03
1996         187       1,916.04     10.25
Sources: Li 2004; Economic Development Bureau of TEDA 2001–07 .
multinational companies that represent the most advanced technology
worldwide, such as Coca-Cola, Halliburton, Honeywell, IBM, Kodak
Polychrome, Pepsi, and Motorola.
Rapid Growth of High-Tech Industries
TEDA has been focusing on the development of high-tech industries and
has made significant progress. At the beginning stage, TEDA paid special
attention to the development of high-tech industries and strengthened
the supporting facilities, including policy, human capital, and financial
services, to create a favorable environment. In 2004, the output of high-
tech products exceeded RMB 100 billion and went as high as RMB 197.35
billion in 2007, accounting for 58.9 percent of the total (see table 3.7).
Information and communications technology is the leading force of
TEDA’s high-tech industry, while biomedicine, aviation technology, new
energy, new materials, and environmental protection are playing an
increasingly significant role. 
TEDA’s objective is to attract foreign funds and develop its high-tech
industries, which have grown rapidly; as of the end of 2007, TEDA
included 218 high-tech enterprises and 46 certified software enterprises.
At present, with major funding from multinational companies, TEDA has
six high-tech industry clusters: the electronic information cluster, with
General Semiconductor, Mitsui, Motorola, Panasonic, and Samsung; the
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Table 3.6  Foreign Investment in TEDA, 1988–2007
Enterprises
with
increased
investment
Value of
increase
(US$ 
millions)
Average
increase
(US$ 
millions)
Enterprises
with
increased
investment
Value of
increase
(US$ 
millions)
Average
increase
(US$ 
millions)
Year 1988–97 Year 1998–2007
1988             6         4.82         0.80 1998             78     520.00         6.54
1989             1         0.19         0.19 1999             50     746.00       14.92
1990             5       13.71         2.74 2000             55   2,308.00       41.96
1991           15       15.26         1.02 2001             56   1,284.00       22.93
1992           26       51.09         1.97 2002             79   1,070.00       13.54
1993           48       50.90         1.06 2003             82   1,169.00       14.26
1994           59     314.22         5.33 2004           144     850.00         5.90
1995           62     979.00       15.79 2005           244   1,710.00         7.01
1996           97     867.00         8.94 2006           252   1,934.00         7.67
1997           52     340.00         6.54 2007           255   2,439.00         9.56
Sources: Li 2004; Economic Development Bureau of TEDA 2001–07. 
optical, mechanical, and electronic integration cluster, with Honeywell
and Merlin Gerin; the biomedicine cluster, with Novo Nordisk and
Smithkline Beecham; the new material cluster, with BBA and PPG; the
new energy cluster, with Energizer and Tong Yee; the machinery cluster
with leading companies such as SEW, SMG, and Toyota; and the environ-
mental protection cluster, with Veolia Water and Vestas (http://www
.teda.gov.cn).
TEDA has created a favorable environment for technology innovation.
As of 2007, there were 11 incubators, with a total incubation area of
296,800 square meters, 245 incubated enterprises, 27 engineering tech-
nology research centers, 35 enterprise technology centers, 45 research and
development (R&D) centers established by multinational companies, and
7 venture capital companies in TEDA. Companies in TEDA have made
great progress in researching, developing, and transforming bio-chips,
membrane technology, the electric automobile, stem cells, and nanometer
technology. As of 2007, TEDA enterprises have obtained 2,520 patents,
1,029 of which are invention patents and 1,790 of which are owned by
domestic enterprises. 
The Driving Economic Force of Tianjin
TEDA has become an increasingly significant force driving Tianjin’s eco-
nomic development. From 1986 to 2007, TEDA’s GDP increased from
RMB 9.35 million to RMB 93.87 billion, and gross industrial output from
RMB 38.72 million to RMB 335.07 billion. In the same period, the GDP
of Tianjin City increased from RMB 19.47 billion to RMB 501.83 billion,
and gross industrial output from RMB 34.473 billion to RMB 1,050.291
billion. The economic growth rate for TEDA was much higher than that
for Tianjin City (see table 3.8). The percentage of GDP, gross industrial
output, export value, and number of employees of TEDA increased from
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Table 3.7  Value of High-Tech Products in TEDA and Percentage of Gross Industrial
Output, 2001–07
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Output of high-tech
products 
(in millions of RMB) 50,042 61,664 71,987 109,693 143,152 186,658 197,354
High-tech products 
as % of gross 
industrial output 57.8 59.8 57.5 60.2 62.1 61.6 58.9
Source: Economic Development Bureau of TEDA 2001–07. 
0.05 percent, 0.11 percent, 0.16 percent, and 0.02 percent, respectively,
in 1986 to 18.71 percent, 31.90 percent, 48.50 percent, and 5.36 percent
respectively, in 2007—an increase of 18.66 percent, 31.79 percent, 48.34
percent, and 5.34 percent, respectively. 
Background on TEDA
Establishing special economic zones (SEZs) and economic and technolog-
ical development areas, which is a vital decision in the face of domestic
and international circumstances, is considered an important experiment
in China’s development policy. As forerunners of China’s export-oriented
economic development, the southeastern cities have competitive advan-
tages and abundant resource endowments, favorable geographic locations,
solid capital foundations, and good management skills and technology
bases. TEDA was established in 1984 after thorough research on location
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Table 3.8  Major Economic Indicators in TEDA, 1986–2007
Year % of GDP 
% of gross 
industrial output
% of
exports
% of 
employment
Number of 
employees (in 10,000)
1986       0.05                   0.11   0.16               0.02                 0.11
1987       0.40                   0.47   1.07               0.14                 0.64
1988       0.74                   0.70   2.25               0.19                 0.86
1989       0.65                   0.73   2.73               0.17                 0.80
1990       0.80                   1.15   3.57               0.31                 1.45
1991       1.96                   2.38   7.06               0.45                 2.14
1992       3.12                   3.21   9.14               0.78                 3.79
1993       4.72                   5.01 15.05               1.10                 5.52
1994       6.65                   8.50 22.68               1.64                 8.42
1995       8.60                 14.18 30.05               2.19               11.29
1996   11.68                 17.00 35.82               2.74               14.02
1997   12.15                 19.19 39.94               3.08               15.79
1998   13.10                 21.08 37.85               3.38               17.16
1999   13.89                 22.12 40.33               3.55               18.05
2000   15.07                 23.75 37.86               3.92               19.11
2001   16.26                 25.70 42.47               3.99               19.50
2002   17.67                 27.74 49.21               4.18               20.59
2003   17.27                 28.63 47.91               4.54               23.20
2004   17.04                 29.46 53.56               4.89               25.81
2005   17.37                 32.15 50.96               5.31               28.83
2006   17.91                 34.02 51.12               5.61               31.57
2007   18.71                 31.90 48.50               5.36               32.93
Sources: Li 2004, Economic Development Bureau of TEDA 2001–07. 
options, preferential policies, industry categories, capital funding, and
management systems.
The Drive toward Opening up and Reform
Before China adopted the opening up-policy, its economy suffered from
slow growth or economic stagnation and faced challenges of capital
shortages, out-of-date technology skills, foreign exchange restrictions,
and employment pressures. With the new science and technological rev-
olution driving the world economy at a faster pace, China was lagging
farther behind in economic as well as in scientific and technological
strength. In the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee
held in December 1978, the Communist Party shifted its focus to
Socialist modernization and adopted the opening-up policy. In July
1979, China began experimenting with special zones in Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen.4 Those SEZs have achieved miraculous
results, attracting attention throughout the world. The success of the
four special economic zones provided valuable experience for China at
that time. 
In February 1984, Deng Xiaoping said, “In addition to existing special
economic zones, we may consider opening more port cities. We would
not call them special economic zones, but similar policies could be
applied” (Deng 1983, 3: 51–51). The objective of opening up more cities
and establishing more economic-technological development areas in
coastal areas was to take advantage of their geographic locations, to build
up a favorable business environment to attract foreign investment to
these small regions as soon as possible, to promote the development of an
export-oriented economy, and to increase the degree of opening up.
Tianjin, as a vital port and traffic hinge in northern China—with an
advanced domestic and international trade system as well as a solid indus-
trial base—was considered a good location for establishing an economic
and technological development area. After thorough research and with
the approval of the State Council, the Tianjin Economic-Technological
Development Area was officially established in December 1984.
TEDA’s Abundant Endowments
In addition to the necessary conditions for an economic-technological
development area, TEDA has unique endowments that have played an
important role in promoting its rapid economic growth. These endow-
ments include abundant land, rich natural resources, transportation infra-
structure, and solid technology and human capital. 
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Abundant land. TEDA is west of Bohai Bay on a saline fluvial plain, land
that used to be a beach. It has an average elevation of 2.5 meters, but after
it was filled with earth for development, its elevation increased to 3.5
meters. It is part of the neo-cathaysian structural system. Its soil is soft,
and there is no seismic fault running through it. Currently, TEDA covers
40 square kilometers. Its southern part, known as the southern living
zone, is for residential apartments, government units, and financial serv-
ices, while the northern part, known as the industrial zone, is for manu-
facturing. The living zone covers about 11.3 square kilometers, the
industrial zone about 26.4 square kilometers, and the college zone and
the forest park about 3.1 square kilometers (http://www.teda .gov.cn).
The planning area of TEDA is 2,270 square kilometers, of which 1,100
square kilometers are saline-alkali wasteland, including tidal flats, and
some are low-yield farmland. The 1,100 square kilometers of wasteland
provide the land source for future development. 
Rich natural resources. Tianjin is rich in fuel, metallic ore, nonmetallic
minerals, and terrestrial heat resources. Dagang Oilfield and Bohai
Oilfield have plenty of natural gas reserves as well as wide distribution,
thick oil formations, good penetrability, low sulfur content, and high eco-
nomic value. TEDA could develop its petrol-chemical industry and
marine chemical industry, taking advantage of Tianjin’s solid foundation
in the chemical industry. Tianjin possesses a wide variety of metallic ores
and nonmetallic minerals, many of which are rare. Tianjin also has plenty
of coal reserves, and the largest medium- and low-temperature terrestrial
heat field among China’s cities. Tianjin’s terrestrial heat resources are
characterized by shallow embedment and good water quality. The regions
around Tianjin are also known for their rich natural resources. For
instance, Kailuan’s coal, Renqiu’s petroleum, Luanxian’s iron ore, and
Jidong’s architectural and refractory material are all within 200 kilometers
of Tianjin. In addition, the coal base in Shanxi Province and the fur pro-
duction area in Neimenggu are not far from Tianjin, about 500 kilometers
away (Gu 1984). 
Convenient transportation. Within a 500-kilometer radius of TEDA
are 17 percent of the nation’s population and 11 big cities, each of
which has a population of more than 1 million.5 Beijing and Tianjin
have a combined population of more than 20 million. Tianjin is also the
transportation hub (with both land and sea routes) for northern China.
Tianjin port was the first to use containers in China and takes a leading
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role in port throughput capacity, storehouse area, port facilities, and
automation. In the 1980s, Tianjin port ranked third in scale and fifth in
port throughput capacity in China, accommodating about a thousand
foreign ships annually with more than 20 ocean shipping routes and
trading with 168 countries and regions (Gu 1984). Tianjin is the eco-
nomic center and the industrial base of northern China, with an
advanced railway and highway network. The well-developed transporta-
tion infrastructure has contributed much to the region’s economy, pol-
itics, science, and technology as well as to its social development, making
TEDA the center of commerce, trade, and goods in the northern and
northwestern regions. 
Technology and human capital. Tianjin has provided significant sup-
port to technology and human resources for TEDA. Tianjin, an old
industrial city, serves as an important industrial base, with a full range of
industrial sectors, strong manufacturing capacity, high-quality industrial
products, and advanced production technology and therefore provides
strong economic returns. Tianjin’s leading enterprises and brand names
are of great importance in China. Furthermore, Tianjin has a competitive
advantage in research and development. A large number of engineers
work here, and scientific research institutions play a central role in this
region of northern China. 
Science and technology in some industries and disciplines take the
leading role in the country. Tianjin’s colleges and universities have also
made outstanding scientific and technological discoveries in both funda-
mental theory and applied science, which have helped the city strengthen
its technology base and improve its economic productivity. In this con-
text, the labor force in Tianjin is well educated (see table 3.9), but com-
pared to Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai, labor costs in Tanjin are
relatively low. 
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Table 3.9  Highest Educational Attainment of TEDA’s Labor Force, 2008
College and
university
degree
Senior high 
school (including 
technical 
secondary)
Junior
high
school
Primary
school
Number of people 5,121 8,218 9,263 2,239
% of population 19.7 31.7 35.7 8.6
Source: Li 2008. Based on the statistics of the fifth population census of Tianjin.
Importance of TEDA to Tianjin’s Economic Development
The establishment of TEDA was of vital importance to Tianjin’s eco-
nomic development because it helped promote the export-oriented
economy, introduce advanced technology from abroad, and explore new
patterns of economic development. TEDA relies on Tianjin for a sup-
portive environment and in return fosters the economic development of
the whole city. 
Promotion of an export-oriented economy. TEDA places a high prior-
ity on using foreign investment and developing export-oriented indus-
tries. A series of preferential policies has been implemented in TEDA
to attract foreign investment, such as a lower income tax rate of 15
percent for foreign-funded enterprises, and special policies for high-
tech and exporting companies. For foreign-funded enterprises, the for-
eign share of the enterprises’ profit can be remitted abroad without
paying income tax. All these preferential policies have made TEDA a
priority for foreign investors. More important, TEDA sets a good
example of how to improve the climate for foreign investment. TEDA
has gradually become the base for Tianjin’s export-oriented economy
and has promoted the awareness of foreign trade in developing the
regional economy. 
Introduction of advanced technology from abroad. The objectives behind
the establishment of TEDA are stated as follows:
TEDA shall introduce advanced technology in urgent need from abroad;
TEDA shall establish Sino-Foreign joint ventures and cooperative ventures
as well as foreign owned scientific research institutions in order to develop
cooperative production, collaborate research, discover new techniques, and
manufacture high end products; in this way, TEDA could boost export, and
share new technology and management experience with the inland areas
(Notice of State Council 1984). 
Therefore, TEDA has focused primarily on high-tech and high value-
added programs to promote technology upgrading and industrial
restructuring. The leading enterprises in TEDA—mostly high-tech com-
panies, some of which have world-class production technology—have
fueled rapid technology development in Tianjin as well as in its neigh-
boring regions. Meanwhile, some multinational companies have
invested in TEDA, which also benefits TEDA’s technology upgrading.
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Reliance on and service to the city. TEDA relies on the city of Tianjin,
which provides the nurturing environment for TEDA’s development,
including infrastructure, manufacturing industries, and human capital. In
return, TEDA provides crucial services for the city’s development.
Generally speaking, the advanced technology introduced in TEDA pro-
motes technological progress and industrial restructuring in the entire
city. TEDA has accumulated valuable experience in location choice, con-
struction planning, land utilization and management, and municipal con-
struction, which set a good example for the city and fuel new development
in Tianjin. TEDA is dedicated to developing high-tech industry through
top-of-the-line projects and to serving as the engine driving the technolog-
ical progress of the city. TEDA helps the city attract a large volume of for-
eign investment, with many foreign-funded enterprises, mainly exporting
companies, in an effort to expand the city’s foreign trade.
The Role of Government in the Construction of TEDA 
The Tianjin municipal government and its authorized organization—the
TEDA Administrative Commission—have played an important role in
the construction of TEDA. Together, they have conducted land exploita-
tion and administration, created an excellent investment environment,
and attracted outside investments by various means.
Land Exploitation and Administration
The government of TEDA implements its land exploitation policy pri-
marily through four patterns. The first pattern is called “indebted
exploitation.” In TEDA’s early years, a national development loan of
RMB 370 million was offered for indebted land exploitation, enabling
the building of infrastructure for a 3-square-kilometer industrial zone
and a 1.99-square-kilometer living zone, which laid a sound foundation
for TEDA’s further development. The second pattern is “roll exploita-
tion,” which entails first aggregating the land, then exploiting it, and
finally reclaiming it. A combination of income from land-use charges and
financial support from the Administrative Commission was reinvested in
land exploitation, with priority on the construction and improvement of
infrastructure, thereby creating a positive cycle of exploiting and
reclaiming land while investing. Given the insufficient funding, TEDA’s
roll exploitation approach ensured rapid land exploitation and provided
a good environment for large-scale foreign investment.
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The third pattern is called “segmented land exploitation” and operates
mainly in three ways (Pi and Wang 2004):
• First, the TEDA Administrative Commission, as owner of the land,
designates a certain piece of land and takes the exempted charge for
the use of land as the capital stock of the government. Then invest-
ment is introduced to make joint development, and then the devel-
oped land is sold, with profits for both sides. 
• Second, a potential foreign investor buys a piece of land from TEDA’s
Administrative Commission at a low price and creates a commercial
development, which is then sold to another investor at a profit.
• Third, the TEDA Administrative Commission uses the land as its share
of investment and establishes a real estate company jointly with other
foreign investors, developing land and obtaining profits through the
transfer of land. 
This segmented land exploitation pattern accelerated TEDA’s infrastruc-
ture construction and met the needs of TEDA’s rapid development; it also
relieved TEDA’s burden of land exploitation by itself and significantly
enhanced the scale and speed of land exploitation. 
The fourth land exploitation pattern is the direct transfer of land-use
rights to foreigners. As the first development area in China to make com-
pensated land-use rights available to foreign investors, the Land
Administration Bureau of TEDA signed a contract for “assignment of the
right to the use of land” with the U.S. MGM Commercial Co. in August
1989, offering the right to use 5.37 square kilometers of land for a max-
imum term of 70 years. The fourth pattern has greatly propelled reform
of the land-use system in China and has expanded foreign investment as
well. These four types of land exploitation have generated large profits
for TEDA, with the total exploited land increased by 20.6 percent annu-
ally within 18 years, from 4.99 square kilometers in 1988 to 42 square
kilometers in 2006 (http://www.teda.gov.cn).
To ensure effective land administration, the government of TEDA has
set up special organizations and issued a series of provisions and regula-
tions on land administration. As the official land administration authority,
the Construction Development Bureau Office of TEDA specializes in the
following administrative functions: implementing the city planning law of
China, managing the cadastre of state-owned land in TEDA, administer-
ing the assignments and transfers of land, registering land transfers, man-
aging land mortgages and donations, issuing certificates for the use of
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state-owned land, collecting taxes and charges on the use of state-owned
land, supervising the land market, and evaluating land values. The regu-
lations on land administration released by the government of TEDA
include mainly the following: Provisions on Land Administration in
TEDA in July 1985, Regulations on Compensated Assignment and
Transfer of the Right to the Use of the Land in TEDA in December 1988,
Measures on Applying to Use Land in TEDA, Measures on Charges for
Compensated Transfer of the Right to the Use of the Land in TEDA,
Implementation Measures on Compensated Assignment and Transfer of
the Right to the Use of Land in TEDA, Provisional Regulations on the
Right to the Use of Land in TEDA in December 1988, Provisional
Measures on the Auction of the Right to the Use of Land in TEDA in
July 1999, and so forth. The government of TEDA has implemented
effective land administration through the Construction Development
Bureau Office and through the administrative provisions and regulations
mentioned above.
TEDA’s Government and the Investment Environment 
To promote the development of TEDA, the government formulated an
integrated development plan. In addition, it has constructed infrastruc-
ture and a good physical environment, established specialized institutions
to promote investment, and provided sufficient financing.
Integrated development plan and implementation. An integrated
development plan provided the guidelines for the overall construction of
TEDA, including regional function orientation, industrial development
planning, strategies for attracting foreign investment, social and cultural
environment, environmental protection, regional image marketing, and
the like. The planning was rather simple at the beginning. The govern-
ment did not create the preliminary development plan until 1985. The
TEDA Administrative Commission constituted the Comprehensive
Master Plan of TEDA in 1996, which was further developed and adjusted
according to the construction and development practices of TEDA in
2001. In January 2008, the comprehensive plan was further revised and
extended in accordance with the overall development requirements of
Tianjin and the Binhai New Area. For planning administration, the TEDA
Administrative Commission issued the provisions on planning and design
administration of TEDA in March 1997, including the compilation and
approval of the comprehensive plan as well as detailed plans, administra-
tion of land planning for construction, administration of construction
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projects, legal liabilities, and so on. All of these were intended to reinforce
the planning administration, to ensure the implementation of the plan,
and to promote balanced economic and social development. 
Infrastructure and the environment. With regard to infrastructure, TEDA
had set a goal of “creating a favorable international investment environ-
ment” early on. The slogan had a number of implications. On the one
hand, the exacting environment suitable for the operation of modern
industrial enterprises was to be built according to international standards.
On the other hand, foreign enterprises were treated much as they were
in other countries. The infrastructure of TEDA consisted not only of res-
idential buildings, schools, hospitals, banks, post offices, custom bureaus,
and so on, but also a convenient transportation network. Currently, among
the national economic-technological development zones, TEDA is con-
sidered to have the best comprehensive infrastructure and facilities. 
For planting and ecological construction, TEDA administrative authori-
ties have issued Administrative Regulations on the Maintenance of Green
Lands, Administrative Regulations on the Transplant and Chopping of
Trees, Green Lands Management and Specification, and so on. The author-
ity has also promulgated the “green guaranty,” which mandates that enter-
prises in TEDA operate according to its environmental standards. The
administrative leadership is responsible for the major greening and planting
projects. In addition, obligatory tree-planting activities are held every year. 
The above measures have proved effective, with a continuously enlarg-
ing green area in TEDA and a green coverage rate exceeding 30 percent.
The Environmental Protection Office of TEDA, founded in 1985, was
restructured as the Environmental Protection Bureau in 1990, responsible
for environmental protection and supervision. At the end of 2000, TEDA
took the lead in passing the ISO14000 urban environmental certification.
By 2003, the planning of an eco-industrial park in TEDA was completed,
and in 2004 the plan was approved by the State Bureau of Environmental
Protection. In September 2007, the supervisory committee of the National
Eco-Industrial Demonstration Area came to TEDA for field research,
confirming that TEDA satisfies 19 of the 21 standards issued by the
State Bureau of Environmental Protection’s Criteria of Integrated Eco-
industrial Areas (trial edition) (http://www.teda.gov.cn).
Promotion of Foreign Investment 
Because attracting investment is TEDA’s key task, the investment promo-
tion authority serves an important role. Among its activities, it establishes
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specialized organizations to attract investment, continually adjusts TEDA’s
focus and approach, and administers industrial parks.
Specialized organizations for attracting investment. The Investment
Promotion Bureau and the Economic Development Bureau are mainly
in charge of investment promotion in TEDA. The former is responsible
for preparation, negotiation, and approval of investment projects;
organizing activities; marketing and maintaining investment clients;
and facilitating TEDA’s overall operation. The Economic Development
Bureau assists the Investment Promotion Bureau in attracting invest-
ment, with a special focus on domestic investment projects. The offices
of TEDA have been set up in many domestic cities including Beijing,
Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, China, and as well as overseas,
including the United States, Japan, Singapore, and Europe. These
offices are responsible for communication with governments, enter-
prises, and other organizations, for marketing TEDA, and for Tianjin’s
favorable investment environment. Furthermore, many well-known
native and foreign experts are employed as consultants for TEDA,
which serves as an additional means for expanding the network to
attract investment. 
TEDA’s focus and approach. When TEDA was established in the late
1980s, the focus on attracting investment meant upgrading technology
and promoting foreign trade. By 1993, that adjustment had been made,
and priority shifted to larger projects and bigger financial syndicates to
strengthen cooperation with multinational companies. In 1996, the focus
changed again, expanding beyond industry to include infrastructure, com-
merce, and finance, among others. 
Since 2000, TEDA has put more emphasis on technology innovation
and has transformed itself from an export-oriented manufacturing district
into a high-tech industrial center. Along with the shifting emphasis,
TEDA’s approach to attracting investment has been adjusted accordingly.
At the beginning, the project contract system was adopted to make
administration uniform, with a focus on marketing and networking. In
1993, as more aggressive guidelines for attracting investment were put in
place, TEDA undertook large-scale marketing with an emphasis on large
multinational companies. Since 2000, TEDA has strengthened its com-
prehensive approach to attracting investment by promoting technology
investment, industry investment, international investment, brand invest-
ment, and domestic investment, among others. 
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Industrial parks. To promote investment, TEDA offers good services to
industrial parks. It administers three major industrial parks: TEDA
Microelectronics Industrial Park, TEDA Yat-Sen Scientific-Industrial
Park, and TEDA Chemical Industrial Park. TEDA Microelectronics
Industrial Park was built in 1996 with the objective of becoming China’s
Silicon Valley. The industrial park accommodates the specific needs of
individual companies by making regular visits to the enterprise. By 2006,
the total accumulated investment amounted to US$1.12 billion in TEDA
Microelectronics Industrial Park, with 92 registered enterprises located in
the park, 61 of which were foreign-funded enterprises and 31 domestic.
TEDA Yat-Sen Scientific-Industrial Park was built in 1993 and offers
high-quality services to the enterprises in the park. By 2006, the total
project investment amounted to US$826 million. The industrial structure
was initially intended to focus on electronics, automobile components,
and machinery manufacturing. TEDA Chemical Industrial Park was
established in 1995, with an emphasis on the development of marine
chemical industries, fine chemical industries, and downstream petro-
chemical products. In 2005, the Chemical Industrial Park was named
most valuable petrochemical park for investment in China. By the end of
2006, there were 40 registered enterprises in the park, and the total
investment was US$585 million (http://www.teda.gov.cn).
TEDA’s Preferential Tax and Fiscal Policies
TEDA’s outstanding economic development relies heavily on a series of
favorable tax and fiscal policies. These policies have been constantly
adjusted to sustain fast economic growth in the region. 
Taxes and Tariffs
The favorable tax policies implemented during TEDA’s initial period
affected mainly enterprise income tax, sales tax, and tariffs. The enterprise
income tax rate for foreign-funded manufacturing enterprises was 15 per-
cent. Those established more than 10 years could enjoy two years of
income tax exemption from the year they started making profits and
could pay half the tax in the following three years (“two-free three-
halves,” for short). Those whose annual export value exceeded 70 percent
of their total annual production could enjoy a 10 percent enterprise
income tax rate. High-tech enterprises could enjoy three more years of
half-tax. Foreign enterprises that introduced advanced technology to
China for free or on favorable terms were exempted from business tax
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and enterprise income tax, and the income from technology transfer was
exempted from sales tax.
During TEDA’s rapid development, the favorable tax policies gradually
became more specific. Complementing the existing policies, new tax poli-
cies came into being. Accordingly, foreign-funded enterprises investing in
infrastructure were to pay an enterprise income tax rate of 15 percent
and, from their first profitable year, enjoyed a tax exemption for the first
five years, followed by a half-tax rate for the next five years. Advanced
technology and high-tech enterprises, from their first year of production,
were to enjoy “two-free three-halves” as well as a favorable enterprise
income tax rate of 10 percent for three more years. And foreign financial
institutions, from their first profitable year, were to pay an income tax
rate of 15 percent and to enjoy a one-year tax exemption and half-tax for
the next two years.
Preferential tariff policies in TEDA have remained stable except in 1996.
For TEDA enterprises, export is exempted from export tariffs. Construction
materials, manufacturing equipment, raw materials, parts and accessories,
vehicles, office supplies, and management equipment imported by enter-
prises for self-use, as well as goods and vehicles that foreign entrepreneurs
imported for home use, are exempted from import tariffs. The exemption
policy for import tariffs was abolished in 1996 but restored in 1998. Foreign
enterprises’ share of profits is exempted from export tax when remitted
abroad. Products processed in TEDA with materials or semifinished prod-
ucts from the mainland, and with value added of more than 20 percent,
could be regarded as products of the development zone and be
exempted from export tariffs. Foreign-funded enterprises are exempted
from import tariffs and import-related taxes when they import self-use
equipment that could not be manufactured in mainland China.
Favorable Fiscal Policies 
TEDA is allowed to issue favorable policies and regulations in support of
enterprises using discretionary government revenues. At the beginning,
these favorable policies were mainly for the manufacturing sector. As
TEDA developed, fiscal policies tended to favor high-tech industries and
the service sector. Specifically, TEDA’s favorable fiscal policies aim to
encourage high-tech industries, promote a modern service sector, and
expand the outsourcing of services. 
Encouraging high-tech industries. The administrative council of TEDA
allocates 5 percent of its disposable annual revenue to a scientific and
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technology development fund to support the development of high-tech
industries. High-tech enterprises and R&D institutions that purchase
land for production or R&D in the zone receive corresponding con-
struction support according to the scale and density of the investment
and quality of the project. High-tech enterprises that enjoy a favorable
income tax rate of 15 percent receive 100 percent financial support in
the first two years and 50 percent in the following three years. High-
tech enterprises in the start-up stage can receive rent subsidies for up to
three years when they rent buildings for research, administration, or
production. High-tech manufacturing enterprises can receive subsidies
for up to 50 percent of the interest on their loans when investing in
fixed assets.
Promoting a modern service sector. TEDA has established the TEDA
Modern Service Sector Development Fund with RMB 100 million from
its annual budget to support modern service enterprises. Headquarters of
domestic-funded enterprises and regional headquarters of multinationals
can receive operational support ranging from RMB 10 million to RMB 20
million, according to their registered capital, and their business and enter-
prise income tax can be exempted for two years from the approved year
and halved for the following three years. Financial enterprises set up in
the zone can receive operational support ranging from RMB 2 million to
RMB 10 million in accordance with their registered capital, and their
business tax can be exempted within the first two years after approval of
the application and halved for the following three years. Professional serv-
ices, logistics, trade, culture, and the conference and exhibition industry
can also receive financial support to offset the value-added tax, business
tax, enterprise income tax, loan interest, and so on.
Expanding service outsourcing. Enterprises that meet the requirements
of the Regulations on Promoting the Development of Service
Outsourcing of TEDA can receive subsidies when they purchase or rent
office buildings in the zone. Service outsourcing enterprises engaging in
software R&D and technology R&D and design can take advantage of
national and municipal tax supports. For other types of service outsourc-
ing enterprises, from the year of establishment, part of the business tax
and income tax collected by the municipal government can be exempted
for the first two years and halved for the following three years. Service
outsourcing training institutions that meet the requirements of the regu-
lations can receive fiscal support amounting to 50 percent of municipally
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collected business tax and enterprise income tax for five years starting
from the year of establishment.
Other Favorable Policies
Besides preferential fiscal and tax policies, TEDA has also implemented
special treatment for enterprise operations: 
• TEDA’s examination and approval power for foreign investment is
similar to the practice in the four special economic zones and has even
a higher quota for using and borrowing foreign exchange. 
• TEDA attracts a talented labor force for R&D in enterprises or scien-
tific research institutions in the zone through favorable housing poli-
cies, research funding, and subsidies for children’s education as well as
assistance in Hukou6 transfer and the evaluation of positional titles. 
• Administrative fees have been abandoned, except those required by
law and regulations. 
• The establishment of nonprofit organizations for education, culture,
science and technology, and health, among other aspects of public
welfare, can benefit from discounts or exemptions from venue fees af-
ter approval from the administrative council of TEDA. Enterprises in-
vesting in the construction and operation of the water supply, gas,
electricity, heating, sewerage, roads, and other infrastructure projects
pay reduced venue fees or are exempted from them. Land used for
production, infrastructure projects, standard factory buildings, high-
tech industries, venture capital, manufacturing, and service sectors can
enjoy favorable land rents according to the needs of different projects
and in some instances can be exempted from them.
TEDA’s Success
After 24 years of reform and development, TEDA is the development
area with the strongest overall strength in China and has also become the
new driving force for Tianjin’s social and economic development. Binhai
New Area, with TEDA at the center, has become one of the three major
sources of China’s economic growth and the economic center of north-
ern China, along with Shenzhen City in Guangdong Province and the
Pudong economic zone in Shanghai. During the development and open-
ing up process, TEDA gained important experience and learned valuable
lessons, which are elaborated in this section to provide guidance for other
economic and technology development areas.
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TEDA’s Low-Cost Advantage in Land, Labor, and Infrastructure
TEDA’s land costs were fairly low in its early stage of development. TEDA
is located on a saline-alkali wasteland, 45 kilometers east of its home city,
Tianjin. The preliminary planning area was 33 square kilometers. Because
the saline-alkali wasteland is state-owned land, TEDA obtained the land-
use rights free. Consequently, the land expropriation cost was largely
reduced. Furthermore, because the wasteland was unpopulated, no reloca-
tion costs were involved. Therefore, TEDA’s initial advantage of low-cost
land provided a solid foundation for its future development.
The high-quality but low-cost labor force has also attracted enterprises
to TEDA. The home city of Tianjin has always been an important manu-
facturing center of China. The number of workers in various sectors in
Tianjin has been growing steadily and their labor skills continuously
improving, satisfying the different demands for labor resources.
Therefore, enterprises in TEDA have easy access to skilled employees. At
the same time, the wages in Tianjin have been far below the average in
other coastal cities in eastern China, which strengthens the competitive-
ness of the enterprises that settle in TEDA. 
The industrial environment and infrastructure in TEDA also facilitate
lower-cost production. Tianjin provides a solid industrial base with compre-
hensive industry sectors easily coordinating with one another. Therefore,
enterprises here can find compatible supporting vendors without much
difficulty. As a result, enterprises in TEDA can not only guarantee quality
of production, but also cut the transportation costs of importing parts and
accessories from overseas. The sound supporting environment is able to
reduce overall manufacturing costs and facilitate TEDA’s sustainable and
balanced development.
TEDA’s International Transportation and Communications
TEDA has an obvious geographical advantage: its proximity to Tianjin
port. Tianjin port, which is adjacent to TEDA, is the largest port in north-
ern China and also ranks among the top 10 artificial deepwater ports in
the world. It is an important foreign trade port in northern China, having
trade relations with more than 400 ports in more than 180 countries and
regions. Tianjin port possesses large throughput capacity and has become
an important port in international trade. With convenient access to
Tianjin port, TEDA has a gateway to the world in northern China and the
front runner in trade cooperation.
TEDA also has an obvious advantage in transportation, with more
than a dozen roads and highways connecting it with other big cities and
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industrial centers and its railway systems linked to the national railway
network. Commodities can be transported to any part of the country and
can be reexported to Europe through Mongolia, which is the shortest and
most convenient route to Europe. Tianjin International Airport, right next
to TEDA, with 39 international and domestic airlines, is the largest air cargo
center in northern China and is considered a substitute international
airport for Beijing.
In addition, TEDA has a historical and cultural heritage of interna-
tional communication and exchange. Tianjin is an old commercial port
city, first opened as a trading port in the 19th century. The city has a long
history of foreign trade and close commercial interaction with countries
around the world. The residents in Tianjin have a good understanding of
foreign customs, lifestyles, values, and beliefs after years of experience in
international communications and exchange. Meanwhile, Tianjin is a pop-
ular residential location for foreigners who have become familiar with
local customs. It offers a good example of how cultural exchange promotes
commercial interaction. 
Committed Government and Efficient Public Services
TEDA has gained the attention and commitment of the central govern-
ment. In the early stages of planning, the central leadership considered
many locations and conducted field investigations before choosing
TEDA. During the construction of the development area, the central
leadership often gave guidance, solved problems on the spot, and issued
preferential policies for TEDA’s development. In 1986, when Deng
Xiaoping visited TEDA, he was pleased to make the inscription, “TEDA
is a promising development area,” which greatly inspired the people
involved in TEDA’s construction and development. In the meantime, as a
state-level development area, TEDA can often communicate directly
with and make recommendations to central ministries and commissions.
Ministries and commissions can also directly respond to TEDA. This
interaction has effectively promoted its development.
The government of TEDA is pragmatic and innovative. It pays a lot of
attention to the training of a talented labor force, invites Nankai
University and other well-known institutions to build their campuses in
the development area, experiments in vocational education, cooperates
with partners in Germany and Spain to facilitate multilevel support for
talent, and has transformed TEDA into an educational base. The govern-
ment of TEDA emphasizes innovation in science and technology as well
as construction of major scientific and technology innovation platforms,
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such as innovation parks, R&D centers, and industrialization bases. The
government operates according to law, makes regulations conforming to
international conventions, and forms internal management systems of
laws and regulations. In the process of streamlining economic laws related
to foreign trade after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO),
the legal system in TEDA rose to the challenge.
In addition, TEDA boasts efficient public services. The government
strives to create a “compatible international investment environment”
according to international standards, to build up infrastructure in line
with the requirements of international investors, to place the rights of
enterprises first, and to restrain from intervening in legitimate business
activities. The government of TEDA aims to create a “service-oriented
government” with simple and efficient approval processes and to avoid
administrative fees. As a separate office of the Tianjin government, the
TEDA management committee is structured efficiently, combining rele-
vant functional departments and establishing fiscal administration that
ensures independent taxation and budget processes. This management
system is highly delegated and specialized with sole concentration on
economic development; it strives to achieve lower costs and enhanced
efficiency.
Policy Advantages of the Special Economic Zone
Shortly after TEDA was established, the central government provided
some preferential tax and finance policies that allowed TEDA to speed
up its development. At the same time, TEDA also established some spe-
cific policies, such as giving preferable land terms to well-known enter-
prises and offering financial support to investing enterprises. TEDA’s
initial purpose was to attract foreign investment, which requires
reforming policies for taxation, foreign exchange, finance, and customs.
For example, allowing foreign companies to recruit and fire Chinese
workers was an unprecedented approach at that time. These policy
reforms made breakthroughs in TEDA’s practices and distinguished
TEDA from other development areas, contributing to the concentration
of high-quality resources in the area and to the formation of an optimal
operational environment for the enterprises. All the high-quality
resources are used efficiently in TEDA and have greatly affected the
area’s development. Thanks to these favorable policies, TEDA has real-
ized remarkable economic development and has become the area with
the most vibrant economic activity and the fastest rate of economic
growth.
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Environment for Sustainable Development in TEDA
TEDA’s administrative committee is in a separate office from the Tianjin
government. It performs general administrative functions and is author-
ized to enact reforms in the role of government, organizational structure,
planning, and construction. To ensure a smooth transition from traditional
administration, the Tianjin TEDA Administrative Regulation granted
legal status to TEDA at its inception. The legislation regulates land trans-
fer, registration of foreign companies, and employment policy by foreign
companies. TEDA is legally authorized to experiment with various pio-
neering reforms. Given the incomplete legal system in China at that time,
the legislative guarantee for the development of the export-oriented
economy represents one of the innovative approaches in TEDA. In addi-
tion, innovation pushes forward the internal reform of TEDA, as it imple-
ments institutional autonomy and efficiency. 
At present, institutional reform relies heavily on the knowledge of
relationships among different institutions. The comprehensive reform
now being instituted is aimed at resolving unbalanced institutional rela-
tionships. The central government has approved Binhai New Area as a
pilot area to put in place these broad reforms. As one of the core func-
tional regions in the pilot program, TEDA can now provide important
support for such reforms. Therefore, these reforms have become a new
institutional advantage for TEDA. In accordance with the general rules
of socioeconomic development, TEDA can make full use of the first-
mover advantages of the reform and seek specific policies and regula-
tions suitable for its development. In other words, compared with the
neighboring area, the most important institutional advantage of TEDA
is the authority to carry out reforms and experiments. TEDA has con-
tinually expanded the spectrum of reform and promoted sustainable
development through a combination of major breakthroughs and gen-
eral innovation, of economic system reform and reform in other aspects,
and of practical problem solving in local areas and theoretical problem
solving. 
Challenges Faced by TEDA
TEDA has already made extraordinary achievements, moving Tianjin’s
social and economic development forward. Many lessons have been
drawn from this process. As an innovative experiment, however, TEDA
has accumulated valuable experience that can be shared with development
areas in other countries and regions.
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Balancing Favorable Policies and Market Competition
The central government has granted certain preferential policies to
support the development of TEDA. And TEDA itself has also created
favorable policies critical to the fast development of the area. With its
entry into the WTO and the deepening of its opening-up reforms,
China has witnessed profound changes in its economy and society. But
development zones, along with the local special economic zones, now
suffer from the diminishing advantages of favorable government poli-
cies. According to the principles of fair trade, transparency, and fair
competition, those favorable policies were weakened or even abol-
ished after China’s entry into the WTO. In effect, enterprises from
home and abroad now enjoy the same policy environment, enterprises
from inside or outside are to be treated equally, and nondevelopment
zones will also benefit from similar favorable policies, such as taxa-
tion, land, and investment. For instance, the enterprise income tax on
enterprises in development zones used to be 15 percent, compared to
the average tax rate of 24 percent. The Enterprise Income Tax Law of
China (2007) indicates that the enterprise income tax in all areas
should be levied equally eventually. Moreover, favorable policies
should be made and executed in line with standards and regulations
on transparency, and afterward those policies implemented in the
development zones can be applied to areas outside the zones.
TEDA’s policy advantages are gradually diminishing. Because regional
policy disparities will be eliminated and information can be shared
between development zones, TEDA must deal with competition from
other zones and the conflicts arising from attracting investment among
development zones. TEDA, however, has already achieved an excellent
reputation, making it an attractive option for investors:
• TEDA is a national development zone with standard management and
high reliability, which makes a difference when it comes to negotiat-
ing with foreign investors interested in TEDA, because they trust na-
tional-level development zones.
• Owing to close contact with foreigners, TEDA has trained a team of
talented people with advanced knowledge and high productivity. 
• TEDA provides an exceptional investment environment and excellent
public services. As a national development zone, TEDA can directly
communicate with central ministries and commissions and lobby on
behalf of the enterprises in the zone.
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Dealing with Land Use 
To some extent, TEDA’s fast development and expansion came at the
price of rapid land exploitation. Land was not considered a scarce
resource at the beginning stage of TEDA’s development. To attract invest-
ment, the zone adopted several land-use measures, such as indebted
exploitation, roll exploitation, financing exploitation, and the like to
accelerate land exploitation, which solved the land-use problem and
boosted the real estate industry and service sectors. The low cost of trans-
ferring land-use rights, however, was used to attract foreign investment.
For example, when TEDA was first established, the lowest market price
for land was only 14 yuan per square meter, which was just 10 percent of
its cost (Pi and Wang 2004). Therefore, the price of land did not reflect
its real value and cannot be treated as an independent commodity. 
At present, TEDA’s restriction on land resources has already become a
challenge to its future development for several reasons. First, demand for
land is rising continuously as the scale of manufacturing grows larger and
larger. TEDA is faced with diminished land resources because neighboring
administrations are unwilling to transfer land to TEDA. Second, the price
of neighboring land has been rising rapidly as a result of TEDA’s prosper-
ity. Land exploitation cost per acre is several times higher than it was when
TEDA was launched, making land expansion a daunting task. TEDA can-
not expand without substantial expenditures on more land. Thus, the most
urgent issue for TEDA now is to figure out how to control its scale, how
to restructure its industrial composition, and how to use land efficiently.
Dealing with the Relationship between TEDA and Tianjin
TEDA relies on the home city of Tianjin and in turn serves the city as
well. On the one hand, TEDA’s smooth development relies on the indis-
pensable benefits of the sound infrastructure, industrial environment, and
labor force of the home city. On the other hand, the development zone
provides a stimulus for the city’s further economic development with its
intensive industrial capacity and modern technology, making itself a new
pillar for the home city’s growth. However, frictions between the two
arise for several reasons.
The first reason is distance. TEDA is in a remote area of the city, like a
“lonely geographic island,” which has led to the high cost of infrastructure
construction, diseconomy of scale, and high operational costs of the enter-
prises in the zone. Moreover, other elements of the zone are incomplete as
a result of its focus on industry. Business facilities, tourism, leisure, culture,
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and recreation are not provided for, and as a result the zone is almost
empty after working hours. Being distant from the home city reduces the
environmental advantage of the zone. 
The second reason is attracting investment. As the policy advantages
lessen, foreign investors will prefer to invest in the home city, which has
more comprehensive city amenities, for the sake of lower cost. Currently,
enterprises want to register in the zone in the hope of favorable policies and
services but physically locate in the city for better facilities. This phenome-
non has become common, creating frictions between the zone and the city.
The third reason is administrative conflict. In its initial years, TEDA’s
gross production and scale of economy were relatively small, contributing
little to the city’s GDP. After 24 years of rapid development, today the
development zone has become the fastest-growing area in Tianjin and has
close contact with the outside world and therefore more interaction with
the city. The power delegated to TEDA’s administrative committee has
been gradually diluted through various administrative regulations by dif-
ferent government departments, and in some circumstances its authority
has been revoked by the municipality, resulting in longer government
procedures and lower government efficiency. 
Dealing with Industrial Development in the Zone
TEDA takes modern manufacturing as its leading sector, aiming to
become a modern high-tech manufacturing base featuring multinational
corporations. These corporations, however, set up only their manufactur-
ing facilities in TEDA, which is the least-profitable link in the business
chain. The more-profitable parts, those with higher value added, are not
based in TEDA. Take Motorola as an example. Motorola’s materials pro-
curement and sales are in Beijing, while its R&D is performed abroad,
leaving only manufacturing in TEDA. Of the three production centers for
multinational corporations—manufacturing, production services, and
R&D—the manufacturing center is not the focal point of competitiveness
anymore, R&D having taken its place. Because TEDA specializes mostly
in manufacturing rather than R&D, technology innovation and high-tech
industry are relatively weak. Few corporations have obtained their own
intellectual property rights in TEDA. Therefore, the serious challenges for
TEDA are how to induce R&D departments of multinational corpora-
tions to come into the zone and how to accelerate the development of
technology innovation. 
The modern service sector has developed as the result of industrial
restructuring and upgrading, which have affected the city’s development
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direction and economic performance. Industry-oriented development in
TEDA has resulted in a relatively backward service sector. As shown in
table 3.10, the proportion of tertiary industry production in 1999 was
only 22.4 percent and fell to only 17.5 percent in 2007. Because of the
backward service industry and the long distance from the urban district,
the cost of living and commuting in the zone is comparatively high. This
situation is not only inconvenient for people working in TEDA, but also
detrimental to the industrial development of the area. How to accelerate
the modern service sector is an urgent issue for TEDA. At present, TEDA
is emphasizing the “headquarters’ economy,” which means promoting a
full spectrum of services by introducing company headquarters into the
zone, leading to more opportunities for employment and economic
expansion. 
Lessons Learned from TEDA
TEDA’s experiences offer broadly applicable lessons. Based on TEDA’s suc-
cessful experience, we have arrived at the following policy recommendations
for economic and development areas in other countries and regions. 
Give Priority to Advanced Open Port Areas
Coastal areas—with more advanced transportation systems, industrial
bases, technology, managerial capacity, and education—are experienced in
foreign trade and in economic and technology cooperation with inland
areas (Notice of State Council 1984). These advantages are important
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Table 3.10  Proportion of Secondary and Tertiary Industry Production in TEDA,
1991–2007
percent
1991–99
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Secondary       93.5       92.8       70.6       80.2       84.2       84.5       82.3       77.7       77.6
Tertiary         6.5         7.2       29.4       19.8       15.1       15.5       17.7       22.3       22.4
2000–07
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Secondary       79.1       78.6       78.9       79.7       83.1       84.3       83.9       82.5
Tertiary       20.9       21.4       21.1       20.3       16.9       15.7       16.1       17.5
Sources: Adapted from Journal of Tianjin Economics and Technology Development Zone; Tianjin Economics and 
Technology Development Zone 2001–07.
Note: No primary industry exists in TEDA currently.
factors for attracting foreign investment. In addition, with a long history
of international exchange and communication, coastal areas are less con-
strained by tradition and more open to new ideas. Therefore, the reforms
required for investment, employment, market, and government regula-
tions can be more easily implemented with fewer struggles to break free
from the old system. Given favorable policies, the coastal areas can pro-
mote science and technology, share management experience, boost
domestic markets, expand foreign trade, and train the workforce to sup-
port and facilitate economic development in their adjacent regions as well
as across the country. 
Adjust Favorable Policies according to Contract Commitment 
and Development Stage
Favorable policies were crucial to TEDA’s development in the early
period. The special policies helped attract foreign funds and allocate
domestic resources to TEDA to accelerate its development. We should be
cautious about adjusting these policies, however, because policies, if
adjusted frequently, directly affect investors’ confidence in the govern-
ment and negatively affect prospective development in the region. For
example, the tax exemption for the equipment imported by foreign-
funded enterprises was abolished in 1996. Because of this policy change,
many multinational companies suspended their investment plans, and
many prospective investors backed away. As a result, the follow-up proj-
ects in TEDA slowed down and as did economic growth. Although the
policy was reinstated in 1998, the initial change led to huge losses for the
development area in just a short time. Of course, though, with economic
development and a changing market environment, some policy adjust-
ments are inevitable. Since the accession of China into the WTO, the
favorable policies in general have declined in number, and the policies for
equal competition have been strengthened. Contract commitment and
appropriate policy adjustment should be given more attention. 
Grant Administrative Autonomy for Provision of Public Services
The role of government is key to the future of TEDA. It is very important
for the local government to give the administrative committee of TEDA
appropriate autonomy so that TEDA can form an innovative managerial
system that meets market needs and permits dealing with foreign
investors more flexibly and efficiently. Certainly, it is critical to define the
role of the government of TEDA, with a clear relationship between gov-
ernment and market. The main responsibilities of the government are
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to establish sound regulations for foreign-funded enterprises, to work
efficiency, and to provide the good facilities and convenient living condi-
tions necessary for foreign investors. The government of TEDA should be
involved only in regulating markets and should not be involved with or
interfere in business operation. Nor should the enterprises depend on the
government. The government pursues service-oriented management for
enterprises, creates a sound market economy in TEDA, and empowers
enterprises with full autonomy in operation without interference in legal
business activities. The new pattern of government-business relationships
helps the government provide better public services and helps enterprises
maximize their profits, creating a win-win situation. 
Allocate Resources in a Local Context with a National Perspective
TEDA’s development should make full use of its comparative advantages,
relying on its rich local resources. For example, if the local area has abun-
dant skilled workers, it should take advantage of lower labor costs. On the
one hand, optimizing resource allocation can lower cost, improve prof-
itability, and turn the resource advantage into incentives for faster indus-
trial development. On the other hand, through favorable institutions and
policies, the development area can compensate for its own resource dis-
advantages by introducing the basic elements for economic development
that are missing in the area. 
Pioneering institutions and policies help the area attract resources
throughout the country for more effective allocation. For example, capital,
technology, and talented labor from other parts of the country relocate in
TEDA because of its favorable institutions and policies. 
Government Plan, Market Control
TEDA’s great success relies on the government’s commitment and pro-
motion. At each development stage of TEDA, the government prepares
development plans, ensuring the right direction for industry. The frame-
work defined by the government, however, should be complemented by
market forces instead of being regulated only by the government, an
approach that might be called “government plan, market control.” It is
one of the principles that TEDA adheres to for its development and
land planning. Government should support the enterprises that comply
with the industrial development plan through favorable tax and fiscal
policy instead of intervening through administrative measures.
Industrial restructuring and upgrading in the development area are
related to the quantity and quality of foreign investment, particularly
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from large multinational companies. Therefore, industrial upgrading
should take into account the development strategy of multinational com-
panies. In this way, the development area is able to make full use of market
regulation and improve the investment climate to attract more foreign
multinational companies. 
Notes
1. If not otherwise stated, all the data are from the Web site of the Tianjin
Economic–Technological Development Area. 
2. The historical name Hong Kong refers to the period before July 1, 1997, when
the former British colony was restored to China; Hong Kong, China refers to
any time after that date. 
3. The foreign enterprises include investment in Hong Kong, China; Macao,
China; and Taiwan, China. 
4. The term special economic zone was officially adopted in 1980. 
5. In China, 32 cities have a population of more than 1 million people. 
6. Hukou is China’s residential registration system. 
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The Kunshan Economic-Technological Development Zone (KETD) was
established in 1985 and was recognized as a provincial-level development
zone in 1991. Then in 1992, because of its success, the State Council ele-
vated it to the national level. With 20 years of development experience,
KETD has expanded from 3.75 square kilometers to 115 square kilometers
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and has become the leading force in Kunshan’s economic development
and scientific and technological progress. From 2001 to 2008, KETD
was ranked among the top four national development zones for eight
consecutive years by a comprehensive nationwide assessment of state-
level development zones conducted by the Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) (Administrative Committee of KETD 2009, 5). Some
comparisons between Kunshan and other major state-level develop-
ment zones can be seen in table 4.1. 
This case study will analyze KETD’s background and history and the
roles that the local government has played during the process of its devel-
opment. The chapter will start with KETD’s development performance
and then summarize its successful experiences and lessons. It will con-
clude by putting forward some suggestions and policy measures for future
development.
Table 4.1  Key Indicators for Kunshan and Other Major State-Level Development
Zones in China, 2008
Indicator Tianjin Suzhou Guangzhou Kunshan Qingdao Yantai Beijing 
GDP
(RMB 100 million) 1,066 1,002 1,140 843 725 650 566
GIP
(RMB 100 million) 3,730 3,000 2,945 3,317 2,016 1,950 2,020
Tax revenue
(RMB 100 million) 238 197 235 86 93 77 158
Local general 
budget revenue
(RMB 100 million) 76 95 109 36 74 32 70
Total imports 
and exports
(US$100 million) 333 620 218 506 130 235 244
Actually 
utilized FDI
(US$100 million) 25.1 18.0 10.3 9.2 12.5 5.5 5.4
High-tech 
enterprises
(number) 225 384 212 54 134 135 597
High-tech 
enterprise output
(RMB 100 million) 1,999 1,482 945 704 1,387 1,429 1,630
Source: Administrative Committee of KETD 2009.
The Major Achievements of KETD
Since its inception in 1984, KETD has made remarkable achievements.
These achievements include those in the investment environment, in for-
eign investment, in the regional economy, in the contribution of large-
scale industries, in park construction, and in industrial spillover.
First, the investment environment has been significantly improved.
Kunshan, situated to the west of Shanghai and to the east of Suzhou, has
a unique geographical location. Over more than 20 years, KETD has spent
nearly RMB 20 billion on the infrastructure, including transportation,
telecommunications, water, energy, and environmental protection, among
others. Kunshan has more than 100 kilometers of local major and minor
roads, and on average, each of them has four to six lanes covered with
asphalt. They are connected to the Shanghai-Nanjing Expressway, State
Highway 312, the Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport Road, and the
Shanghai-Nanjing railway, offering very convenient transportation.
Furthermore, it has set up international schools, foreign-funded hospitals,
foreign enterprise service centers, and an inland customs office. KETD has
also established an ISO14000 national demonstration zone, which has
created a good environment for investors.
Second, it has attracted a high volume of foreign investment. As of
2009, KETD had introduced some 1,600 foreign investment projects
from 43 countries, economies, and regions such as Europe; the United
States; Japan; Republic of Korea; Hong Kong, China; and Taiwan, China,
with contracted foreign direct investment (FDI) of US$14.6 billion and
actually utilized foreign capital of more than US$8 billion. Among these
investments, those from Taiwan, China accounted for 55 percent. The
newly introduced FDI is more likely to finance larger-scale projects,
wholly foreign ownership, and a higher level of new technologies. Up
until 2009, 41 projects had an investment value of more than US$100
million, and 511 projects had more than US$10 million. Worldwide, 45
of the world’s top 500 firms have invested in Kunshan or set up factories
(Administrative Committee of KETD 2010, 1–2). A number of high-tech
enterprises such as InfoVision and Nan Ya have their roots in the Kunshan
Development Zone.
Third, the regional economy is developing rapidly. In 2009, the
regional gross domestic product (GDP) saw a year-on-year rise of 14.4
percent, reaching RMB 96.4 billion. The industrial output value realized
was RMB 375.34 billion, up by 13.1 percent on a year-on-year basis.
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More than 40 enterprises have a total output and sales value exceeding
RMB 1 billion. The total value of exports and imports reached US$53.3
billion, increasing by 5.5 percent, with the value of exports reaching
US$36.5 billion. Nearly 30 companies had more than $0.1 billion worth
of exports. The tax revenue has grown steadily year after year, and in
2009, it exceeded RMB 10 billion for the first time in history, reaching
RMB 11.98 billion, up by 28.81 percent (Administrative Committee of
KETD 2010, 1–2). The tax revenue of Kunshan has continuously ranked
number one among the counties of Suzhou. The open development of
KETD has driven the industrialization, urbanization, and urban-rural
integration of Kunshan and has also laid a solid foundation and provided
strong momentum for Kunshan to become a modern industrial and com-
mercial city.
Fourth, certain large-scale industries have formed. Three major
industries—electronic information, precision machinery, and living
supplies—have arisen in KETD, and the degree of their contribution to
the economic development of the region continues to increase. The elec-
tronic information industry especially has taken advantage of clustering
and has developed rapidly over these years. Owing to the effects of scale,
this industry has made an outstanding contribution. In 2009, output of
the regional information and communications technology (ICT) industry
reached RMB 210 billion, with a sharp increase of 30 percent. The
regional production of personal computer notebooks reached RMB
60.67 million, which is more than 40 percent of the global total. The dig-
ital camera output was 18 million pieces, accounting for about 15 percent
of global production. Clearly, Kunshan has become an important produc-
tion base for the ICT industry both nationally and globally (Administra -
tive Committee of KETD 2010, 1–2).
Fifth, the park construction is quite satisfactory. KETD has always
focused on the specialized parks to promote economic development, and
it has established different functional parks such as export-processing
zones (EPZ), an overseas student pioneer park, an electronics industrial
park, a science and technology industrial park, a precision machinery
industrial park, and the Small and Medium Enterprises Garden. All these
parks are located in one area and can easily interact with each other. Table
4.2 shows that the Kunshan Export-Processing Zone compares favorably
with other major EPZs in the region. In 2009, the optoelectronics indus-
try in KETD made a great breakthrough: after successfully creating its
own brand, it was awarded as the National Opto-electronics Production
Base by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. The State
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Table 4.2  Key Indicators for the Jiangsu Kunshan Export-Processing Zone and Other Export-Processing Zones in Its Surrounding 
Area, 2008
Shanghai, Songjiang Jiangsu Kunshan Jiangsu Suzhou Jiangsu Wuxi
Volume or 
number Growth rate Accumulation
Volume or 
number Growth rate Accumulation
Volume or 
number Growth rate Accumulation
Volume or 
number Growth rate Accumulation
Volume of imports 
& exports
(US$100 million) 390.7 1.2 n.a. 352.4 11.6 n.a. 123.6 1,448.6 n.a. 86.1 –18.3 n.a.
Volume of exports
(RMB 100 million) 284.7 10.8 n.a. 243.6 16.8 n.a. 89.3 1,659.2 n.a. 48.4 4.4 n.a.
Industrial output
(RMB 100 million) 2082.2 –2.2 n.a. 1589.4 26.5 n.a. 85.6 206.2 n.a. 258.1 –48.1 n.a.
Electronics and 
information industry
(RMB 100 million) 1937.4 –6.0 n.a. 1405.1 26.7 n.a. 81.0 252.0 n.a. 235.1 –37.4 n.a.
Sales of industrial 
products
(RMB 100 million) 2030.6 –5.4 n.a. 1582.7 26.7 n.a. 84.9 202.6 n.a. 252.9 –43.8 n.a.
Profit of industrial 
enterprises
(RMB 100 million) 20.9 –14.7 n.a. 19.8 –19.4 n.a. 3.8 3321.5 n.a. 15.7 –52.4 n.a.
Approved projects
(number) 10 25.0 94 10 –37.5 113 5 0 60 1 –80.0 33
Utilized contracted FDI
(US$100 million) 1.2 –4.3 8.7 1.1 15.6 9.4 3 40.3 9.7 0.3 –96.1 23.9
Employees (hundred) 9.0 n.a. n.a. 10.0 n.a. n.a. 6.0 n.a. n.a. 3.0 n.a. n.a.
Inspected square
meters (number) 4.28 n.a. n.a. 2.86 n.a. n.a. 2.70 n.a. n.a. 1.70 n.a. n.a.
Source: Lu 2009.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
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Council then approved a comprehensive bonded zone planning area of
5.86 square kilometers, which became the eighth state comprehensive
bonded zone. The provincial government has recognized many enter-
prises as high-tech firms. Fifteen provincial-level high-tech enterprises, 90
high-tech products (including software) and 2,600 patent applications
were added to the list in 2009. The Microsoft Technology Center, an
opto-electronics industrial patent information platform, and a number of
public technical service platforms have been established. Some important
enterprises like Sany and Nano have built a research and development
(R&D) and engineering center. Currently, 13 foreign-funded R&D insti-
tutions are located in Kunshan (Administrative Committee of KETD
2010, 1–2). 
Sixth, the effect of industrial spillover is significant. Since 1992
when the first supplier district was set up, KETD has helped introduce
more than 300 foreign-funded projects to a dozen rural industrial sup-
port districts, and the value of contracted foreign investment has sur-
passed US$2 billion. To help domestic firms plug into supply chains
through FDI is one effective way for KETD to generate spillover
effects. Currently, more than 1,600 domestic suppliers provide 2,300
supporting projects. The annual sales income has now exceeded RMB
40 billion, and the number of enterprises whose contracting service
revenues are more than RMB 10 million reached 640 (Administrative
Committee of KETD 2010, 3; data calculated from 1992 to 2009).
The establishment of local supply chains has not only helped domestic
private enterprises but has also helped foreign enterprises take root in
Kunshan. Table 4.3 shows the growth of Kunshan’s supply services
since 1997. 
Background and History of KETD’s Development
Before the mid-1980s, agriculture dominated Kunshan’s economic struc-
ture, and the industrial base was relatively weak. After 30 years of reform
and opening up, however, Kunshan has become a successful example of
open economic development among counties in China. Kunshan’s export-
oriented economic development falls into three phases, and each phase has
presented different challenges and opportunities.
Start-up and Opening Phase: From the Early 1980s to the 1990s
In 1978, the industrial output value of Kunshan County (upgraded to a
city in 1989) was only RMB 0.28 billion, and the percentage contribution
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of the three industry sectors (agriculture, industry, and service) to
Kunshan’s GDP was 51.4 percent, 28.9, percent, and 19.7 percent,
respectively. Agriculture dominated the economy, and urban and rural
residents had saved on average only RMB 22. With the development of
township enterprises in southern Jiangsu Province—an important
national commodity grain base—Kunshan faced an important choice for
its future development path. The grim realities required Kunshan to
change its production methods. Under such a circumstance, Kunshan
County government made a crucial decision to shift its economic devel-
opment from predominantly agrarian to industrial. 
Benefiting from its location advantage adjacent to Shanghai, Kunshan
seized the opportunities of Shanghai’s industrial upgrading and relocation
of some labor-intensive industries, as well as the transfer of certain mili-
tary enterprises from inland to coastal areas. Using the overall strategy of
“relying on Shanghai to the east, depending on the military enterprises to
the west, associating the villages and towns with the relevant enterprises,”
it successfully attracted some military enterprises from Guizhou, Shanxi,
and other provinces, and soon they were converted from military to civil
production. Kunshan also established more than 500 joint-venture enter-
prises with Shanghai. All these efforts laid a preliminary foundation for
industrialization. In 1985, the proportional contribution of the three sec-
tors to Kunshan’s GDP had changed to 30.7 percent (agriculture), 50.2
percent (industry), and 19.1 percent (services), marking the transformation
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Table 4.3  Kunshan’s Export-Oriented Supply Services, 1997–2008
Year
Number of 
supply 
enterprises
Number of 
supply projects
Supply services 
revenues
(RMB 100 million)
Tax revenues from 
supply services
(RMB 100 million)
1997 199 374 11 1.6
1998 237 408 20.2 2.2
1999 200 605 33 4.1
2000 349 619 45.2 5.3
2001 376 668 58.2 6.8
2002 479 816 73.9 8.5
2003 584 1,002 102.6 10.9
2004 685 1,156 132.8 14.8
2005 958 1,292 193.7 18.9
2006 1,058 1,560 232 19
2007 1,503 1,878 316.2 33.3
2008 1,585 2,378 419.3 41
Source: China Executive Leadership Academy 2009.
of its economic development model from an agriculture basis to an indus-
try basis. This change not only prepared the manufacturing base for its
future export-oriented economic development, but also helped the peo-
ple of Kunshan County learn more about the market economy and even-
tually connect with the global economy. 
In early 1983, a general manager of the Japanese enterprise SWANY
came to China to look for places to invest. After visiting six places in the
Yangtze River Delta region, he finally chose Kunshan, which is 40 kilo-
meters from the Shanghai Hongqiao airport, because of its advantageous
geographic location. He immediately decided to set up the first joint-
venture corporation producing and exporting medium-high-level gloves
in the eastern part of Kunshan County in Jiangsu Province. This program
was approved in June 1984 and officially began in February 1985. It
marked the first step in the transformation of Kunshan’s economy from
domestic production to export-driven production. 
In April 1984, the central authorities decided to open 14 coastal port
cities and establish economic and technological development zones
(ETDZ). Given the economic and jurisdictional status of Kunshan at
that time, it was not included and so was unable to enjoy the benefits
conferred upon ETDZs. To further attract FDI and promote export-
 oriented development, Kunshan, imitating other open cities, decided to
establish its own self-funded development zone in 1984. Following this
decision, the county government opened a new industrial area of 3.75
square kilometers in the southeast part of town, forming the embryonic
state of the Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone.
After January 1985, the self-funded development zone officially entered
a substantial development phase: the area was expanded from 3.75
square kilometers to 6.18 square kilometers, and in 1998 it officially
received the name Kunshan Economic and Technological Development
Zone. In 1991, it was designated a key development zone in Jiangsu
Province. 
In the beginning stages of the zone’s development, the government
adopted a policy of “planning richly, developing economically.” Planning
richly means focusing on the long-term perspective and building the zone
with full modern features to high standards. Developing economically
means self-reliance, hard work, and accomplishing more with less money.
With this spirit, Kunshan’s average per kilometer construction cost was
only one-eighth that of the other 14 coastal port cities at that time, and
its realized profits and taxes were 2.37 times as much as the cost of its
infrastructure construction. 
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After its foundation, by virtue of its superior location and policy
advantages, KETD attracted many foreign-funded enterprises. From 1985
to 1991, Kunshan’s contracted foreign investment increased from
US$1.51 million to US$59.34 million, up 38 times. The early start on the
constructing of the development zone helped Kunshan win opportunities
in the export-oriented economic race of the late 1990s. According to sta-
tistics, from 1985 to 1991 the actually utilized foreign capital in Kunshan
accounted for half the total foreign investment in Suzhou and one-fifth
the total foreign investment in Jiangsu Province. The change in focus of
Kunshan’s economic development from internal to external helped accel-
erate its industrialization process. In 1990, the proportional contribution
of the three sectors to Kunshan’s GDP was now 22.6 percent, 56.5 per-
cent, and 20.9 percent, respectively, and the proportion of the industrial
sector increased further.
Rapid Expansion Phase: 1992–2001
During this period, changes in the domestic and international economic
environment brought rare opportunities for KETD and its export-oriented
economic development. With globalization, international competition
became increasingly fierce. Many multinationals of developed countries
began to shift their traditional capital-intensive industries and labor-
intensive sectors to emerging economies and regions. These moves pro-
vided a great opportunity for developing countries and regions to
participate in the global division of labor led by the multinationals. 
In 1990, pushing for further reform and opening up, the central gov-
ernment opened the Shanghai Pudong New Area as a special economic
zone, and in 1992, the State Council also approved KETD as a state-level
economic and technological development zone. Taking advantage of this
rare opportunity, Kunshan actively integrated with Pudong’s develop-
ment and caught the wave of industrial transfer from multinationals.
From 1991 to 1992, Kunshan’s actually utilized foreign capital rose from
US$15.48 million to US$126.43 million, up by 717 percent, and in 1995,
the actually utilized foreign capital increased by 300 percent compared
with 1992. Meanwhile, the quality of FDI was also improved, with larger
size and higher-level technologies. From 1992 to 1995, the number of for-
eign-funded programs greater than US$10 million reached 73. 
During the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, the industries of
Taiwan, China were hit hard, and many of them, especially in the infor-
mation technology (IT) sector, were seeking industrial transfer opportu-
nities. The Kunshan government and KETD decisively adjusted their FDI
County- to State-Level SEZ: Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone 131
policy to “focus on introducing capital from Taiwan, China,” and follow-
ing this policy, they went to Taiwan, China eight times to attract invest-
ment. Such a strategy worked well and made KETD a superstar in
attracting foreign capital. From 1996 to 2001, average actually utilized
foreign capital increased by 6.8 percent, and the amount of annual actu-
ally utilized foreign capital was more than US$500 million.
Meanwhile, KETD sped up building various industrial parks to attract
foreign investments and also gradually changed its industry structure
from traditional to high-tech. Based on the experience of the Hsinchu
Industrial Park of Taiwan, China, Kunshan set up the Kunshan Export-
Processing Zone in April 2000. In October of the same year, it began
operation. The establishment of the Kunshan Export-Processing Zone
sped up the customs processing of imported and exported products, fur-
ther increasing KETD’s attractiveness to foreign-funded enterprises, espe-
cially for the high-tech ones that had higher demand for fast delivery. At
the same time, among all the counties in the country, Kunshan was the
first to set up a national overseas student pioneer park. As a high-tech
incubator, it attracted many overseas returnees and domestic students
who wanted to set up high-tech ventures. In addition, Kunshan also set
up the Zhouzhuang Sensor Industrial Base, Yushan Module Park, Bacheng
Software Park, and other high-tech industrial parks to promote the
agglomeration of special industries. These parks have gradually become
the growth pole of regional economic development. More than 90 per-
cent of the utilized foreign investment and total trade and more than 80
percent of Kunshan’s GDP were generated in these functional parks. By
the end of the 20th century, the IT, precision machinery, fine chemicals,
and consumer goods industries had become the leading industries in
KETD. From 1996 to 2001, the IT industry grew by 20 percent annu-
ally. In 2001, the output value of the industry stood at RMB 9.347 bil-
lion, accounting for 21.5 percent of the city’s major industrial output
value, and IT has become the leading industry in Kunshan. The output
value of precision machinery and fine chemical industries accounted for
10.2 percent and 7 percent, respectively.
Enhanced Development Stage: After 2000
Since 2002, after the amount of FDI had reached a certain level (tables
4.4 and 4.5 show the FDI amount and its sources) and the leading indus-
tries had been formed, KETD’s FDI policy became more selective; that is,
it paid more attention to the quality of foreign investment, focusing on
technology and industry. Meanwhile it made great efforts to improve
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Table 4.4  Export-Oriented Economic Development of Kunshan Development Zone, 1984–2008
Year
Number of new,
approved 
foreign-funded 
projects
Total investment of 
new, approved 
foreign-funded 
projects (US$10,000)
Amount of 
contracted FDI
(US$10,000)
Actually utilized 
FDI (US$10,000)
Number of 
foreign-funded 
enterprises in 
operation
Number of projects 
spending below 
US$10 million 
1984 1 150 74 30 — —
1985 1 340 174 40 1 —
1986 — — — — 2 —
1987 2 289 94 30 2 —
1988 1 336 174 13 4 —
1989 4 724 299 173 5 —
1990 4 2,165 853 97 8 —
1991 18 4,937 4,047 733 12 —
1992 66 39,240 28,709 4,374 24 16
1993 99 47,213 43,877 12,915 68 33
1994 46 59,668 55,534 25,111 124 52
1995 53 61,196 59,978 32,863 153 66
1996 73 60,700 58,998 37,916 206 77
1997 58 39,503 37,055 35,160 243 89
1998 52 69,894 66,358 37,400 273 109
1999 73 60,596 58,249 33,408 296 127
2000 107 125,856 139,951 38,477 328 160
2001 136 135,760 133,766 37,543 361 192
2002 134 218,708 217,432 56,491 413 226
2003 131 22,800 95,423 47,468 514 270
2004 104 182,984 88,824 52,253 582 358
2005 93 244,453 92,936 63,103 641 391
2006 98 183,617 92,071 73,710 593 431
2007 137 236,838 133,797 87,892 677 462
2008 113 272,657 142,877 92,442 831 485
Source: Zhong and Zhang 2009, 221. 
Note: — = not available.
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Table 4.5  Countries, Economies, and Regions Invested in KETD, 2008
Country, 
economy, 
or region
Number of 
approved 
projects 
Amount of 
contracted 
foreign 
investment 
(US$10,000)
Total of 
approved 
projects
(number)
Total of 
contracted 
foreign 
investment 
(US$10,000)
Austria 1 197 3 443
Britain 2 254 10 4,025
Brunei 3 232 26 4,111
Cambodia 0 0 1 500
China, Macao 0 0 4 87
China, Hong Kong 18 35,925 228 286,958
China, Taiwan 17 1,473 357 105,510
Denmark 0 0 5 3,448
France 0 69 12 4,347
Germany 1 1,121 24 5,523
India 1 19 2 422
Indonesia 0 0 5 9,039
Italy 1 214 6 1,373
Japan 6 2,016 132 100,473
Korea, Rep. 3 1,668 48 12,086
Luxembourg 0 640 2 4,308
Malaysia 0 0 9 3,710
Mauritius 0 3,642 31 28,272
Myanmar 0 0 2 80
Netherlands 1 5 7 10,335
Seychelles 1 70 1 70
Singapore 2 1,866 72 49,015
Spain 0 35 7 188
Thailand 0 0 2 2,039
Total 113 142,877 1,564 1,344,795
Source: Zhong and Zhang 2009, 222. 
domestic production and service systems. It placed strong emphasis on
promoting technology innovation, aiming to transform its products from
“made in Kunshan” to “created in Kunshan.” To build upstream and down-
stream of the industrial clusters, the whole region focused mainly on elec-
tronic information, precision machinery, fine chemicals, and consumer
goods as its four pillar industries. 
At the same time, Kunshan actively supported the development of
domestic private enterprises so that they could participate in the interna-
tional industrial division of labor and become part of the supply chains for
the FDI operating locally. By 2008, KETD had more than 20,000 private
enterprises, and the total registered capital was more than RMB 50 billion.
These figures put Kunshan at the top of Jiangsu Province’s county-level
cities. By 2008, the number of private service enterprises inside and out-
side the zone had reached 1,600, and the electronic information industry
had become Kunshan’s leading sector. Nearly 300 foreign-funded elec-
tronic information enterprises are in the zone, one-third of the city’s total
number, and their total investment is US$6.37 billion, or one-half the
city’s total investment. Now the output value, sales, and imports and
exports of the electronic information industry account for a large propor-
tion of the city’s and province’s total, making it a uniquely endowed lead-
ing industry. Particularly worth mentioning is that in this period, high-tech
industries of KETD had achieved a significant breakthrough. Key technol-
ogy projects were set up and went into production stages in optoelectron-
ics, semiconductors, and new energy industries. One example was the
formation of a new optoelectronics industry chain through the InfoVision
core program, which exemplified KETD’s important breakthrough in
industrial transformation and upgrading.
With the continuous expansion of the manufacturing sector, KETD
also realized the importance of developing modern service industries,
especially the “producer services,” which are between the secondary
industry and tertiary industry industries. In contrast to the development
of Shanghai, KETD focused on developing logistics, exhibitions, market-
ing, business services, and other productive service industries and also
built an industrial park to promote the service industry. In 2006, KETD
set up the province’s only economic development zone—Huaqiao
Economic Development Zone—with the service industry as the domi-
nant focus. Applying its previous experiences to developing its service
industry, KETD followed the same ideas of openness, good planning with
high standards, and actively introducing foreign capital. The amount of
service-oriented foreign capital constantly increased, and the proportion
of registered foreign-funded services in 2008 reached 38 percent of total
foreign capital. According to statistics, KEDT had introduced more than
700 service projects with a total investment of US$5 billion. Table 4.6
shows KETD’s main economic indicators. 
Preferential Policies for Foreign-Funded Enterprises
After KETD was approved as a state-level development zone, all FDI
(foreign enterprises and enterprises with foreign investment) in the devel-
opment zone began to enjoy the same preferential policies that applied
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Table 4.6  KETD’s Economic Indicators, 1984–2008
Year
GDP (RMB 
100 million)
Total industrial
value (RMB 
100 million)
Total 
exports 
(US$
10,000)
Total 
industrial 
profits 
and taxes
(RMB 10,000)
Fiscal 
revenue
(RMB 
10,000)
Infrastructure 
investment
(RMB 10,000)
1984 — — — — — 50
1985 0.1 0.6 218 518 — 106
1986 0.4 1.7 448 994 — 250
1987 0.8 3.1 834 1,528 350 621
1988 1.1 4.6 2,000 2,423 480 801
1989 1.2 5.1 1,152 2,255 680 882
1990 1.4 5.6 2,348 3,557 770 1,185
1991 3.1 11.7 6,500 7,568 661 1,496
1992 3.5 21.1 10,040 10,168 5,970 8,000
1993 7.7 30.1 15,050 16,761 6,118 20,000
1994 14.2 45.0 20,030 23,068 12,100 20,000
1995 18.6 65.0 30,338 23,083 11,843 21,000
1996 30.4 100.0 12,743 34,706 22,670 10,100
1997 41.5 130.0 70,136 43,653 29,259 11,147
1998 56.0 157.0 86,913 68,099 37,733 11,148
1999 65.0 185.0 119,600 72,849 59,434 13,000
2000 84.6 253.0 158,233 229,704 89,003 21,515
2001 113.3 347.5 198,649 282,013 177,216 60,298
2002 180.4 535.0 365,234 347,016 225,283 10,100
2003 272.3 852.1 631,002 456,872 346,154 311,000
2004 411.4 1,261.2 1,139,149 667,330 528,351 240,000
2005 535.9 1,760.7 1,610,985 777,723 541,732 154,454
2006 539.3 2,028.1 2079,856 984,805 540,431 187,003
2007 673.2 2,587.6 2,762,792 1,426,664 717,596 210,736
2008 843.5 3,317.5 3,310,261 2,251,349 9,29,864 229,369
Source: Zhong and Zhang 2009, 220. 
Note: — = not available
to all other state-level development zones. These policies included those
applying to taxes and dividends:
• The income tax is levied at a reduced rate of 15 percent on manufac-
turing enterprises with foreign investment. Those scheduled to oper-
ate for a period of more than 10 years (inclusive of 10 years) are
exempted from income tax in the first two profitable years and granted
a 50 percent reduction in the next three years. The income taxes levied
on enterprises with foreign investment in the fields of energy, trans-
portation, and large-scale integrated circuits are to be exempted for
the first five profitable years and granted a 50 percent reduction in the
next five years. 
• Export-oriented enterprises with foreign investment are to pay their
income tax at a reduced rate of 10 percent upon expiration of the tax
exemption and reduction period. Enterprises involving state-of-the-
art technology are granted a 50 percent reduction for another three
years before enjoying the 10 percent income tax rate after the period
of tax exemption and reduction.
• Enterprises with foreign investment that reinvest in China to set up
 another export-oriented enterprise, or one applying state-of-the-art
technology with a business term of no less than five years, are refunded
all the collected income tax on the reinvested portions, after examina-
tion and approval from the relevant tax authorities.
• The remittance of dividends to foreign countries obtained from enter-
prises with Chinese and foreign investments will be exempted from
the income tax on the remitted amount.
Besides the preferential policies already described, companies within
the KETD Export-Processing Zone (KEPZ) can also enjoy the “within
terri tory but out of customs” policy, namely, the “four noes,” the “four
exemptions,” the “one bonded,” and the “one return” policies. Specifically,
the “four noes” refer to no bank deposit system, no customs registration
system, no (value-added tax) VAT or consumption tax on processed
products, and no import-export quota or export license. The “four
exemptions” refer to the duty exemption on machines, equipment, and
modules to be used in production and the spare parts to be used in
repairs; the duty exemption on machines and equipment to be used in
the construction of infrastructure or the building materials to be used for
factory and warehouse construction; the duty exemption applied to a
reasonable amount of office supplies imported for self-use by enterprises
and administrative institutions; and the duty exemption on final prod-
ucts, leftover pieces, or defective or waste pieces that are processed in
the zone and are to be sold abroad. “One bonded” refers to raw materi-
als, spare parts, components, packaging materials, and expendables
imported for processing export products that are bonded for the total
value. “One return” refers to goods that are sold to companies within
KEPZ; these are considered exports and are eligible for a tax return.
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KEPZ is the first among all EPZs in China to allow the final or semifinal
products turned out by companies within the zone to be moved freely
to companies outside the EPZ for further processing. 
In addition, preferential policies are available in the Kunshan Business
Incubator for Overseas Chinese Scholars. The Chinese diaspora can enjoy
several benefits that were once located in the Kunshan Business Incubator: 
• The management provides the business with offices and standard fac-
tory buildings at discounted rates for three years.
• The income obtained from technology transfer, technical innovation,
and technical consultation is exempted from the sales tax. 
• The equipment imported for the purpose of technical innovation and
technology transfer is exempted from duty and import-related VAT.
• The state’s favorable policies regarding enterprises with foreign invest-
ment, software, and integrated-circuits design companies are also
 applicable in the incubator. 
• An apartment will be offered to overseas Chinese scholars, rent-free,
for a period of three years.
• Overseas Chinese scholars, their spouses, and their children under 18
can transfer their permanent residence to Kunshan free of charge.
• The relevant authorities will give priority to making adequate arrange-
ments for those young or middle-aged experts with outstanding
achievements in their field. 
Apart from the items mentioned above, KETD also grants additional
preferences to those with needed talents, such as experts younger than 50
with advanced professional titles and suitable specialties or those less than
45 years old with intermediate professional titles and suitable specialties;
they will be exempted from the three kinds of expenses mentioned
above, and their spouses and children can also enjoy the same benefits
according to the related regulations. Talented candidates younger than 30
with assistant-level professional titles and a suitable specialty will be
granted a reduction of 50 percent on the expenses noted above, and their
spouses and children can also enjoy such reductions. Graduates with less
than five years of work experience and a suitable specialty can enjoy a 50
percent reduction on the three types of expenses.
In addition, the Kunshan municipal government provides foreign staff
with high-quality apartments or villas, such as Lijing Garden, Baodao Villa,
Jinshan Mansion, Big Shanghai Golf Resort, and the like, which have
sound property management and are well equipped (Nankai University’s
Multinational Study Center Research Group 2006, 141).
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The Essential Experiences of KETD’s Development
The success of KETD’s development can be attributed to applying the
right strategy to local practice and bringing local advantages into full play
while continuously aligning its development practices with the latest
trends in the international division of labor. In addition to choosing the
right strategy and building on comparative advantages, KETD has also
benefited from having strong government support, applying flexible
strategies, making best use of industrial parks, setting up industrial chains,
taking a “people-first” approach, and promoting indigenous innovation. 
Choosing the Right Strategy and 
Building on Comparative Advantages
In the mid- and late 1980s, Kunshan wisely chose an open development
strategy. After the reform and opening up in 1978, Kunshan relied mainly
on agricultural industries. In the manufacturing sector, the rural and
township enterprises started fairly late and suffered shortages of capital
and technology; in addition, they faced conflicts over property rights as
well. With respect to state policy, Kunshan had difficulty getting fiscal
inputs and policy incentives from the state like those in special economic
zones. Under such circumstances, Kunshan could rely only on overseas
capital and technologies as the road to development.
An open-economy strategy fit with Kunshan’s comparative advantages
and location. Kunshan had a strong human capital base and a relatively
high-level labor force. In addition, with Shanghai to the east, Kunshan is
located in a key area of the Yangtze River Delta, making it easy to get peo-
ple, logistics, information, and capital for its processing trade. 
Strong Government Support
A forward-thinking government, with clear ideas, was essential to KETD’s
fast development. Since the establishment of the national industrial zone
in 1984, Kunshan’s leaders have changed quite frequently, but the devel-
opment strategy of an open economy that relies on FDI for exports has
never changed. Every leader has been determined to work wholeheart-
edly for the planning and construction of KETD and has carried forward
its development vision.
An executive system with innovation and a reasonable structure was
another essential ingredient for the fast development of KETD. After the
formulation of the development strategy and goals, the leadership
became the decisive factor. KETD carefully selects high-quality cadres to
form the management of KETD and strongly encourages management
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innovation. In such an atmosphere, Kunshan has many “firsts” to its
credit in Jiangsu Province: it established the first self-financed develop-
ment zone, the first Chinese-foreign joint venture, and the first wholly
foreign-owned enterprise; it was the first to carry out the land payments
on compensatory transfers; and it set up the nation’s first county-level
export-processing zone.
A service system with credibility, diligence, and high efficiency was a
third critical ingredient of government support. Such a system was
achieved through the following approaches: 
• Constantly innovating service ideas. Every year the Kunshan municipal
government and the KETD Administrative Commission put forward
distinctive goals for services to foreign investors. For instance, in 1999
the objectives of sincere service, good administration, decreasing cost,
and increasing effect were set. In 2000, probusiness ideas like securing
business and serving business were put forward to build a good invest-
ment environment. In 2001, after China joined the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO), the goals of international practices, teamwork, and
efficiency and effectiveness were established. To build an even more
open, transparent, service-oriented, and highly efficient government,
in 2002 Kunshan adopted the policy of proficiently serving the foreign
companies and implemented regular, transparent, and highly efficient
cooperation along with an emphasis on win-win outcomes. Further, in
2004, professionalism and high effectiveness in building a harmonious
social environment while developing the export-oriented market
economy became the goals.
• A continuously innovating service system. From 1998 on, the govern-
ment of Kunshan has constantly issued decrees and regulations to
 improve the service environment. Many of them were related to busi-
ness inspection and approval, registration, licensing, and administrative
efficiency. As a result, an efficient Kunshan has been established, and
certain systems such as the notification-promise system, deadline-
binding system, first-acceptance responsibility system, department
consultancy system, and so on are fully functioning. 
• Constantly innovating service platforms. In recent years, KETD succes-
sively built the administrative examination and approval service cen-
ter, foreign investment promotion and service center, domestic private
investment promotion and service center, and enterprise complaint
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and solution center. In 2005, in response to a need, Mashangban, a
center specifically serving enterprises in Taiwan, China, was set up.
With the increase in investment diversity, service centers for European
and American enterprises and domestic private enterprises were also
established. At the same time, the contract system between KETD
leaders and foreign- and private-invested enterprises was implemented,
providing 24-hour immediate services. Every September, KETD brings
together governmental department leaders to perform credit services
for foreign-invested enterprises and to solve practical problems.
• Continuously evaluating services. The Kunshan municipal government
and KETD Administrative Commission took the lead in Jiangsu Province
in implementing an effectiveness evaluation mechanism for government
services, including voting for effectiveness, accountability systems, Inter-
net supervision, service innovation award, and so on. In 2009, the Electri-
cal and Electronic Association of Taiwan, China ranked Kunshan number
one on the investment environment of mainland cities.
Flexible, Realistic Investment Promotion Strategies
The goal of flexible, realistic strategies was first evident in KETD’s change
in foreign investment promotion targets. In the early and mid-1980s,
KETD attracted mainly military industries and industrial transfer projects
from Shanghai, such as the Shanghai Jinxing TV Factory, Guizhou Fenghua
Fridge Factory, Hongshan Bearing Factory, and so on, which were all big fac-
tories for Kunshan at that time and laid a foundation for its industrial devel-
opment. In the early 1990s, seizing the opportunity of the opening of the
Shanghai Pudong New Area, KETD successfully attracted many small and
medium labor-intensive enterprises to enlarge its industrial base quickly. In
1997, KETD implemented the important strategy of targeting investments
from Taiwan, China and dispatched eight groups there to attract invest-
ment. From then on, Kunshan gradually became one of the three major
areas for investment from Taiwan, China, especially in the IT sector. 
To diversify its FDI investments, starting in 2005, the Kunshan munic-
ipal government and the Administrative Commission of KETD began to
target Japanese and Korean as well as European and American invest-
ments, the proportion of European, American, Japanese, and Korean
investments noticeably increasing. The newly approved European and
American investments increased by 128 percent, and the Japanese and
Korean investments by 78 percent. Besides attracting FDI, from 2006 on,
Kunshan also began to emphasize developing domestic private enterprises
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and the service industries that are related to its manufacturing sectors. This
approach greatly helped build the industrial value chains. 
While its manufacturing sector was maturing, Kunshan again began to
focus on the technology intensity of its industrial sectors and tried to
increase the percentage of R&D projects. In 2008, the Kunshan munici-
pal government and the Administrative Commission of KETD put for-
ward the new strategy of shifting Kunshan’s industrial structure from
common manufacturing industries to high-level manufacturing and mod-
ern service industries.
Kunshan also has effective ways of attracting FDI. One is to build
industrial value chains or clusters. Inviting leading firms and then help-
ing them extend their vertical and horizontal links is Kunshan’s secret to
building its industrial sectors in a relatively short time. Kunshan’s IT and
optoelectronics are all good examples in this regard. In addition to
attracting firms, Kunshan also tries to attract R&D institutes to serve its
industries. Currently, KETD has more than 90 foreign-invested R&D
centers, technology centers, engineering centers, and laboratories, which
are building strong technological and innovative foundations for indus-
trial restructuring and upgrading.
In addition, Kunshan has also built logistics centers to attract investors.
Through the electronic purchasing center, the stowage center, and the
Jiangsu Huaqiao business center, among others, Kunshan quickly formed
an integrated commercial service area. It includes the functions of elec-
tronic commerce, modern logistics, delivery, industrial training, and infor-
mation services and energetically promotes the commercial and trade
service industries. Many service projects have successively settled in
KETD, such as the East China Businessmen’s Children’s School of
Taiwan, China; the Zong-Ren Yu Qing Memorial Hospital of Taiwan,
China; the Chang Hwa Bank of Taiwan, China; American International
Assurance; Federal Express; Singapore YCH Logistics; and so on, which
have significantly improved the city’s functions and enhanced the busi-
ness environment for industrial development.
And finally, Kunshan also tries to explore new fields. Besides devel-
oping manufacturing and service trade, Kunshan has also put much
effort into attracting agriculture and some newly emerging industries.
Seventy-two agricultural projects have been approved, with registered
foreign capital of $200 million. Some new industries such as special
vehicles, biomedical, and new materials manufacturing are also moving
into Kunshan.
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Effective Use of Industrial Parks
Since the 1990s, based on successful past experiences, KETD has built
industrial parks according to the modern concept of separating industrial,
residential, and living and entertainment activities into different functional
areas, a practice that greatly enhances the efficiency of land use. Meanwhile,
KETD set up an export processing-zone, a pioneering park for overseas
scholars, a Japanese industrial park, and so forth to target different groups
of investors. In 2010, Kunshan will pay more attention to coordinating the
relationships among different investment parks to avoid duplication of sim-
ilar projects and vicious competition in attracting investment. It will try to
enhance support and complementarities in the various parks.
Attracting Investment through Industrial Chains
To tap into the global division of labor more effectively, KETD has set up
industrial chains to attract FDI, helping build the up- and downstreams
for the industries it intends to attract. Examples of its efforts include the
following:
• After successfully attracting a foreign enterprise, especially a leading
enterprise, KETD will try to track down its domestic and overseas up-
and downstream enterprises and attract them to Kunshan. For exam-
ple, after bringing in Infovision Optoelectronics to the zone, KETD
 investigated InfoVision’s value chains and subsequently persuaded
Dexing Electronics to settle beside InfoVision. KETD preserved the
surrounding land for its up- and downstream enterprises, such as
American liquid crystal glass producers and domestic producers of liq-
uid crystal display (LCD) televisions, which laid the foundation for
the LCD industry in KETD.
• Targeting the missing links in local industrial value chains, KETD has
focused on filling the gaps to enhance its ability to attract FDI, espe-
cially multinationals. One official of KETD used to disassemble his
laptop to show which components had not been produced in Kunshan
to persuade relevant foreign enterprises to settle in the development
zone. Through such efforts, a complete IT industrial chain formed in
Kunshan rather quickly.
• Kunshan has also vigorously developed the local supplier market for
FDI. In 1997, the Kunshan municipal government set up a special
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 office and designated highly competent officials to work on the sup-
porting industries for FDI. The main measures included
° Building platforms. Every year the special office involving all the ma-
jor functioning departments of the municipal government jointly
holds discussions for domestic private enterprises and enterprises
from Taiwan, China to promote cooperation and investment
 opportunities for the two parties. In addition, the office holds forums
for the domestic suppliers every year to promote interfirm coopera-
tion and reward the key performers for the previous year. A virtual
platform has also been set up to provide information on product sup-
ply and demand for both domestic and foreign enterprises. 
° Policy support. To encourage innovation and technology-based sectors,
the Kunshan government has implemented many programs to sup-
port R&D and encourage large firms to obtain brand products with
their own intellectual property rights and core technologies. Mean-
while, it has issued laws and regulations to enhance product standards
and quality and to protect intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
A “People-First” Strategy
The effectiveness of investment attraction relies mostly on the quality of
the investment promotion team. Investment promotion personnel should
have four strong qualities: passion, integrity, service consciousness, and pro-
fessionalism. To build such a team, the Kunshan municipal government
and the KETD Administrative Commission set up special foreign invest-
ment promotion and service institutes to provide professional training and
even send qualified candidates to domestic and overseas colleges and uni-
versities for study and training. Meanwhile, they provide incentives to
reward high-performing investment attraction and service personnel. 
Promoting Indigenous Innovation
Indigenous innovation is the essential ingredient for the sustainable devel-
opment of an open economy. The Kunshan municipal government and
KETD actively participate in supporting indigenous innovation and the
building of an enterprise-led innovation system. Concrete steps include 
• Continuously increasing investment in technology innovation, especially in
the form of risk investment for high-tech projects. For this purpose, KETD
set up a venture investment fund. In 2006, the municipal government
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appropriated RMB 30 million in specific funds to promote indigenous
innovation and invested RMB 50 million in high-tech projects through
the venture investment fund. Meanwhile, the government-run assets
operation company of KETD directly helped high-tech firms secure
finance; for example, in 2006, it helped Infovision Optoelectronics
obtain a joint loan of US$350 million from seven banks. 
• Assisting high-tech firms or firms with brand products with land applica-
tion, planning, and construction. 
• Attracting highly talented people in the fields of technology and manage-
ment through strong incentives, such as housing, health care, provision of
children’s education, and the like. 
Challenges and Some Policy Suggestions
Given increased globalization, wide fluctuations in international markets,
and the intensified competition among the regional economies, KETD,
with its open economy, faces new challenges and increasing limitations on
its current and future development. Some of these challenges include
attracting international capital, technology, and industrial transfers.
First, as a traditional state-level development zone, Kunshan cannot
rely solely on industry, foreign capital, and foreign trade for continuous
development. It needs to redefine the concept of “open economy” and
establish a development mode for improving its competitiveness by
responding to the demands of both domestic and international markets
and optimizing industrial and economic structures.
Second, KETD, which is in the process of industrialization and urban-
ization, is increasingly constrained by shortages of land, capital, and
human resources and by the need to preserve the environment. KETD
has been transformed from an entity with a single economic function—
that is, growth—to one that has multiple functions, including comprehen-
sive construction, development, and management.
Third, the improvement of regional competitiveness and the transfor-
mation and upgrading of industries in KETD face two big hurdles. The
first is the huge task of transforming and upgrading “initial industries,” and
the second is how to optimize the “newly emerging industries” such as
those associated with environmental protection and cartoon production. 
And fourth, regional investment promotion and industrial configuration
in KETD face more intensified and increasingly homogeneous competition
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from the rest of the country. Competition among different provinces, cities,
and regions over land prices, taxes, rebates, and cash bonuses, as well as
competition in the same region, is rather fierce. The homogenization or
overlaps of industrial layout and construction and repetitive investments
are becoming a key problem for many industrial parks across China. 
To overcome these challenges, state-level development zones need to
consider their industrial structures in the overall framework of national
planning and regional integration and take fully into consideration their
own comparative advantages and development needs. For Kunshan to
overcome the above-mentioned challenges, it needs to expand its service
sector substantially—the sector accounted for only 16 percent of KETD’s
GDP in 2008–and to further enhance indigenous innovation to move up
the global industrial value chain. 
During the 12th Five Year Plan, KETD should put a strong emphasis
on “second ventures.” The second venture of KETD should bridge the
past and future and accelerate the transformation from reliance on
resources to reliance on talent, science, and technology; the transforma-
tion from extensive development to intensive development; and the
transformation from a focus on expansion to an emphasis on quality.
KETD should also pursue excellence in industry, innovation, and talent
and improve its independent innovation capability, its international com-
petitiveness, and its capacity for sustainable development capacity. It
should carry on its role as the engine for future economic growth, as pio-
neer in transformation and upgrading, as pilot for modern city develop-
ment, as ice-breaking ship for systematic innovation, and as manifestation
of social harmony (Wang 2009, 1).
Continue to Be the “Engine” for Future Development
The primary task of the second venture for KETD is to use the status quo
as a base for future planning and to build the “engine” for the future eco-
nomic growth of Kunshan. During the next three to five years, KETD
should ensure the achievement of several targets of economic growth:
that is, increasing industrial output value by RMB 300 billion, increasing
fiscal revenue by RMB 200 billion, and increasing trading volume by
RMB 100 billion. KETD, in its role as engine, is moving forward in the
following four ways.
The TFT-LCD High-Gen project. With the TFT-LCD High-Gen project
as a breakthrough, KETD is about to reach a critical point in the acquisi-
tion of high-end industry. The construction of the TFT-LCD High-Gen
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project has laid a solid foundation for the rapid development of KETD’s
future economy. With the start of the High-Gen project and the succes-
sive settlement of projects in the Kunshan Optoelectronic Village—such
as glass substrate, color filter, polarizer module, and machinery, among
others—the Kunshan Optoelectronic Village will become a top-level pro-
ducer in the international flat panel industry both at home and abroad
after three to five years of development. The park should grow into an
industrial cluster with US$10 billion of total investment and RMB 200
billion of output value.
“Three old machines.” KETD should consolidate and expand its tradi-
tional advantage of the “three old machines” to stabilize the growth of its
industrial clusters. It is a major global laptop manufacturing base, and the
three old machines—the laptop, the digital camera, and the cell phone—
have together become one of the pillars of the industrial economy of
Kunshan. The output value of the Kunshan IT industry, dominated by
KETD, accounts for 31 percent of the value of Jiangsu Province’s total
output. With Compal and other three leading enterprises increasing their
investment in KETD to build regional headquarters, an R&D center, and
a second manufacturing base, a new output volume of 30 million laptops
or LCD TV sets will undoubtedly be achieved.
Integrated innovation as a source of growth. In one example of how
integrated innovation might work, as the IT industry, the precision
machinery industry, and technologies like bionics become more integrated,
they could serve as an incubator for the digital medical industry, an
emerging industry expected to achieve breakthroughs in the develop-
ment of the Chinese digital medical equipment industry. In another
example, the technological integration of IT and the special machinery
industry could lead to breakthroughs in the automation equipment man-
ufacturing industry. KETD will also build on the huge automobile elec-
tronics, spare parts, and components industry to support the development
of special vehicles and energy-efficient automobiles, which will bring new
engines of growth to KETD’s economy.
Opportunities in domestic trade. KETD should take advantage of the
growth opportunities in domestic trade for traditional service industries
and the state-level comprehensive bonded area. In the next five years, tra-
ditional service industries in KETD, serving industry and the domestic
trade in the state-level comprehensive bonded area, will bring in more
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than RMB 100 billion of trading volume for KETD. Currently, the import
and export volume of the Kunshan Export-Processing Zone ranks at the
top of export-processing zones in China, and the key is to exploit further
its potential for promoting trade. 
Continue to Be a “Pioneer” in Transformation and Upgrading
One of KETD’s major tasks is to promote industrial development and the
transformation and upgrading of regional economic growth by relying on
technology innovation. KETD’s development has entered a new historic
period in which it confronts new challenges brought on by the global eco-
nomic crisis and the new international economic order. It needs to com-
ply with the new requirements of development stages, accelerate
structural readjustment, promote transformation and upgrading, and
strive for excellence in industry, innovation, and talent to cope with crisis
and to strengthen its capability in indigenous innovation, international
competition, and sustainable development.
It is also important to constantly improve the investment environment
and perfect the service functions of KETD. This effort includes fully uti-
lizing the advantages of the various industrial parks to attract technologi-
cal resources and to speed up the construction of service platforms—such
as the outsourcing and distribution center, the supply and allocation cen-
ter, and the exhibition and transaction center—and to strengthen critical
functions like commercial, financial, information, public technology, and
policy services.
Continue to Be the “Pilot” for Modern City Development
The critical task for KETD in its second venture is to promote its transfor-
mation from an industrial park–oriented development zone to a compre-
hensive urban development zone, constantly improving the level of urban
development based on modern and ecological standards. All these call for
changing the development mode and for coordinating industrial develop-
ment with social, urban, and human development. The comprehensive
urban development zone will integrate the knowledge economy, scientific
management, and sustainable development all together. To achieve this
goal, KETD needs to improve its existing industrial parks and realign them
with modern concepts, in compliance with international standards. 
Continue to Be the “Ice-Breaking Ship” for Systematic Innovation
The fundamental changes that happened to KETD during the past 20
years can be attributed mainly to the endless momentum generated
148 Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China
through innovation in systems, institutions, and policies. With the success
of KETD, however, its management approach is gradually becoming less
open and forward looking and more closed and conservative, with its staff
lacking aggression and speed in updating knowledge. This change poses
serious challenges for KETD’s sustained development. For KETD’s “sec-
ond venture,” it should continue to encourage system and institutional
innovations, continue to play the role of “ice-breaking ship” in many
uncharted areas in development, and strive to develop better and faster. 
Continue to Be the “Demonstrator” of Social Harmony
KETD has the noble but difficult mission of being a demonstration model
for building a harmonious society, with sound public services and social
security system and well-integrated ecological and humanistic functions
in the park. KETD, on the one hand, should focus on the expansion of
economic functions and the improvement of economic quality to achieve
better and faster development. On the other hand, it needs to place peo-
ple first, faithfully fulfill social responsibilities, improve people’s living
standards, and emphasize environmental protection and sustainable
development.
Conclusions
As a development zone that started out as a self-financed county-level
industrial park, Kunshan benefited from the wave of industrial transfers in
East Asia, a very entrepreneurial and probusiness local government, inno-
vative industrial parks, and an effective industrial value chain approach. In
the future, continued innovation in institutions and technologies and a sus-
tainable development strategy will be the keys to its continued success.
KETD’s experience is unique among special economic zones in China,
especially because it did not have direct support from the central or
provincial government. But it also shares some commonalities, such as
innovation, FDI and diaspora investment, and a strong local government,
among others. We hope this case study will shed light on the industrial-
ization process in other developing countries. 
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Developing countries’ success in competing in the fast-changing global
industrial environment depends on their ability to innovate and learn. To
avoid the “low road,” multinational corporations (MNCs) must increase
outsourcing and the flexibility of the labor market to reduce costs, which
is the key challenge for these countries (Pyke and Sengenberger 1992;
Humphrey 1995; UNIDO 2002). The fast track to acquiring domestic
production capabilities is to participate in global value chains. To do so,
though, requires setting basic macroeconomic and social policies and
engaging in the collective efforts that are already in place, not just open-
ing up to world market forces and linking with foreign partners. 
While research on global value chains has focused mainly on the increas-
ing role of global buyers or global producers in determining local industrial
upgrading, the literature on industrial clusters optimistically stresses the
role of local actors and their policy network in promoting local upgrading
and fostering regional development (Bellandi 2002; Gertler 2003).
Mounting evidence shows that local clustering and global production
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networks are not only compatible, but also mutually reinforcing
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2000; Bathelt, Malmberg, and Maskell 2002).
Latecomer firms in developing countries can be vertically integrated into
the global value chain and horizontally integrated into local clusters.
The importance of the links between firms, institutions, and other
economic agents located in geographical proximity lies in the generation
of external economies of scale (Dicken and Lloyd 1990). Furthermore,
geographical proximity and regional agglomeration may greatly facilitate
the “learning economy.” Some scholars recognize this idea as the territo-
rial process in industrialization and the social process in innovation
(Asheim and Cooke 1999). In this sort of agglomeration are the places
where the most relational portions of global value chains may be found
(Sturgeon 2003). 
The framework of global value chains focuses on the nature and con-
tent of the interfirm links and concentrates on the power that regulates
coordination of the value chain. On the upstream end of the chain, com-
ponent and equipment suppliers can wield a great deal of power. On the
downstream end, highly knowledgeable users can play a significant role in
determining the attributes and innovative trajectory of the products and
services that global value chains churn out, as they do in many complex
service industries. Similarly, lead firms strategies to simultaneously increase
outsourcing and consolidate their supply chains have created a set of
highly capable suppliers. Those suppliers, in turn, have made outsourcing
more attractive for lead firms that have yet to take the outsourcing plunge
(Sturgeon and Lee 2001). The evolution of global value chains emanating
from one national or local context, especially if successful, provides an
example that often generates a reaction in value chains rooted in other
places (Gereffi 1994, 1999).
This chapter aims to add new insights to the study of global value
chains and local clusters by using the case of the Chinese footwear clus-
ter and citing the representative footwear industry in Wenzhou as a case
study. The chapter is divided into five sections: a general review of the
development of the Chinese footwear industry, the formation and indus-
trial structure of the Wenzhou footwear manufacturing cluster, the suc-
cess factors and challenges, a discussion of the strategies for upgrading and
sustainable development, and policy recommendations. 
Overview of the Chinese Footwear Industry
The footwear industry, traditionally a low-technology sector, has been
viewed as consisting of “sunset activities”: that is, it is more difficult to
make a technological breakthrough here than in other sectors. For a long
time, the sector has been exposed to severe global cost competition, mak-
ing it plausible for the decline of production sites at “old” locations and
the migration of the industry to “young” locations in low-wage regions
(Schamp and Main 2003). As a result, labor costs continue to be a dom-
inant factor in the competitiveness of the sector. Entrepreneurs are
induced to search for countries and regions with lower wages. More effi-
cient utilization of labor is required even in regions or countries that are
generously considered sources of “unlimited cheap wages.” 
In the 1960s, footwear manufacturing began shifting from developed
countries first to Japan, then to the Republic of Korea and Taiwan,
China, and in the 1980s to southern China. In the mid-1980s, Korea
and Taiwan, China, supplied 45 percent of the world’s footwear exports.
By 1994, their share of world exports had dropped to 7 percent, while
mainland China’s share had grown from 8 percent to 50 percent in
1985. In addition, many companies have invested substantially in
expanding production lines in China. Since the 1980s, 80 percent of the
industry in Hong Kong1 has shifted a significant part of its shoe produc-
tion to mainland China, especially to Guangdong Province. More than
90 percent of Taiwan, China’s footwear factories (more than 1,000
companies) have set up plants in mainland China, especially in Fujian
Province and Guangdong Province.
The demise of mature manufacturing sectors in the developed coun-
tries has been foretold by some scholars in recent years. They argue that
advances in information and communications technology have paved the
way for the emergence of a new knowledge economy where competitive
advantage and wealth generation rest increasingly on those economic
activities based on learning, innovation, and knowledge creation and less
on the processing of physical materials. More recently, however, this nar-
row interpretation of the knowledge economy has been challenged by the
recognition that physical goods also have intangible qualities (or “sym-
bolic forms”) and that these qualities increasingly serve as the basis for
their economic success (Rantisi 2002). 
China has become a key competitor through lower labor costs and more
rapid advancement in its shoe production and designs, although it lags
slightly in manufacturing value added per capita. Nevertheless, for several
reasons the Chinese shoe industry still faces a grim situation. For one thing,
it confronts powerful challenges from many competitors in and outside
Asia, with its low-grade shoes competing with those made in Indonesia,
Thailand, Mexico, and India, and with its high-grade shoes threatened by
those made in Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Rigorous competition also exists
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among the more than 20,000 domestic shoe enterprises, of which most are
small firms. In addition, some foreign shoe businesses have established their
factories in China to enter the Chinese market, which puts great pressure
on the local shoe enterprises.
How did the Chinese footwear industry gain an international com-
petitive advantage in the past 30 years? Discussion has focused on
China’s cheap labor, even child labor. Labor is a factor, because the
Chinese footwear industry is at the low-value-added stage. However, to
some extent, demand factors, such as China’s huge domestic market
and its sophisticated and demanding buyers are ignored. A more impor-
tant factor is that many local clusters in the footwear industry have
built up in China. 
The decline of the footwear sector in the high-wage countries opened
the opportunity for the value chain to extend into developing countries
like China, which has accounted for almost 50 percent of the world’s pro-
duction for five years. China dominates the production scene and serves
as both the largest exporter and the largest consumer of footwear prod-
ucts. In 2003, more than 20,000 companies produced more than 6 billion
pairs of shoes of various kinds, of which more than 3.87 billion pairs
with a value of US$9.47 billion were exported. Sixty percent of the
shoes made in China entered the international market, accounting for
25 percent of the total turnover of the shoe industry in the world. In
addition, China now produces the highest volume of galosh products
in the world and has become the main exporting country of galoshes.
China also accounts for about 68.3 percent of all footwear imports
into the United States. Because of China’s low-cost labor means, it is
considered the ideal place for the foreign shoe industry to build fac-
tories. Since 1986, U.S. shoe imports from China have increased by a
staggering rate of 2,700 percent. 
The Chinese will continue to develop their shoe industry for the fol-
lowing reasons:
• The increasing demand for shoes. Shoes, together with clothes, have be-
come symbols of fashion for modern Chinese women rather than sim-
ply items for keeping warm. With the improvement of living
conditions in China, people desire to purchase more shoes with better
style; thus, the demand in the domestic shoe market has risen. 
• The labor intensity of the industry. As a typical labor-intensive industry
with a low technology threshold for entry, the shoe industry can help
solve the social problem of unemployment. It is especially important
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when much of the surplus labor force has been released from state-
owned enterprises to search for new jobs.
• The value of the industry. The shoe industry is critical to increasing Chi-
na’s domestic income. For example, the export value of shoe products
reached US$17.1 billion in 2005. 
In China’s footwear industry, most of the producers are subcontracted
to produce world-class foreign brand names such as Nike, Reebok, Adidas,
and so forth, and these products are mainly for export. These producers
use modern machinery and technology, consistently developing their pro-
duction. With the technology assistance provided by the contracted com-
pany or the machinery supplier, these producers can manufacture shoes of
standard quality acceptable to the world market. Most of them engage in
supporting industries such as tanning, shoe mold manufacturing, shoe
parts, and others with a view toward enhancing their ability to reduce cost
and increase their flexibility in production and quality control.
In the case of Italy, the footwear industry has clustered in the main dis-
tricts of Lombardy, Veneto, Marche, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany,
Campania, and Puglia. Likewise, the major footwear produces in India are
clustered in Chennai, Ranipet, Ambur in Tamil Nadu, Mumbai in
Maharastra, Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh, Jalandhar in Punjab, Agra, and
Delhi. Similarly, most of the shoe-related enterprises of China have clus-
tered mainly in the eastern coastal provinces of Guangdong, Fujian,
Zhejiang, and Shandong (in south-north order), with a few scattered in
the western region. At present, the volume of leather shoe production in
the eastern region accounts for about 80 percent of the whole of China,
while the volume of sports shoe production accounts for more than
90 percent. The output of cloth shoes and plastic shoes is also high in the
eastern coastal region. 
Only a few companies specializing in shoemaking lie outside of clus-
ters. Qingdao Double Star Group Haijiang Shoes Co., Ltd., in Shandong
Province, is an example. This large manufacturer of sports shoes origi-
nated from the state-owned ninth rubber factory in Qingdao, which was
established in 1955 and was converted into a multilocation and diversi-
fied business enterprise group in 1990. At present, it has 90 subsidiary
and branch companies with about 20,000 employees and fixed assets of
more than RMB 200 million. The Double Star brand has won the
National Famous Trademark prize. However, the main business of Double
Star in shoemaking is as an original equipment manufacturer (OEM). As
one of the Payless shoe sources, the company exports almost 9.98 million
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pairs of shoes to the United States each year. Double Star learns a great
deal from global buyers—Payless Shoe Source—about how to improve its
product quality and increase its speed of response to customer orders. 
The Formation of the Wenzhou Footwear Industry
The city of Wenzhou has had a shoe manufacturing industry for hundreds
of years, providing a fertile environment for new entrepreneurs rising and
responding to the global challenge. In China, the first pair of pigskin
shoes, the first vulcanized shoes, and the first press molding shoes all came
from Wenzhou. In other words, Wenzhou is one of the seedbeds of the
Chinese shoe manufacturing industry and represents the history of
China’s shoemaking industry. Its industry size, the number of enterprises,
its production value, its quality, and the completeness of its production
chain have made it the footwear capital of China. Not only are the prices
competitive, but also the shoes are world-class commodities in design and
quality. Wenzhou has won three of 10 “kings of genuine leather shoes”
awards in China in 1998–2000. Having grown from family workshops
into modern enterprises, the shoe industry in Wenzhou is moving up the
global value chain.
In 2005, Wenzhou had 4,000 shoemaking firms, 2,500 of which were
specialists in chemical materials and metal hardware, shoe-adorning
material, leather production, sole production, and shoemaking machines.
Accommodating more than 400,000 workers, these firms produced more
than 1 billion pairs of shoes in that year, one-fourth of the gross domestic
footwear output and one-eighth of the total footwear production of the
world. The production of shoes in Wenzhou was valued at US$3.8 billion;
the value of exports reached US$837 million, and its share of the domestic
market and global market is also expanding. The footwear manufacturing
cluster in Wenzhou has followed a successful development path, has
promoted the upgrading of local industry, has cultivated many well-
known brands, and can boast many more success stories. However, the
footwear manufacturing cluster in Wenzhou has also confronted the
bulk of antidumping claims in the global market.
The Formation of the Wenzhou Footwear Manufacturing Cluster
Wenzhou, birthplace of the shoemaking industry in China, has a long
history dating back to 422 AD and over time has built local production
and capabilities for innovation. Since the reform and opening up of
China, the shoemaking industry in Wenzhou has experienced rapid
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growth in industrialization and clustering, a process of development
that can be divided into three phases (see figure 5.1).
The “family workshop” stage, from the 1970s to the 1980s. In the 1980s,
the shoemaking industry in Wenzhou boomed as a rural cluster. Taking
advantage of the reforms and opening up policy, local families with spe-
cialties in shoemaking started low-end businesses. The industry featured
family workshops that had the advantages of low costs and low risks. 
However, several problems came along with the prosperity of the
shoe-manufacturing industry. Before 1987, the market with its thousands
of workshops was expanding rapidly in Wenzhou, but inferior shoes were
being made by profiteers who substituted leatherette for real leather or
even used cardboard for soles and shoe supports. Soon footwear products
from Wenzhou gained the reputation as having a “one-week life
expectancy” in the industry, and shoe retailers all over China refused to
sell the footwear products from Wenzhou. The most serious negative
occurrence was the so-called Wulinmen incident. In August 1987, a num-
ber of people who bought fake and inferior shoe products from Wenzhou
gathered at the Hangzhou Wulin Plaza, where they angrily burned more
than 50,000 pairs of inferior shoes, announcing their boycott of the fake
shoe products from Wenzhou. The incident was noted by the relevant
regulatory authority, and, as a result, the former Ministry of Light
Industry united with five other ministries and listed Wenzhou footwear
products as the major target for remediation and imposed strict regula-
tion. That regulation made significant progress in improving the quality
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Figure 5.1  Formation of the Wenzhou Footwear Manufacturing Cluster,
1970s–Present
of the shoes manufactured in Wenzhou. In the later 1990s, Wenzhou
footwear products regained their reputation for high quality and were
received in markets all over the nation. 
The “clustering” stage, from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. The “clus-
tering” stage has two separate phases: spontaneous clustering and gov-
ernment-induced clustering. Over time, the “local” mode faced the
disadvantage of distance from the market, inconvenient transportation,
and inadequate information and communication. The small family
workshops then spontaneously relocated in or close to the town. In
addition, professional retailers started their own manufacturing business
according to a new mode of “factory and shop.” Meanwhile, several shoe
production sites formed, where families sold their goods in the local
market or at transportation sites. These gathering sites further attracted
the shoemaking and cluster-support firms, generated the network of
specialized family workshops, and later formed the rudimentary shoe
manufacturing cluster in Wenzhou.
However, the development of Wenzhou’s shoemaking cluster was stag-
nant in the 1990s, calling for further government regulation. Low quality
was one threat to its growth. Since the Wulinmen incident in 1987,
footwear products from Wenzhou had faced stricter quality controls, but
the industry still needed the involvement of the local government for
guidance on quality standardization. Moreover, the need for land with
abundant infrastructure was increasing. The well-developed firms with
strong market expansion and innovative capabilities particularly needed a
better infrastructure environment for scaling up production, more con-
venient transportation for reducing cost, and more advanced channels of
communication, all of which relied on the efforts of the local administra-
tion. Since the 1990s, the local administration of Wenzhou has played
an active role in the development of the footwear manufacturing clus-
ter: it instituted industry development policy and planning, improved
local infrastructure, and promoted the standardized shoe-product mar-
ket, among other endeavors. (The role of local administration is dis-
cussed in more detail in the section titled “Dynamics: The Local
Production Network.”)
The relocation and expansion stage, from the late 1990s to the present.
In the late 1990s, the firms in the footwear manufacturing cluster in
Wenzhou began moving out: some firms relocated or expanded to other
cities. Several factors contributed to this relocation and expansion,
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namely, the tension among the supply of local industrial land, the increase
in labor costs, and the investment attraction of other cities in China,
among others. The footwear industry in Wenzhou was also experiencing
a phase of relocation and expansion both domestically and overseas. 
On the domestic scene, the Wenzhou footwear industry has expanded
to such cities as Lishui and Taizhou in the nearby areas of Zhejiang
Province. In 2003, more than 10 shoe leather production firms invested in
Lishui, a city close to Wenzhou. Shoemaking firms also moved to the west-
ern part of China. Bishan Town (in the western part of Chongqing City)
government actively worked to attract leading shoemaking firms from
Wenzhou to invest and set up streamline manufacturing in the local indus-
trial areas. In 2003, Aokang Corporation invested RMB 1 billion (approx-
imately US$130 million) in Bishan, building up the West Footwear
Industry Development Zone with an output of 100 million pairs of shoes
per year and attracting investment from many supporting firms. 
Compared to the eastern parts of China, western China enjoys the
comparative advantage of low costs. For example, the cost of electricity
in the town of Bishan is only 80 percent of that in the city of Wenzhou,
the average wage for the frontline workers is RMB 200–300 lower in
Bishan, and the average material cost for soles is RMB 4 lower per pair,
or 30 percent. In addition, the Aokang Group has a strong domestic
market and sells some 7 million pairs of shoes from Bishan to markets
in western China, which helps the company balance its loss of interna-
tional market share. 
The attraction of western China is one part of the story. The other
part is the two endogenous problems of the Wenzhou footwear manu-
facturing cluster—the high cost of land and the shortage of skilled
labor. The conflict between the urgent need for industrial land and the
policy of protecting farmland is becoming an obstacle to the develop-
ment of local firms. For instance, the average land price per mu2 is
approximately RMB 250,000 in Wenzhou City and towns nearby,
while it is only RMB 30,000 per mu in the Shanghai suburbs. The price
of land is far too high for small and medium enterprises; therefore, they
choose to locate their firms in cheaper provinces with preferable poli-
cies. Another major problem for firms relocating in other cities is the
lack of specialized skills, as the high real estate prices and low quality of
local research institutions make Wenzhou less attractive to the talented
workforce needed by most footwear manufacturing firms compared to
cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. In Aokang’s foot-
steps, Hongqingting Group invested RMB 200 million (approximately
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US$26 million) in the Chongqin Tongliang Industry Development
Zone and formed an association with more than a hundred commer-
cial and service firms. Hence, more and more footwear manufacturing
firms in Wenzhou are preparing to leave the area.
As for overseas expansion, several corporations have developed distri-
bution channels overseas on the basis of exports. In 2001, Kangnai Group
set up franchise stores in Paris and New York, and later the number of
overseas franchises grew to 83. The average export price for a pair of
shoes was US$15, and the average retail price was US$60. Kangnai is a
successful example for the whole shoemaking industry dealing with the
challenge of antidumping in overseas markets. Besides Kangkai’s expan-
sion of its franchise stores, Aokang followed a strategy of cooperation with
Italy’s GEOX Corp. to sell through GEOX’s sales network. In addition,
the footwear manufacturing firms in Wenzhou began to set up overseas
research centers and production sites. In 2004, the Wenzhou Hazan Shoes
Company set up the Hazan-Wilson Footwear Research Center in Italy
and merged with Italy Wilson Footwear Manufacturing Corporation and
Lijiang Commerce Firm in Taiwan, China. Meanwhile, Hazan invested in
a production factory in Nigeria, making Hazan the first MNC in the
Wenzhou footwear industry. Aokang is also preparing for a manufactur-
ing industrial development zone in Ethiopia.
The Structure of the Wenzhou Footwear Cluster
Over the past three decades, the footwear industry in Wenzhou has
developed from isolated family workshops to a cluster with the advan-
tages of external economies, specialization, and brand effect. 
The Rapid Growth of the Local Cluster
Wenzhou is home to more than 4,000 footwear manufacturing firms and
is the largest footwear manufacturing city in China. Firms in the cluster
have achieved an interorganizational division of labor, cooperation, and
intensive interconnections and have shared the rapid growth of the indus-
try. In an illustration of their success, more than 30 firms in Wenzhou
have an output of more than RMB 100 million per year; 70 percent of the
top 30 domestic highest-selling footwear firms are from Wenzhou. The
output of the footwear industry in Wenzhou in 2007 reached more than
890 million pairs (574 million leather shoes and 318 million rubber
shoes), which accounted for approximately 25 percent of domestic out-
put in 2007.
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Output data of the Wenzhou shoe and leather industry is presented
in table 5.1 and figure 5.2. The compound annual growth rate (CAGR)
of shoe and leather production and the CAGR of shoe product manu-
facturing are 25.00 percent and 15.29 percent, respectively, indicating
a rapid growth of the industry in the five years from 2001 to 2005.
Meanwhile, the CAGR of export value was 36.08 percent, two times that
of shoe-product manufacturing in Wenzhou (which was 15.29 percent),
suggesting the expansion of overseas markets.
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Table 5.1  Annual Output and Growth Rate of Wenzhou Footwear Industry,
Selected Years, 1990–2005
Shoe and leather Shoe products
Output
(million
pairs)
Growth
rate (%)
Output
(RMB 
1 billion)
Growth
rate (%)
Export
value (US$
millions)
Growth
rate (%)
1990 60.87 — — — — —
1995 115.07 — — — — —
1997 118.13 — — — — —
1998 388.48 229 — — — —
1999 330.92 –15 — — — —
2000 371.92 12 — — 316.9 —
2001 464.37 25 24.9 — 461.79 —
2002 556.15 20 26.3 5.62 667.23 44.37
2003 562.63 1 30.7 16.73 837.46 25.49
2004 835.05 48 34.6 12.70 1149.03 37.28
2005 822.11 –2 44.0 27.17 1583.99 37.86
CAGR (%) 25.00 15.29 36.08
Source: Wenzhou Shoe Association and Statistical Yearbook of Wenzhou, various years. 
Note: — = not available. 
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Figure 5.2  Annual Output of the Wenzhou Footwear Industry, 1990–2005
The Structure of the Wenzhou Footwear Cluster
Nowadays, Wenzhou’s footwear products account for one-fourth of
China’s and one-eighth of the world’s footwear products, and the
footwear sector is becoming a vibrant manufacturing cluster with more
than 300,000 employees. An analysis of the cluster structure can help
reveal the dynamics of the booming industry (figure 5.3). The industrial
manufacturing structure of the Wenzhou footwear cluster has four inte-
gral parts: a labor-division network, a specialized supplier market, a solid
sales network of domestic and foreign markets, supporting institutions,
and industrial associations.
The clustering effects. Because the production process is technically divisi-
ble, each small and medium enterprise (SME) tends to cover an individual
phase of production and is connected by specialized transaction networks
coordinated by more or less explicit forms of cooperation. The cooperation
among small and medium-sized firms generates the effect of the external
economy. A Chinese economist calls the vigorous SME-dominated
Wenzhou economy a “small dog economy,” that is, a mode of development
characterized by a clear division of labor and close cooperation. In fact, the
economy of Wenzhou is better described as a “swarm effect.”
Shoemaking consists of five key factors: leather production, sole pro-
duction, shoe adorning, last production, and shoemaking machinery. The
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Figure 5.3  Structure of the Wenzhou Footwear Cluster
localized clustering of shoemaking firms in Wenzhou has produced a net-
work based on the local division of labor: more than 200 firms of shoe-
making machines (70 percent of the domestic firms), more than 200
last-producing firms, more than 300 sole-producing firms with 600 pro-
duction lines, more than 200 leather-producing firms, and more than 100
shoe-adorning firms. The cluster offers the advantage of cutting the cost
of production and complementarity (map 5.1). In the meantime, the
labor-division network positively stimulates the diffusion of knowledge
and information in the local industry.
Specialized supplier market. The specialized markets in the urban and
rural areas of Wenzhou provide abundant raw materials for the local
footwear manufacturing firms at short notice and serve as a significant
channel for the wholesaling and retailing of local footwear products. The
large number of stalls and annual transaction value of the North Zhejiang
Shoe-Material Market and the Wenzhou Shoe-Material Market indicate
the important role of specialized supplier markets in the manufacturing
structure of the Wenzhou footwear cluster.
The Wenzhou Shoe-Material Market is located in the town of Quxi, 7
kilometers from the Wenzhou freight train station. Built in 1991, the
market specializes in leather trade and now has 235 leather trading
rooms, 60 stores with sufficient support facilities, and an annual turnover
of RMB 1.3–2 billion, placing it at the top of the domestic leather trade
markets (table 5.2). The market organizes a professional leather whole-
sale network for a number of countries and areas.
Sales network of domestic and overseas markets. The businesspeople
and entrepreneurs in Wenzhou have developed a sensitivity to the chang-
ing market of shoe products and have formed a solid network of domes-
tic and foreign markets. On the basis of the personal connections of
domestic and overseas Wenzhou entrepreneurs, the footwear industry in
Wenzhou has built up a global sales network consisting of global buyers,
export agencies, and retailers. These connections explain the continuous
success of Wenzhou’s export in past years. The sales network encourages
firms in Wenzhou to cooperate with each other to expand into the
mature market and enter new ones.
This solid sales network has made a great contribution to the rapid
growth in value of Wenzhou’s shoe exports in recent years. In the interna-
tional footwear market, the shoe products from Wenzhou can be found in
the markets of Italy, Germany, Portugal, the Czech Republic, the Arab
Industrial Clustering in China: The Case of the Wenzhou Footwear Sector 163
Taishun
Wencheng
Ouhai
Lucheng
Yongjia
Yueqing
Longwan
Dongtou
Ruian
Cangnan
Pingyang
FUJIAN  PROVINCE
Z H E J I A N G   P R O V I N C E
WENZHOU
TAIZHOU
LISHUI
D o n g  H a i
P h i l i p p i n e
S e a
E a s t
C h i n a
S e a
Yel low
Sea
Sea
of
Japan
BEIJING
HEILONGJIANG
JILIN
LIAONING
NE
I  M
ON
GO
L
HEBEI
BEIJING
TIANJIN
S
H
A
N
X
I
SHAANXIGANSU
QINGHAI
N
I
N
G
X
I
A
SHANDONG
HENAN
ANHUI
ZHEJIANG
SHANGHAI
SICHUAN
CH
O
NG
Q
IN
G HUBEI
GUIZHOU
HUNAN
JIA
N
G
XI
FUJIAN
GUANGXI GUANGDONG
TAIWAN
HAINAN
YUNNAN
HONG KONG
JIANGSU
MACAO
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
MONGOLIA
JAPAN
PHILIPPINES
VIETNAM
REP. OF
KOREA
D.P.R. OF
KOREA
LAO
P.D.R.
shoemaking corporation
Xian (county) boundaries
prefecture boundaries
province boundary
international boundary (inset)
IBRD 37895
JULY 2010
Source: Author’s research.
Map 5.1  Shoemaking Companies in Wenzhou164
Republic of Egypt, and other countries. Some leading firms in Wenzhou,
such as the Kangnai Group, have even set up franchise stores in foreign
markets. 
Support institutions and the industry association. With the development
of the local footwear zone, some support institutions were introduced into
the cluster: the Footwear Testing Center of China, China Shoes Library,
China Shoes InfoCenter, China Shoes Museum, Institution of Shoemaking
Technology of China, the China Shoes Journal editorial board, and China
Shoes Tech-Center. These supporting institutions have strengthened the
competence of the Wenzhou footwear cluster in technology innovation,
sales, and product quality control. 
In addition, universities and research institutions play an important role
in supporting technology innovation in footwear manufacturing in
Wenzhou. In recent years, Wenzhou University has put much effort into
research on innovations in leather production and cooperated with several
firms in the industry to set up the Leather Production Technology
Research Center of Wenzhou in 2004. The center concentrated on green
industrial product development, clean leather production technology, and
other high-tech research in leather production. In 2006, the center became
the Key Leather Project Laboratory of Zhejiang Province and established
the Service Platform for Leather Production Innovation of Zhejiang
Province to strengthen research capabilities. The Key Leather Project
Laboratory of Zhejiang Province and the Leather Industry Technology
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Table 5.2  Number of Stalls and Annual Transaction Value of the Shoe-Material
Market in Wenzhou, 2000–07
Commodity exchange markets
North Zhejiang Shoe-Material Market Wenzhou Shoe-Material Market
Stalls (number)
Annual 
transaction value
(RMB 1 million) Stalls (number)
Annual 
transaction value
(RMB 1 million)
2000               596               50.00               570               45.50
2001               596               50.00               500               49.00
2002               442               24.00               658               45.00
2003               442               23.35               658               44.54
2004               675               26.34               658               27.33
2005               675               50.11               564               28.48
2006               675               76.19               658               23.39
2007               979               73.29               658               20.66
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Wenzhou, various years.
Research Center of Wenzhou are the only leading professional and high-
end leather research institutions in eastern China. In cooperation with
Wenzhou University, the laboratory has concentrated on producing and
testing leather chemicals, genuine and synthetic leather-processing tech-
nology and performance testing, and the environmental management of
leather production and pollutant treatment.
Besides the supporting institutions, the shoemaking firms in
Wenzhou formed an association with 1,138 members and 26 associa-
tion branches. In recent years, it has made a great effort to improve
shoe quality, help the member enterprises enter and expand in the
domestic and overseas markets, set up enterprise groups, and build and
strengthen electronic information networks. Connected by the associ-
ation, the firms in the Wenzhou footwear industry formed a highly
competent and dynamic group.
Success Factors and Challenges of the Wenzhou 
Footwear Manufacturing Cluster
Wenzhou’s success could be attributed to its highly developed local
production network and its very capable industrial association and
local government, as well as the very dynamic local entrepreneurs.
However, in recent years, the Wenzhou cluster also faces challenges of
antidumping, higher eco-standards, low technology, and lack of indige-
nous innovation. 
The Success Factors
Dynamics: the local production network. The footwear industry in
Wenzhou has formed a large local production network with thou-
sands of independent small and medium enterprises covering inde-
pendent but related phases of production. Referring to the previous
research on the development of clustering, the following characteris-
tics are identified as prerequisites for the success of an industrial cluster
(Schmitz 1995):
• The division of labor and specialization among firms 
• The provision of specialized products and services at short notice 
• The emergence of suppliers to provide raw materials and components 
• The growth of suppliers of second hand machinery and spare parts 
• The emergence of agents who sell to distant national and international
markets 
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• The growth of specialized producer services in technical, financial,
and accounting matters
• The formation of associations providing services and lobbying for
members
The Wenzhou footwear industrial cluster of the local production net-
work meets all these prerequisites. Currently, there are shoe enterprises
that specialize in three industrial activities (tanning, leather shoes, and
leather articles) and footwear-related industries including leather chemical
engineering, leather mechanical engineering, leather hardware, footwear
material, and so on. The footwear industrial cluster of Wenzhou is noted
for the large size of its industry, the cooperative industrial system, the
highly concentrated shoe brand names, the strong marketing network, and
the local industrial association. Besides, the Wenzhou footwear industrial
cluster has a mature specialized market that supplies raw materials, a well-
developed domestic and overseas sales network, and industrial associations
that provide up-to-date information to the companies and facilitate their
communication with each other.
An analysis of the footwear industry in the Lucheng District, the most
centralized shoe manufacturing zone in Wenzhou, reveals further features
of the dynamics of the local production network. Lucheng is located in
the center of Wenzhou and has an area of 104 square kilometers. It has a
population of 875,000, of whom more than 344,800 come from outside
the city for work. There are 905 industries in the footwear industry with
an annual output of more than 300 million pairs of shoe products,
amounting to one-eighth of the total output of shoe products in China.
There are more than 300 million square meters of factory buildings and
more than 550 advanced production lines for manufacturing. The value
of the annual output of shoe products is RMB 25 billion (US$3 billion),
accounting for 20 percent of China’s domestic shoe market. Besides dom-
inating the domestic market, the shoe products from Lucheng are sold in
a multinational market of more than 20 countries and regions, including
North America, Europe, South America, and the Middle East. In the
domestic and overseas markets, these products are well-known brands
that have been extremely successful in the past few years. 
In the Lucheng District, a local division of labor among suppliers,
including shoemaking machines, lasts, soles, shoe-related chemical mate-
rials, and metal hardware, has emerged. The production districts and trade
markets are colocated around the Lucheng shoe production zones: the
production zone in Baishi of Yueqing Town; the district of shoe-adorning
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materials in Yongjia of Huangtian Town; the shoe material market with an
annual transaction value of RMB 3 billion in Hetongqiao; and the raw
leather market, leather machine market, and leather chemicals market,
with an annual transaction value of RMB 2 billion in Shuitou Town.
Clustering brings a close and convenient connection among the firms in
different parts of the value chain. However, as the products are mainly
homogeneous, clustering also generates the problem of brutal competi-
tion among materials suppliers, pushing them to use and develop their
resources fully. Furthermore, the low labor cost in local zones helps cut
the price of the products.
With its specialized manufacturing network, the Lucheng District has
attracted both big brand-name companies in China and multinational
firms from Italy, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and Taiwan, China, to build fac-
tories or set up agencies. To illustrate, Nike has now been purchasing
leather material from the Far-East Company in Shutou since 1998.
Connecting: the local industrial association. Since the reform and open-
ing up of China, the SMEs in Wenzhou have grown at an amazing rate,
generating an economy of agglomeration. However, clustering alone
without an association to connect firms to each other would not lead
to breakthroughs in industry upgrades. In the process of cluster devel-
opment, the first Chinese shoemakers’ association in Wenzhou has
played an important role. The formation of the industry association
was closely related to the development of the industry. As mentioned
earlier, the footwear industry of Wenzhou developed from local family
workshops. These family workshops had little encouragement as well
as little impediment from the planned economic system that existed in
China before 1978 (the year of the implementation of the reform and
opening up policy). The local entrepreneurs created the initial shoe-
making industry in Wenzhou with their wisdom, diligence, bravery,
broad vision, and great creativity. They created the various prevailing
and attracting commodities at a low price. 
However, in the 1980s, the period of excess demand for shoes in the
domestic market, the shoemaking cluster in Wenzhou suffered a serious
crisis of trust: the low quality of its products at that period severely dam-
aged the reputation of Wenzhou-made footwear products. For one thing,
large numbers of replica shoes came from unlicensed factories; for
another, some enterprises with poor management went for high profits by
cutting costs and producing shoes with low quality, which finally led to
the Wulinmen incident. Since then, the shoemakers in Wenzhou have
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realized that products should meet quality standards. In 1991, the firms
spontaneously founded the Wenzhou Lucheng Shoe Industrial
Association. Acting as the bridge between the government and its mem-
ber enterprises, the association started standardizing quality and played an
important role in enlarging the influence and enhancing the reputation of
Wenzhou shoe products. 
At present, the association has 1,138 member enterprises and 26
branches. According to interviews with the entrepreneurs of local shoe-
making firms and the leader of the association, the role of the footwear
association can be summarized as follows: 
• Connecting the local administration and the industry. The association
acts as the bridge between the local administration and the enterprises.
It passes the regulatory policy pertaining to enterprises and also trans-
mits the requirements of the enterprises to the administration.
• Serving members of shoemaking firms. The association serves the enter-
prises in every aspect and helps them strengthen their brands. 
• Promoting the industry. The association often holds exhibitions of high-
quality shoes in other cities in China and introduces Wenzhou shoes to
other buyers. It also invites the local commerce bureau and reporters to
Wenzhou to extend their understanding and impression of the shoe
products in Wenzhou. 
• Exchanging information. The association holds lectures on learning
techniques and new equipment and provides information. 
• Introducing new technology. The association encourages the shoe com-
panies to introduce advanced production lines and organizes them to
visit companies in other countries, such as the United States, Italy, and
Korea. 
• Promoting trade. The association keeps in close touch with the trade as-
sociation of Italy and invites experts to give lectures on using new
equipment and materials. 
• Training. To enhance the design level, the association offers training
classes given by the national footwear institution and Beijing
Leather College. These activities greatly help upgrade the Wenzhou
shoe industry.
China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization created opportu-
nities and challenges for the shoemaking industry in Wenzhou. The asso-
ciation focuses on how to call global attention to Wenzhou and how to
promote the Wenzhou footwear industry so that it can prosper in the
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international market. To illustrate, the association has held international
exhibitions to help expand the influence of the Wenzhou footwear indus-
try in the international market and has introduced advanced technology
as well as recent market information to its members. In addition, since
1996, the association has held an annual exhibition of advanced equip-
ment, material, and techniques, which has become one of the most influ-
ential professional shoemaking exhibitions in Asia.
Promoting: the local administration. The local government of Wenzhou
has played an active role in the development of the footwear manufac-
turing cluster. It constituted the industry’s development policy and plan-
ning, improved local infrastructure, and promoted a standardized shoe
product market, as well as providing other assistance. The main contribu-
tions of the local administration are as follows:
• Encouraging the development of the shoe industry. As early as 1978, when
China began implementing its significant economic reforms and open-
ing up policy, the local administration in the towns of Wenzhou be-
came the leading force. It instructed the local people to conduct any
legal privately or publicly owned business to help them solve the prob-
lems of poverty and become prosperous. In that laissez-faire institu-
tional environment, the privately owned township firms in the rural
areas of Wenzhou experienced an unprecedented boom. 
• Setting regulations. The local administration also played an important
role in quality control. Due to the low quality of the shoe products in
the 1980s during the development of the shoe business, Wenzhou-made
shoes had the advantage of low prices but the disadvantage of a bad rep-
utation. Since the Hangzhou Wulin–Gate incident, the administration
has called on enterprises to improve their standards of shoe quality. This
governmental instruction has not only regulated the shoemaking indus-
try, but also prompted shoe companies to develop into branded corpora-
tions. Since then, some brands have risen to among the top 10 in China’s
shoemaking industry and have expanded the national market.
• Promoting technology learning and innovation. The local administration
encourages entrepreneurs in Wenzhou to build learning institutions.
Moreover, it has persuaded the shoe manufacturing business in Italy to
set up a footwear design center in Wenzhou, marking its transition
from an industry solely concentrated in manufacturing into a cluster
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with internal innovation capability. It also built up or introduced
professional shoe leather majors in the local colleges and schools and
educated thousands of young professional graduates in the sustain-
able development of the industry.
• Improving the local infrastructure. Infrastructure is a principal factor in
the development of an industry cluster, because it is the key to site lo-
cation, cost of transportation, and ease of access to business partners
for face-to-face communications. The government of Wenzhou City is
investing RMB 557 million in setting up an industrial zone called the
“Chinese shoe metropolis” in Shuangyu Town, Lucheng District (see
figure 5.4). The zone covers an area of 6.5 square kilometers, with a
building area of 697,000 square meters. It is planned as a large indus-
trial complex of shoe development that integrates technological train-
ing, trading, testing, and information provision and production. The
zone will be divided into four separate functional sectors of shoemak-
ing, shoe machinery, shoe service, and shoe culture. A museum of shoe
culture, an exhibition hall for shoe transactions, and a park based on
shoe culture are to be built. This complex combines a manufacturing
specialty with a focus on tourist and consumer services. Visitors will
enjoy learning about both the new technology of shoemaking and the
traditional culture of Wenzhou. It is anticipated that the annual out-
put value of the zone may be more than RMB 20 billion after it has
reached full manufacturing capacity.
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Figure 5.4  The Development of the “Chinese Shoe Metropolis,” 1999–2008
The establishment of the Wenzhou China Shoe Capital (WCSC)
project is a good example that illustrates how the local government
implements significant strategy for the industry. The WCSC is a large
shoemaking base that integrates production with scientific research,
testing, information, and trade. 
Venturing: the local entrepreneurship. Local entrepreneurship in
Wenzhou has a long and prosperous history in the development of the
local economy. The network of entrepreneurs from Wenzhou extends to
every part of the world market, through dynamic information sharing,
learning, market expansion, and capital accumulation. The entrepreneurs
are a key driving force in the development of the Wenzhou shoe indus-
try. Their role in Wenzhou is summarized as follows:
• The spirit of venturing. The history of the SME boom in Wenzhou exem-
plifies the spirit of venturing. The development of privately owned busi-
nesses in Wenzhou required entrepreneurs to make a breakthrough in
the existing market system and develop an economy suitable for SMEs.
Through trial and error, SMEs in Wenzhou prospered, evolving from
small-scale enterprises into a variety of clusters and going from doubt
to hope. The venturing spirit was therefore essential to the success of
the industry. 
• Building a global network. There are more than 2 million people in the
shoemaking industry; they live or work in every part of the world and
form an invisible but powerful global network of information, knowl-
edge, and markets. The entrepreneurs in Wenzhou have been active in
setting up various overseas markets in light industry and expanding
demand for local products.
• A keen understanding of the global value chain. Thousands of SMEs in
Wenzhou concentrate on a single specialized phase of production and
thus serve as part of the global value chain. The specialization of pro-
duction contributes to the SMEs’ keen understanding of cooperation
in the global division of labor.
The Challenges to a Sustainable and Upgraded Cluster
Generally, to maintain sustainability and perform upgrades, firms in
clusters need to gain additional value from innovation in new products,
a larger scale effect, and a bigger share of the domestic and overseas
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markets. All these can help maintain and improve the competence of
local industry and lead the upgrading from the bottom to the top in
the global value chain. 
In the development environment of the international and domestic
shoe product market, several factors create challenges to the sustainabil-
ity and upgrading of the footwear manufacturing cluster in Wenzhou,
particularly dumping, eco-standards, and low technology and lack of
independent innovation and concerted action among the enterprises. 
Antidumping. There are two essential prerequisites for charging an indus-
try with “dumping”: the price of the item is lower than the cost of produc-
tion and disrupts the local market. Foreign countries set up antidumping
barriers against Chinese goods for three main reasons: 
• “Dumping” activities by Chinese firms in the European and American
markets. The firms in Wenzhou are willing to export their products at
a price under their costs to the overseas markets, because they can
gain back the export taxes through subsidies. That strategy, however,
actually constitutes dumping the goods in overseas markets.
• Unilateral policies for protecting the local industry. The combination of
low price and desirable quality in Chinese products severely threatens
local industry in other countries. To protect local markets and indus-
tries, countries take unilateral actions such as antidumping measures
and punitive tariffs to restrict the entrance of Chinese products. 
• Low added value of Chinese products. Due to the weakness in innova-
tion and technology development, Chinese products can easily be
supplemented with homogeneous products from other countries.
For whatever reason, governments of the developed overseas mar-
kets generally take “antidumping” actions to benefit local firms and
industries.
At present, the average export price for a pair of shoes from China is no
more than €3, while the average sales price for shoes in the European mar-
kets is €35–70. Chinese shoe products, therefore, are vulnerable to inves-
tigations of dumping. If the export prices for shoe products from China
were to reach the average sales price in the European market, it would not
only increase revenues 10 times for the shoe-exporting firms in Wenzhou,
but also would avoid the deep suspicion of illegal dumping. If that were
the case, though, it would raise the question of how the footwear manu-
facturing firms in Wenzhou could reach the threshold of €35.
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Eco-standards. Eco-standards are an issue in the context of environmen-
tal protection and sustainable development. Various such barriers exist in
the international market, specifically, the RoHS (Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Hazardous Substances) in Europe, the WEEE (Waste Electrical
and Electronic Equipment) system, REACH (Registration, Evaluation, and
Authorization of Chemicals), and EuP (Energy-using Products). These
restrictions will significantly affect manufactured products exported from
the developing countries to the European markets.
REACH is the regulation directly restricting the materials used in the
process of shoemaking. At the end of 2005, for example, Chinese shoe
products exported to Italy were charged with containing excessive nickel,
azo dyes, cadmium, and pentachlorophenol. In addition, a shipment of rub-
ber shoes sent back from Germany was charged with containing excessive
formaldehyde. These experiences with eco-standards suggest that Wenzhou
should change its practices to meet the requirements of overseas markets.
Low technology. Compared to shoe production techniques in Italy, Spain,
and Taiwan, China, production methods in Wenzhou rely on lower-level
technology. Few shoemaking firms in Wenzhou have mastered advanced
technology in nanomaterials, solvents, and surface treatment agents.
Generally, shoe manufacturing industries in developed countries take
advantage of computer-aided design (CAD), computer-aided manufac-
turing, (CAM), and product data management (PDM) for their designs.
They also use streamlines, automatic control systems, and lasers to
increase the efficiency and quality of the products. These advanced tech-
nologies significantly improve design capability, R&D capability, and
manufacturing. Although streamlines are prevalent in Wenzhou, the
application of these other advanced technologies is rare, indicating a lack
of industrial innovation capability. Meanwhile, the footwear industry in
Wenzhou depends heavily on assistance from developed countries such as
Italy, which restricts the improvement of local innovation.
Lack of independent innovation. At present, many outstanding firms
have strong, independent innovation capabilities in Wenzhou; they have
developed many new functional products with excellent sales records.
These products—such as the Goodyear Shoe by Kangnai, the Antibacterial
Shoe by August, and the Nanomaterial Shoe by Gierda—were developed
through a combination of foreign advanced shoe manufacturing and
domestic needs. These examples demonstrate that leading firms in the
Wenzhou shoe industry have been aware of the significance of inde-
pendent innovation. More than 80 percent of the SMEs in the shoe
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industry in Wenzhou, however, specialize in processing and manufactur-
ing OEM products for other firms; lack of awareness of the importance of
independent innovation has impeded the further development of the
whole industry.
The call for collective action. Because antidumping restrictions affect the
interests of the whole industry rather than just individual firms, shoemak-
ing firms need to take collective action and cooperate with each other to
respond to the challenges. The firms in the architectural ceramics indus-
try in Guangdong Province, for example, learned the lessons of the puni-
tive tariff of 247 percent in the Indian market when no Chinese firm
responded to the unreasonable antidumping restrictions. Fortunately,
awareness is increasing within the footwear industry of the need to unite
in collective action. For example, on March 8, 2006, members of the
footwear association in Wenzhou, Quanzhou, and Guangdong founded a
union to respond to charges of dumping in the European market. Such
collective action will help the footwear industry in Wenzhou preserve its
rights in the global market.
Independent Innovation: The Road to Upgrading
As discussed in this chapter, challenges exist to the future development
of the footwear industry in Wenzhou. But responses like collective action
and mastering international market regulations are not enough to solve
the fundamental problem of upgrading. The most essential point for the
sustainable development of the footwear industry in Wenzhou is to
improve the capacity for independent innovation to help the industry
reach a higher place along the global value chain. In the development of
China’s industries, specialized OEM manufacturing has brought prosper-
ity to millions of SMEs. OEM, however, can only help China become the
mass production factory for the global market; it cannot transform China
into an innovative industrialized country.
Independent innovation is a multifaceted concept. It contains the four
patterns of innovation proposed by the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization—product innovation, production innovation,
function innovation, and interdepartmental innovation—and emphasizes
the role of interorganizational R&D departments, research centers with
outputs of new technology, other firms with advanced technology, and uni-
versities. It is a process of imitation, digestion, assimilation, and re-creation;
it even requires firms to improve their business mode, sales mode, service
mode, brand operations, and other value-added capabilities. 
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A brief review of the developmental history of the Kangnai Company
illustrates how independent innovation helps the firm thrive and succeed.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the process of Kangnai’s transition from family work-
shop to leading firm in the Wenzhou footwear industry. In each phase of
development, Kangnai was a pioneer in introducing new technologies and
independent innovation. Because of its roots in the footwear industry,
Kangnai has been one of the most active participants in the Shoe and Allied
Trade Research Association (SATRA). However, it has since diversified to
become a specialist in testing consumer products. It is also one of the largest
research and certification institution in China, with pervasive influence, and
it is the first Chinese footwear manufacturing firm to participate in setting
regulations. Kangnai has invested RMB 10 million in building a world-
class R&D center in Wenzhou to work on the latest footwear manufac-
turing technology, materials, processing, and environmental standards. It
has set an example for other shoemaking firms in Wenzhou to improve
their capacity for independent innovation and increase their competence.
Policy Suggestions for Upgrading the 
Footwear Industry in Wenzhou
Basically, the development and upgrading of the industry depend on the
strategies of firms within the cluster, and the most effective method is to
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Figure 5.5  Development Stages of the Kangnai Company, Selected Years, 1980–2004
improve the independent innovation capability of the firms to respond to
the challenge of antidumping barriers. Meanwhile, the significance of the
role of local government, associations, research centers, and universities
must be emphasized, because they are all involved in the development
process. To meet the challenges to further development of the sector, this
chapter offers the following policy recommendations for the footwear
manufacturing sector in Wenzhou:
• Provide a better environment for further development. The high price for
land use is becoming a major obstacle to the further development of
most footwear manufacturing firms. The local administration should
improve land-use and transference policies and put some effort into
creating better infrastructure in the industrial zone to help the
footwear firms. The administration of Jinjiang may serve as one good
reference point for Wenzhou in making land-use policy: the local
administration provides a two-thirds discount off the land price for
those firms designated as a Famous Brand of China and provides
preferable policy support for the development of local firms.
• Establish a professional training center for footwear manufacturing. The
lack of technology talent is another threshold for the labor-intense
footwear manufacturing industry, which closely relates to the capabil-
ity of technology innovation and research. The establishment of a
training center would provide professional labor to the local firms and
help increase the innovation capabilities of local industry. In the town
of Shiling of Guangzhou City, for example, the Professional Training
Center of China Light Industry and the Shiling Base of the China
Leather Industry Training Center have proved helpful in making the
local professional labor market successful and have provided a suffi-
cient supply of technology talent for the firms.
• Encourage firms in the footwear industry cluster in Wenzhou to improve
their independent innovation capabilities. To increase investment in in-
dependent research and new-product innovation, firms should receive
support in their effort to enter the global value chain system through
innovation in product, function, brand, and sales mode. By learning
from successful foreign corporations, local firms can increase and ac-
cumulate independent innovation experience. The development of
Kangnai’s innovation capability mentioned earlier is one successful
case study for other footwear manufacturing firms to emulate.
Industrial Clustering in China: The Case of the Wenzhou Footwear Sector 177
• Promote cooperation and pursue collective action. Promoting coopera-
tion and pursuing collective action by using overseas networks can
help the people of Wenzhou gain and transmit information and
strengthen individual firms as well as clusters. For local enterprises,
the footwear industry association is an essential way of connecting
firms; in the domestic realm, the governmental departments can
serve as nodes linking the firms, research centers, universities, and
the other institutions.
• Regulate domestic eco-standards to meet the requirements of the global
market. Firms, the administration, and the industry association should
develop an agreement on eco-standards for footwear products; then
domestic regulations should enforce the quality of local products for
the global market.
Notes
1. The historical name Hong Kong refers to the period before July 1, 1997,
when the former British colony was restored to China.
2. 1 mu is equal to 1/15th of a hectare. A square mile has about 3,885 mu.
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Since China’s reform and opening up in 1978, Chinese products have
been increasingly exported all over the world. Buyers, both domestic and
foreign, would be surprised to find that hundreds of suppliers in one
town, county, or municipality are producing the same products. Along the
eastern coast of China, especially in Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces,
a “world factory” for various products has rapidly emerged, creating the
“China miracle” that puzzles the world’s experts: how did China build
such a competitive advantage during a short 30-year span? Lower labor
cost is only one of the reasons; another critical factor, the industry clus-
ter—a form of industrial organization—has played a very important role. 
This cluster-based development pattern is suitable to China’s level of
industry, which greatly benefited from such advantages as the availability
of a labor pool, technology and knowledge transfer, lower transportation
costs, easy supply of intermediate inputs, lower transaction costs due to a
high degree of social trust, high-level specialization, and shared public
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infrastructure with geographical proximity. Besides these general factors,
how did China’s clusters develop so successfully? What lessons can be
learned from that development? What role does policy play? A case study
might help us gain insight and lead to some answers. 
This study takes one typical case, a textile industry cluster in Xiqiao
Town in Guangdong Province, as the epitome of traditional industry clus-
ter development in China. To give a clear picture, a brief introduction to
the background of cluster development in China and Guangdong
Province is presented first.
An Overview of Industrial Cluster Development in China
Based on the formation and development mechanisms of clusters over
different periods, we can divide the evolution of China’s cluster develop-
ment into three phases: formation, consolidation, and upgrading or transfer.
Because different mechanisms operate in each of these three phases, it is
difficult to specify exactly the time frame of cluster development. In
addition, differences exist among clusters in eastern, central, and western
China with respect to formation mechanisms. For the currently emerging
clusters in central and western China, industry transfer and expansion
from eastern China and policy encouragement over recent years are the
main factors, for example, the formation of the Chengdu footwear clus-
ter in Sichuan Province. This kind of cluster will not be analyzed here. We
shall focus only on clusters in eastern and southern China, particularly
those in the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong and in the Yangtze River
Delta.1 (See map 6.1.)
Formation, Early 1980s through Mid-1990s
Early in the transformation of the planned economy into a market-
 oriented one, China suffered from product shortages; an enterprise could
sell almost everything it manufactured. After a few enterprises had
demonstrated some financial success, more and more peasants, workers,
and even officials and scholars began to run businesses or enterprises.
Hence, clusters of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) emerged in
Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces, mostly in traditional industries such
as textiles, garments and apparel, metalwork, household electrical goods,
furniture, and leatherwear. The phenomenon of “one town, one indus-
try—one village, one product” was widely evident in the Pearl River Delta
area of Guangdong and Zhejiang. In Guangdong, this phenomenon came
to be called the “specialized town,” while in Zhejiang it was referred to as
the “block economy.” Some of these clusters were derived from special-
ized product markets. Around these markets, related producers came
together, and gradually a particular cluster formed.
At the initial stage of the reform and Open Door policy, quite a num-
ber of businessmen from Hong Kong2 and Taiwan, China moved their fac-
tories or investments into Guangdong to manufacture clothing, electronic
goods, toys, and footwear. The information technology (IT) cluster in
Dongguan City, Guangdong Province, is a typical case. In that area, 84.3
percent of the IT enterprises were foreign investments by the end of
1998, while only 15.7 percent were enterprises with domestic invest-
ment. Then, more and more foreign direct investment (FDI) entered
China, of which 85 percent was concentrated in Guangdong, Jiangsu, and
Zhejiang provinces. Business enterprises from Japan and Taiwan, China
were often clustered together: when the core enterprise moved, its sup-
pliers—that is, those enterprises providing parts or materials for the core
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Map 6.1  Provinces, Autonomous Regions, and Municipalities
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business—moved along with it. Most of them were involved in export-
oriented processing activities. 
The formation of those clusters was driven by market demand, both at
home and overseas. The cooperation of enterprises in the supply chain is
usually frequent and strong, while horizontal cooperation—that is, coop-
eration among similar enterprises—is less so. These clusters, especially the
endogenous ones, were characterized by small scale, extensive imitation,
lower innovation capacity, and rapid expansion with low quality. Low-
cost production was their main advantage. Some high-tech industry parks
with capacity for innovation were set up too, however, such as the
Zhongguancun High-Tech Park in Beijing. 
Adjustment and Consolidation, Mid- and Late 1990s to 2000
Since the mid-1990s, after an initial period of fast development, domestic
markets became buyers’ markets, that is, the supply of a commodity
exceeded the demand. In addition, competition inside and outside the
cluster became more and more fierce as the size of the cluster increased.
Most of China’s clusters declined for some time because of low innovation
dynamics, inadequate innovation capacity of SMEs, and strong market
competition, and experienced an adjustment and consolidation develop-
ment period. For example, after such a decline, the Wenzhou footwear
cluster in Zhejiang Province began to pay attention to quality, consumer
trust, and regional brands, and Xiqiao textile cluster in Guangdong began to
raise its innovation capacity with the support of local government. From
this period onward, local government began to intervene in cluster devel-
opment, following the central government’s reform of the tax distribution
system in 1994, which allowed local government to share a certain propor-
tion of taxation (Zhang et al. 2007; Fu 2008). 
Because clusters were recognized as the growth engine of the regional
economy, local government—including provincial, municipal, county, and
town governments, especially the latter three—began to support cluster
development through taxation, loans, and direct support such as infra-
structure and innovation services. Meanwhile, enterprises, businessmen,
and local governments in the cluster set up industry and commerce asso-
ciations. Innovation for development and for improving competitiveness
was the main theme of this period. As a result, eastern China gradually
developed into the “world factory.” Various new clusters—such as those
in IT, software, biomedicine, and new energy—emerged to replace most
of the traditional industry clusters of the former period. Although these
changes indicated an adjustment in the structure of Chinese industry,
184 Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China
overall clusters in China were still “driving on the low road,” meaning that
they were positioned at the lower end of the global manufacturing value
chain, based on their low-cost advantage. How to move up the global
value chain, how to make growth more efficient, how to move the cluster
from the “low road” to the “high road,” and how to maintain sustainable
development are now China’s main challenges for cluster development. 
Upgrading Development since 2001
After more than 20 years of development, most of the clusters in China
are mature or relatively mature; they typically have large-scale industry,
complete industry chains, and high market share. At the same time, how-
ever, since the start of the new century, cluster development in China has
confronted new challenges, such as increasing costs of production, limited
development space, resource depletion for the time being and more vig-
orous competition. Therefore, labor-intensive and resource-based industry
clusters, such as textile, garment, footwear, and ceramics manufacturing
clusters, have begun to move or spread into central and western China.
Other clusters have begun to enter international markets and invest more
in research and development (R&D) and innovation, while some cre -
ative industry clusters have emerged in Shanghai, Beijing, Hang Zhou,
and elsewhere.
Upgrading and transforming have been the outstanding features of this
period. Some clusters whose advantages had been lost in eastern China
have tried to relocate to other provinces, even to other countries like
Vietnam. In central and western China, provinces such as Jiangxi, Hunan,
Hubei, Sichuan, Anhui, and Guangxi began to attract these industries,
with some new clusters being gradually formed. For example, the
footwear manufacturing cluster in Chengdu in Sichuan Province has ben-
efited greatly from this cluster diffusion and has developed rapidly during
recent years. By the end of 2005, this region in western China had
agglomerated more than 1,200 footwear enterprises, and more than
3,000 related enterprises, producing more than 10 million pairs of leather
shoes and accounting for more than 50 percent of the total footwear
export volume of western China (Yuan and Li 2008).
Types of Clusters in China
Based on different formation dynamics, China’s clusters can be divided
into two categories, endogenous and exogenous.3 The endogenous type is
driven by local factors, including local natural resources, industry history,
entrepreneurial culture, large-scale enterprises, universities or colleges,
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specialized markets, and an enabling local policy environment. Examples
are the textile, metalware, and household electronics clusters in
Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu provinces; the Puer tea industry clus-
ter in Yunnan; and the coal cluster in Shanxi Province. 
Certain high-tech clusters have been formed on the basis of local uni-
versities, for example, the Zhongguancun cluster in Beijing. At the end of
2006, more than 16,000 firms in Zhongguancun Science Park were
involved in software, integrated circuits, network communications, bio-
medicine, and new environmental resource industries. Some clusters have
taken shape through the incubation of large and medium stated-owned
and private enterprises, such as the automobile industry in Changchun
City, the household electronics cluster in Qingdao in Shandong Province,
the motorcycle cluster in Jiangmen in Guangdong Province, and so forth.
As noted earlier, the footwear industry cluster in Chengdu was formed
by industrial relocation from eastern China. Since 2000, the increasing
costs of land, labor, and energy resources have forced some labor-intensive
industries to relocate their production base from southern and eastern
China to the inner provinces to form new clusters. More and more such
clusters will emerge in China.
The exogenous cluster comes into being through foreign direct invest-
ment. At the end of the 1970s, with rapid economic development, increas-
ing costs forced some businesses from Hong Kong and Taiwan, China to
move elsewhere. With the proximity of the neighboring Guangdong and
Fujian provinces, some enterprises first ventured into these regions, and
their success led others to follow. Encouraged by local government,
more and more related enterprises gathered together and formed a clus-
ter. An example is the IT cluster in Dongguan, Guangdong Province,
where 83.4 percent of the enterprises have FDI, such as those from Japan.
Another example is the IT and electronics cluster in Suzhou in Jiangsu
Province, in which some investors are from Singapore.
Main Features of China’s Cluster Development
By the end of 2007, China’s clusters were located mainly in the southeast
coastal region, especially in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, and Guangdong,
where the manufacturing clusters accounted for 54.5 percent of the
national total. The distribution ratio of industry clusters in eastern, central,
and western China was approximately 79:12:9,4 with actual numbers
being 3,630, 557, and 418, respectively (Yuan and Li 2008, 1–12). The
textile clusters and transportation equipment clusters are distributed over
the three regions, while the electrical and communication equipment and
facilities clusters are mainly in eastern China. However, clusters in central
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and western China are mostly in the process of forming. Clusters in east-
ern China are fairly advanced in terms of agglomeration, export ratio, inno-
vation, and growth ratio, while those in central China have higher profits
and development potential; most of the clusters in western China are
resource dependent, focused mainly on basic processing.
China’s clusters came into being gradually during China’s opening up
and reform process, a development promoted by both the central and the
local government. Policies have played an important role in China’s clus-
ter development. Enterprises in China’s clusters are mostly SMEs, with
low innovation ability and competitiveness. As China’s enterprises are
gradually losing their low-cost labor, cluster upgrading and transfer have
become the key tasks of current cluster development.
Outline of Industrial Cluster Development in Guangdong
As a coastal province of China, Guangdong has played an important role
in China’s economic development since the 1980s. It was the frontier of
China’s opening up and reforms and the earliest developed area to bene-
fit from the national reform policy. After more than 30 years of develop-
ment, Guangdong has basically completed its industrialization and
urbanization process and become an industrial province rather than an
agricultural one. In 2008, with a growth rate of 10.1 percent, higher than
that for the previous year, Guangdong’s gross domestic product (GDP)
was US$509.884 billion, accounting for 11.87 percent of China’s total
GDP. The per capita GDP of the province reached US$5,369, much
higher than China’s average level (US$3,097). Although Guangdong was
affected by the current financial crisis, it was still ranked first in China in
total imports and exports in 2008 (see table 6.1). 
As the growth pole of Guangdong, the Pearl River Delta area has
become the world’s factory.5 Here, clusters have played an important role
in the rapid economic development in the province. Particularly after the
1990s, in some counties with an active market, sound transportation, and
telecommunication and information services, many towns established
industries with output values ranging from RMB 1 billion up to RMB 10
billion. In those towns that are more or less concentrated on one indus-
try, specialized divisions of labor and business networks have become key
factors in economic development. These industrial clusters are located
within the township administrative boundary and hence are known as
specialized towns.6
The clustering industries in these towns are called specialized industries
and have developed with integrated production, supply, and sales chains
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Table 6.1  Key Economic Indicators for Guangdong Province and China, 2008 
Area
(sq. km)
Population
(millions)
GDP
(billions)
GDP 
per capita
Primary 
industry (%)
Secondary 
industry (%)
Tertiary 
industry (%)
Growth rate
1980–2008
(%)
Import 
(billions)
Export 
(billion)
FDI inflow 
(billion)
Guangdong
Province 179,757 94.49 509.88 5,369 5.5 51.6 42.9 13.15 279.2 404.1 19.2
China 9,600,000 1,386.28 4,294.73 3,097 11.0 49.0 40.0 10.25 1,133.1 1,428.5 92.4
%a 1.87 6.82 11.87 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 24.64 32.29 28.29
Sources: China data are from China Monthly Economic Indicators, February 2009. Guangdong data are from Guangdong Provincial Government Report, February 13, 2009, and other reports.
Note: The population is 2008 data. n.a. = not applicable. 
a. % = to the % of Guangdong accounting for China’s total. 
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and are usually privately owned. These towns are located mainly in the
inland regions and east bank of the Pearl River Delta, some are in the
eastern Guangdong. By 2008, there were a total of 277 such specialized
towns or industrial clusters. 
By 2007, 228 clusters in Guangdong, with a GDP of RMB 765.049 bil-
lion, accounting for 24.9 percent of the total provincial GDP, had become
the key force driving the development of the provincial economy. As the
growth engine of the local region, the 104 industry clusters in the rela-
tively developed Pearl River Delta region contributed 28.4 percent of the
regional GDP, within which 33 clusters in Foshan, with an industrial and
agricultural output value of RMB 294.225 billion, contributed 81.6 per-
cent of the GDP of Foshan (Provincial Science and Technology Bureau of
Guangdong 2008). Table 6.2 gives some basic information on the clusters
in Guangdong. 
Cluster development in Guangdong has greatly accelerated the process
of industrialization and urbanization. Currently, the Pearl River Delta has
reached the middle-to-advanced stage of industrialization and the middle
stage of urbanization, with a 72.8 percent level of urbanization in 2003
compared to an average of 55 percent for the province as a whole. During
recent years, with current industry transfers and development, clusters
newly formed in the peripheral area of the Pearl River Delta have con-
tributed 44.3–67.6 percent of local economic growth. Therefore, industry
clusters are regarded as the key policy instruments for developing under-
developed areas.
The clusters that are scattered primarily through the Pearl River Delta
and eastern areas are now relatively mature and involve not only labor-
intensive industries, such as textiles and garments, foodstuffs, construction
ceramics, and metalware clusters, but also communication equipment,
automobiles, the IT industry, household electronics, and high-tech indus-
tries. In the western and northern parts of Guangdong, clusters focus on
natural resource industries, such as water and sea products, aquaculture,
fruit, masonry materials, farming, and some small household electronics.
And in the eastern areas, such as Shantou, Chaozhou, and Jieyang, industrial
clusters specialize in stainless steel products, toys, wedding and knitted gar-
ments, foodstuffs, ceramics, and the like (see map 6.2).
Guangdong’s industrial clusters can be classified into endogenous and
exogenous types. The exogenous clusters, mainly driven by overseas
Chinese firms and foreign investments, are concentrated on the eastern
side of the Pearl River in the Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Huizhou areas.
These clusters developed because of their proximity to Hong Kong, China,
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Table 6.2  Key Economic Indicators of Guangdong’s Clusters, 2001–07
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Clusters (number) 21 50 71 103 159 201 228
Total GDP of specialized townsa
(RMB billions) 44.069 97.610 146.712 228.015 465.832 609.115 765.049
Proportion of provincial GDP (%) 4.14 8.32 10.77 14.22 20.83 23.25 24.94
Total population of specialized 
towns (10,000) 148.0 351.5 549.9 850.3 1,358.1 1,708.6 2,037.2
Total S&T personnel in towns 
(10,000) 10.69 18.78 26.01 48.16 42.24 — 42.23
Number of enterprises in towns 
(10,000) 3.92 9.79 13.47 16.40 23.94 36.66 41.39
Number of high-tech enterprises 
(unit) 68 257 336 513 688 971 1,222
S&T investment by township 
governments (RMB millions) 135.27 29.525 41.132 60.004 61.283 — 65.544
Accumulated patents granted 
(number) 2,852 16,289 23,006 46,101 49,285 68,964 108,416
Number of enterprises engaged 
in industrial cluster (10,000 units) 1.48 3.39 4.32 4.81 10.07 — 10.33
Output value of cluster (RMB 
billions) 42.245 127.138 178.027 269.365 468.313 — 973.136
Taxes contributed by clusters 
(RMB billions) 1.181 4.039 6.319 7.230 11.635 — 26.423
Total employees in clusters 
(10,000) 52.95 182.29 241.74 266.47 370.71 — 431.48
S&T personnel in clusters (10,000) 3.36 11.78 14.94 18.71 24.11 — 26.30
Sources: Lu, Lin, and Guan 2008, 217. Data of 2007 are updated by authors according to the survey and report of the Development and Planning Department of the Provincial 
Science and Technology Bureau of Guangdong. 
Note: — = not available. S&T = science and technology. 
a. Specialized towns are towns where clusters are located.
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Map 6.2  Industrial Clusters in Guangdong Province, 2004
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and the preferential development policy for coastal regions in effect since
the 1980s. Dongguan is regarded as a major center. Among these clusters,
both well-known foreign personal computer–related companies, including
IBM, Compaq, Dell, and Acer, and domestic companies, such as Legend
and Founder, have established plants in this area. More than 20,000 firms
are engaged in parts and components processing for personal computers. 
The endogenous clusters mainly consist of domestic firms, mostly SMEs,
and engage in traditional industries, such as shoes, textiles, garments, alu-
minum alloys, toys, foods and beverages, construction materials, paper, auto
parts, arts and crafts, leather goods, metalwork, plastics, furniture, appa-
ratus manufacturing, nonferrous metals, and so on. These clusters can be
found in many regions and are anchored to a network of small and
medium towns somewhere between the large cities and the interior
countryside (Wang and Mao 2005). In 2006, among the 201 clusters in
Guangdong, about 83 percent belonged to this type (see figure 6.1).
Among the 103,300 enterprises in these clusters, some have grown up
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Figure 6.1  Distribution of Industrial Clusters in Guangdong, 2006
Source: Guangdong Bureau of Science and Technology, 2006.
and become leaders in local clusters and have played a key role in clus-
ter innovation and development upgrades.
Three features of endogenous clusters can be observed in their processes
of emergence and development:
• First, almost all endogenous clusters consist mainly of family-owned
SMEs, which result in the importance of family ties, traditions, and a
sort of “path dependence,” which means that these are minor SMEs
operated and managed by families at a low level and that it would be
difficult to develop most of them into modern firms. 
• Second, SME clusters are mainly labor intensive and focus on prod-
ucts with lower added value. These characteristics reflect the history
of their establishment, in which they started with simple products,
such as food, clothes, and shoes, and clustered in the neighborhoods
surrounding a marketplace for selling their products. 
• Third, the low price of the products, linked with the low cost of
 labor, is their most important basis for competitiveness. For exam-
ple, at the beginning of the 1990s, the price of a pair of sports shoes
made by state-owned enterprises in Guangzhou City was nearly
twice as much as those made by private enterprise in rural areas only
some 50 kilometers away. However, low price is often associated
with the low quality and old technologies of SMEs. With the 
increase in competition and cost of labor, product quality and tech-
nological capability have become more important factors in improv-
ing competitiveness.
In recent years, labor costs in Guangdong have already become higher
than in Vietnam and India. Competition from domestic and foreign com-
panies is increasing rapidly. Low price alone is no longer a sustainable
long-term strategy. Growth characterized by quantity with low quality,
low productivity, and high pollution cannot be sustainable. Because of
increasing labor costs, since 2000 some enterprises have begun to move
their production to areas outside the Pearl River Delta and into neighbor-
ing provinces. To keep these enterprises and facilitate development of
other regions in Guangdong, since 2005 the provincial government has
worked out a series of policies to encourage local governments in the
Pearl River Delta and other areas to jointly construct industry transfer
parks in underdeveloped areas. 
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So far, there are 29 provincial-level industry transfer parks in eastern,
western, and northern Guangdong. In 2008, under the new industrial
development policy, the province appropriated a total of RMB 7.5 billion
to develop 15 industry-transfer demonstration parks to induce industries
to move from the Pearl River Delta area to the underdeveloped areas in
Guangdong. It is required that all industries accepted by these parks be
developed into one or more clusters, with one dominant sector and sev-
eral supporting sectors.
Because most of the clusters are producing low value-added prod-
ucts and lack innovation capability, the Guangdong Science and
Technology (S&T) Bureau initiated a program to address these issues
and to advance the S&T progress of the specialized towns. In 1999,
the bureau launched the Guangdong Specialized Town Technology
Innovation Pilots and provided RMB 300,000 for each pilot to set
up technology innovation platforms. The city and township govern-
ments were asked to invest matching funds in the proportions of
1 (province):10 (city): 50 (town) by 2007, a total of 153 such plat-
forms had been established. These platforms provide product identi-
fication and other information services, facilitate innovation, help
commercialize R&D results, and facilitate cooperation among indus-
try, university, and research institutes (see the sections “Implementing
an S&T Strategy” and “Giving Impetus to Cluster Upgrading” later in
the chapter for details). Among these, most of the platforms operate
as quasi-public institutes or as public organizations. These account for
75.8 percent of the total; 11 of them, accounting for 7.2 percent of
the total, operate as private enterprises. 
By the end of 2007, these platforms had facilitated 856 projects in total.
The focus of these platforms has gradually shifted toward R&D, and local
governments have increased their R&D investment. Some of the platforms
have become demonstration projects in the province, even in the country,
such as the Xiaolan productivity promotion center in Zhongshan City
and the Xiqiao textile technology innovation center in Nanhai, Foshan
City. Through the support of these innovation platforms, Guangdong’s
cluster development has entered the upgrading stage. 
How did these clusters develop? What are the roles of local govern-
ment? What are the challenges these clusters face? How can they best
respond to those challenges? What are the policy implications for cluster
development in other regions? To answer these questions, we need to
explore particular clusters. The following section takes one textile industry
cluster in Guangdong as a case study.
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A Typical Textile Cluster in Xiqiao Town
Xiqiao Town is located in the inland region of the Pearl River Delta in
Guangdong Province, southwest of the Nanhai District of Foshan City,
covering an area of 177 square kilometers. Xiqiao Town covers four juris-
dictions and 26 administrative villages, with a resident population of
140,000 and a floating population of 70,000. With convenient sea and
land transportation, and located only 45 kilometers from Guangzhou,
Xiqiao has a unique geographical advantage. Since 2000, Xiqiao has
made great economic strides. In 2006, the total value of local industrial
output amounted to RMB 21.4 billion, up 22 percent from the previous
year. The output of the textile industry was valued at RMB 5.62 billion,
accounting for 60.1 percent of the value of Xiqiao’s total industrial out-
put (see table 6.3) and 30 percent of the total market share of textile
fabrics in Guangdong Province, 11 percent of the China market, and 
6 percent of the international market. The production volume of textile
fabrics reached 1.2 billion meters, out of which 0.11 billion meters were
for export, with a value of US$87.52 million. This volume accounted for
15 percent of the total domestic exports of fabrics and 6.5 percent of the
global market. 
China’s Famous Town of Textile Fabrics and the 
First Textile Industry Upgrading Demonstration Pilot
In 2002, Xiqiao was awarded the title China’s Most Famous Town of
Textile Fabrics by the Textile Industry Association of China (TIAC); it
was the second-largest production and sales base for textile fabrics after
Shaoxing in Zhejiang Province. In May 2004, TIAC launched the first
Textile Industry Upgrading Demonstration Pilot program in Xiqiao. The
local specialized market, Xiqiao Textile City, is one of the three largest
textile wholesale markets in China and is the number-one textile produc-
tion and distribution base in southern China.
Such titles have laid a foundation for further development of the
Xiqiao textile cluster and are attracting more related enterprises to join. As
a typical endogenous SME cluster, among the current 741 textile enter-
prises,7 only a few have investments from Hong Kong, China or Taiwan,
China; more than 90 percent are privately owned, and more than half are
operated by local people. Among the first-generation entrepreneurs in
Xiqiao, almost none had graduated from any textile university or college
of science and technology. Most of them had worked in the processing
line in the plants and picked up their professional knowledge and skills
and their market information on textile fabrics through learning by doing. 
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Table 6.3  Key Statistics on the Textile Industry in Xiqiao Town, 2000–06
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Gross industrial and 
agricultural output 
value (RMB billions) 6.97
9.78
(industry: 9.017)
11.37
(industry: 10.434)
13.262
(industry: 12.41)
154.05
(industry: 12.434)
17.228
(industry: 14.156)
21.4
(industry: 17.982)
Total output value of 
textile industry 
(RMB billions) 2.66 4.33 4.98 4.91 5.039 9.09 10.8
Output value of textile 
industry as % of gross 
industrial output — 43.6 47.7 39.6 40.5 64.2 60.1
Number of textile 
enterprises 1,600 1,636 1,265 1,259 1,100 1,102 800a
Number of employees 
in textile industry 
(thousands) 40.61 44.481 49.405 62.905 60.0 62.9 60.0
Sources: Yue, Cai, and Liang 2008. All data are based on the report “Briefing of Xiqiao Textile Industry” made by Nanhai District Policy Research Office, September 2007. Other data (that is,
the textile proportion of the total industrial output value data) are based on the research and calculations by the authors. 
Note: The number of textile enterprises in this table contains enterprises as legal entities, industrial units, and the like. The number of employees includes those who work in positions 
associated with the textile industry. — = not available. 
a. Approximate number.
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As part of the industry upgrading demonstration pilot, some well-known
large enterprises in the industry chain have invested in the Xiqiao textile
industrial base, which helps extend the local industry chain from the
weaving of specialized fabrics at one end of the chain to a complete tex-
tile cluster with textile machinery, weaving, printing, dyeing, and finish-
ing of various fabrics for garments and furnishings, as well as garment
manufacturing, at the other end. With a contribution of 60.1 percent to
local GDP in 2006, the textile industry has become an important pillar of
Xiqiao’s economic development. 
The Formation of the Xiqiao Textile Cluster
Although Xiqiao has a thousand-year history in the textile industry, it
began to emerge as a cluster only after China’s reform and opening up. Its
development has gone through three phases: the formation phase from
the 1980s to the early 1990s, the innovation and expansion phase from
the mid-1990s to the early years of the 21st century, and the comprehen-
sive upgrading phase since 2004. 
History of the textile industry in Xiqiao. The textile industry in Xiqiao
first prospered during the Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD) and reached its
peak in the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 AD), benefiting from Guangzhou’s
reputation as a source of superior-quality silk and yarn. During the Tang
and Song dynasties, China’s economic center gradually moved south. In
the process of exploring and developing the Pearl River Delta area, people
created the traditional production pattern of “combining fish farming with
mulberry cultivation,”8 which provided the raw materials needed for the
development of the silk textile industry. 
After the Opium War in 1840, stimulated by world demand, large
quantities of raw silk were exported, boosting the industry. In 1872, Chen
Qiyuan, well known as the Father of Textiles, established the Ji Chang
Long Silk-Reeling Factory and opened a new era in which machines were
used to reel silk, greatly stimulating local industrial development. By 1924,
Xiqiao owned 12,000 sets of silk machines, accounting for one-third of the
total silk operations in the Pearl River Delta area. During China’s War of
Resistance against Japan (1937–45), the textile industry in Nanhai County
was nearly destroyed. On the eve of liberation, the textile industry began
to recover, with 982 textile enterprises in 1949 and 2,562 manually oper-
ated textile machines. Only 1,963 silk looms remained, and the annual
output was valued at RMB 2.53 million, accounting for only 6.04 percent
of Nanhai County’s annual gross industrial output. 
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After 1949, the textile industry in Xiqiao Town and Nanhai County
began to be developed by state operation through merging the privately
owned and the government-owned enterprises. At the end of 1957, local
enterprises began to manufacture artificial silk products. Three state-
owned silk factories in Xiqiao Town were set up in 1973 and 1974, on the
basis of several silk enterprises owned by towns or villages. They belonged
to the Nanhai County government and were named Nanhai Silk Factory,
Nanhai Silk Factory II, and Nanhai Silk Factory III. By 1972, all manual
looms had been replaced by machinery and electrical equipment, speed-
ing up the development of the silk industry. The principal local products
included silk fabrics, silk yarn, rayon woven products, and the like, which
were sold at home and abroad. In 1978, the textile industry output of
Nanhai was valued at RMB 47.37 million, accounting for 12.98 percent
of the county’s total GDP (Nanhai County Textile Group 1992).
Formation of the Xiqiao textile cluster. During the 1980s, the reform and
opening up policy had significantly driven forward the development of
Xiqiao’s textile industry. More and more local farmers set up factories
rather than farming in the fields, and private textile mills emerged rapidly.
Simultaneously, with the deepening of the market-oriented reforms during
the late 1980s, the business of the three state-owned silk factories in Xiqiao
started to decline. The reasons included serious shortages of raw silk sup-
plies, lack of incentives, and the low efficiency of state-owned enterprises.
Many skilled employees left these factories to run their own businesses. At
the same time, local private businesses were experiencing rapid develop-
ment. Minle Village, for example, had more than 400 individual textile
mills, with nearly 5,000 looms. Many individual plants only had three or
four machines, and others were run by partnerships of local farmers, with
an investment of several thousand yuan each and no more than 10
machines. The textile industry supported almost 60–70 percent of villagers. 
In the late 1980s, when the three state-owned enterprises underwent
restructuring, a large number of laid-off workers moved to private enter-
prises as skilled laborers. With a rapid increase in domestic demand for
textile goods, a production and marketing system with more than one
thousand factories, ten thousand looms, and more than 10 million meters
of textile production was formed in Xiqiao Town, which then became
one of the major production and sales bases for textile products in China.
The embryonic form of the Xiqiao textile cluster emerged. 
In 1986, to address the backlog of several tons of cloth, the town gov-
ernment coordinated the stakeholders and established the Southern
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Textile Market (also called the Southern Cloth Wholesale Market) on
Jiangpu Dong Road in the Guanshan District, based on the original mar-
ket formed by the local producers. Some 400 wholesale stores with vari-
ous types of cloth attracted both domestic and foreign textile fabric
manufacturers and retailers, who subsequently set up businesses there. By
1995, the Xiqiao Southern Textile Market had become one of the largest
professional wholesale markets in the world, with 1,338 fabric stores in
an area of 50,000 square meters. The expansion of this professional mar-
ket also contributed to the prosperity of the surrounding industries that
offered related services. 
With a production base of more than 2,000 small and medium enter-
prises and a well-developed professional market, a prosperous textile
industrial cluster finally emerged in Xiqiao Town. By the mid-1990s,
there were 2,234 textile factories, 13,432 looms, and more than 20,000
employees. The textile industry had become an important pillar of
Xiqiao’s economy. 
The development of the Xiqiao textile cluster during this period, how-
ever, was a simple expansion of low-quality production (Wang and Yue
2008). Many textile looms were outdated, and some had been abandoned
by the former state-owned plants. Obsolete equipment led to low-grade
products and low efficiency, creating a great challenge for the cluster. On
the one hand, the launch of a large number of textile projects across the
country led to a rapid increase in the capacity for textile production and
caused heated competition in the domestic market. Meanwhile, along
with rising income, domestic consumer demand began to shift toward
new raw materials and fashion designs, resulting in an overstock of low-
grade textile products. 
At the same time, local SMEs lacked the technical capacity for inno-
vation. First, most of the workers were from other provinces and had low
skills. Being located in townships and far away from the center of the
city, local SMEs found it difficult to attract high-quality talent. In addi-
tion, according to one questionnaire given out to 32 enterprises (Wang
et al. 2008), the educational level of the workers and staff in these enter-
prises was generally low: 65.2 percent had a high school education or
below, 25.02 percent were from secondary professional schools, 8.86 per-
cent had three or four years of university or college education, and 0.92
percent had master’s degrees. Technicians accounted for less than 10 per-
cent of the total labor force in many small enterprises, and senior techni-
cians and departmental managers accounted for even less. Moreover, it is
very difficult for SMEs in China to obtain finance from commercial banks.
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Lacking innovation resources, these SMEs chose to imitate. By relying
simply on imitation, however, the SMEs in the Xiqiao textile industry
ended up with a serious shortage of innovation dynamics and capacity
(see table 6.4). 
Innovation for development of the Xiqiao textile cluster. Facing the
structural imbalance of the textile market in the mid-1990s—that is, with
low-grade fabrics in excessive supply and some 30–50 percent of mid-
and high-grade fabrics being imported—the Xiqiao Town government
realized that it was necessary to enhance the overall quality of its textile
products through technology innovation. The town government thus
implemented a strategy of revitalizing the textile industry through sci-
ence and technology. 
From 1995 onward, the town government implemented three main
measures under this strategy: building a textile city, establishing a fabric
sample manufacturing company, and invigorating large enterprises while
relaxing control over small ones, an approach that was to help large enter-
prises gain bank loans to buy advanced equipment. In view of local enter-
prises’ lack of innovation dynamics and ability, the government decided
to assist them through a technology service organization that would offer
public services aimed at innovation and upgrading for the textile indus-
try, including, for example, product testing, certification, protection of
intellectual property rights, and professional training. 
Through these measures, a large number of enterprises have now
updated their equipments and attained broader capabilities for producing
new products on their own or with the help of the technology innovation
center (TIC). Within a decade, local textile enterprises had invested a
total of RMB 4 billion in upgrading equipments and machines. As a result,
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Table 6.4  Innovation Methods Used by SMEs in the Xiqiao Textile Industry, 2004
New sample or design 
supplied by clients
(OEM)
Imitation and 
innovation
Independent 
R&D
Enterprises 9 21 8
Percentage 28 66 25
Sequencing of the 
largest percentagea 2 1 3
Source: Wang et al. 2008, 99.
Note: Number of SMEs is 32.
a. Sequencing refers to the percentage of innovation methods used by SMEs, ranging from 1 to 3; 1 refers to the
most frequently used method. 
the Xiqiao textile cluster has gradually passed through the difficult times
and made some substantial progress in technology upgrading.
Upgrading the development of the Xiqiao textile cluster. At the begin-
ning of 2004, China’s textile industry experienced three “cold fronts”: the
shortage of electrical power and pressure for saving energy; increasing
costs of raw materials; and a price war that was getting more intense in
the textile industry, especially in the low- and medium-quality product
markets. Meanwhile, some overseas trade protection measures created
friction in export markets. The traditional growth path of Chinese textile
industry, that is, to win by sheer quantity with low prices, had come to an
end. The Xiqiao textile cluster faced not only domestic competition from
Jiangsu and Zhejiang, but also international competition from India,
Pakistan, and other countries. Under such circumstances, the textile clus-
ter had to upgrade, that is, to increase the added value of products
through innovation (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2004).
To promote the restructuring and upgrading of the textile industry, in
2004 TIAC chose Xiqiao as the first national textile industry upgrading
pilot. Since then, the Xiqiao textile cluster has entered an upgrading era.
A technology innovation center was constructed to offer more effective
services to SMEs and to enhance the overall innovation ability of the tex-
tile cluster. 
Role of Government, Policy Instruments, 
and Their Implementation
The administrative decentralization brought on by the 1994 fiscal reform
of the tax-sharing system allowed local government to share tax revenues
to a certain extent with the central government. Under this system, local
governments bear certain responsibilities for providing public goods. And
because their fiscal revenues are derived mainly from enterprise income
tax, value-added tax, sales tax, and land transfer fees, the more developed
the local economy is, the more revenue the local government collects.
This arrangement has provided strong institutional incentives for local
governments to participate actively in developing the local economy.
The Role of Local Government in Cluster Development
Along with the deepening of China’s reform, however, the role of local
government began to change. Qiu and Xu (2004) point out that during
the transition to a market economy, the role of local government evolved
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from “local state corporatism”—that is, local government directly partici-
pated in setting up enterprises to gain profit and assumed the character-
istics of a “corporation,” while its officials played the role of entrepreneurs
(Oi 1992, 1995, 1998,1999; Walder 1995)—to “post–local state corpo-
ratism,” in which local government withdrew from owning and operating
all kinds of enterprises and focused on levying taxes and providing a full
range of services for local economic development. State government then
moved into “post–post–local corporatism,” in which the government sup-
ported intermediary organizations and enabled them to replace part of
local government’s functions so that government could govern the local
society and economy more effectively. With this evolution, a market-
oriented economic system gradually developed. Such a path can be
clearly observed in the case of Xiqiao. 
Under China’s old system of the planned economy, all sectors and
industries were owned and operated by the state government, and state-
owned enterprises in China have played key roles in local cluster devel-
opment. For example, the Xiqiao textile cluster was formed from three
state-owned silk enterprises. Most of the private enterprises routinely
obtained their raw material, technology, and market information from
them. Many managers, technicians, and workers in private enterprises had
formerly worked for those state-owned textile factories. Along with the
system transition, local government’s roles also changed at different stages
of cluster development as shown in table 6.5.9
Policy Instruments and Their Implementation
Facilitating the formation of local clusters. Since the early 1980s,
town governments have implemented a series of policies and measures
to support the development of the local textile industry: (a) encourag-
ing and supporting local farmers in setting up textile enterprises indi-
vidually or with other farmers; (b) coordinating four trade companies
with related government agencies and setting up a professional team to
assist local enterprises in purchasing raw materials and selling fabric
products; (c) in the early 1990s, targeting the most outdated looms and
equipment that produce low-quality products and providing financing
guarantees to help SMEs gain bank loans to update their machines;
(d) establishing the specialized Southern Textile Market in 1985 to
regulate the local trading market and stimulate mass production and
sales. These policies and measures have proved fairly effective in pro-
moting the development of local SMEs and facilitating the formation
of the Xiqiao textile cluster.
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Table 6.5  Evolution of Local Government Role in Xiqiao Cluster Development 
Stage
Formation
(1980–95)
Innovation for development
(1996–2003)
Upgrading
(2004–present)
State of cluster and 
enterprises IC
Cluster already formed
State-operated silk enterprises, local 
family mills, and private SMEs; lack of
advanced looms and IC; mainly 
depending on imitation
Maturing cluster
Some SMEs were set up by people 
from other provinces; some private
SMEs began to emerge; certain IC 
in product and process became 
available
Cluster being upgraded
1/7 of firms are large enterprises with
some IC; SMEs still rely on TIC to inno-
vate; became textile industry upgrading
demonstration region based on TIC and
textile industrial base and Xiqiao Textile
City; more strong agglomeration effects
Challenges in cluster
development
Buyers’ market emerging, facing fierce
competition; cannot meet market
demand in new products due to 
shortage of IC; local cluster stepped 
into predicament
Fiercer competition;  IC constraint; more
variability in technology and market
demand; more innovation pressure;
more difficult to keep competitive
advantage 
Increasing production costs; labor 
shortage; influenced by RMB 
appreciation and financial crisis; 
shrinking international and domestic
market; low IC; cluster upgrading
Local government’s 
role
Public policy and its
objective
• Encourage and support local textile
industry development 
• Set up Southern Cloth Wholesale 
Market to facilitate sales of local 
products, and to accelerate local 
cluster development
• Provide financial guarantee for local
enterprises to gain bank loan and buy
new looms 
• Formulate the strategy of revitalizing
the textile industry through science 
and technology 
Implement this strategy to break out of
the predicament:
• Build Xiqiao Textile City to promote
specialized market 
• Set up the Fabric Sample Manufactur-
ing Company and TIC as industry 
public innovation service platform to
enhance cluster IC and local 
competitiveness; transform TIC into
private operation to make it more
effective and sustainable
To facilitate local cluster upgrading: 
• Enrich the functions and raise the effi-
ciency of TIC
• Encourage e-innovation through spe-
cific measures to enhance local cluster
competitiveness
• Construct eco-textile industry park to
reduce production cost and protect
environment and to attract more
investment to extend local industrial
chain 
(continued)
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Table 6.5  Evolution of Local Government Role in Xiqiao Cluster Development (continued)
Stage
Formation
(1980–95)
Innovation for development
(1996–2003)
Upgrading
(2004–present)
Evolution of local 
government’s role
Owner and operator of enterprises; 
both player and administrator in 
local economy development;
dual roles: both public servants and 
entrepreneurs
• Provide guarantee for large local 
enterprises to get bank loans for 
equipment upgrading to raise 
production efficiency
• Construct textile industrial base 
from player to referee; transform 
from direct supplier of new products 
to administrator of local innovation 
service public platform; supplier of 
better infrastructure, production 
and marketing environment; 
public servants
• Widely brand “Xiqiao Fabrics”
Regulator to set rules for TIC; 
designer for local cluster upgrading; 
supporter of local industrial association; 
promoter of regional brand; 
strategists for local development
Sources: Authors, based on data and materials in Yue, Cai, and Liang 2008, Yue 2009. 
Note: IC = innovation capacity.
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Implementing a “science and technology” strategy to support cluster
development. A large number of similar small and medium enterprises in
the cluster compete intensely through low prices. As a result, some enter-
prises in Xiqiao eventually had to move away, change to other businesses,
or go bankrupt. Consequently, the number of enterprises fell dramatically
from more than 2,200 in the mid-1990s to just over 1,300 in 2000.
Under such circumstances, the Xiqiao Town government decided to
focus on the development of large enterprises to sustain the growth of
local industry. By offering bank credit guarantees to some promising
enterprises, local government helped them buy advanced equipment to
produce new fabrics of better quality. With limited R&D and manufac-
turing ability, local fabric producers usually purchased advanced equip-
ment to achieve process innovations. At the same time, government
reduced some taxes and administrative fees to support enterprise devel-
opment. 
Another key policy instrument, the Fabrics Sample–Manufacturing
Corporation (FSMC) backed by town governments, was set up in 1998
specifically to address local enterprises’ lack of innovation capabilities.
The FSMC was composed of three departments—the Solid Colored
Fabric Design Department, the Jacquard Fabrics Computer Design
Department, and the Printing Color Separating Design Department,
which specialized in developing new fabrics, new dyeing processes, and
new printing and dyeing formulas and in analyzing new weaving
processes using information technology. The Xiqiao government invested
more than RMB 4 million, mostly to buy systems for computer-aided
design (CAD), computer-aided manufacturing (CAM), and computer-
integrated manufacturing systems (CIMS). This equipment was beyond
the purchasing power of most small enterprises at that time. Later on, the
FSMC, using its own intellectual property, developed a small-sample
loom that was able to produce small fabric samples, which greatly
reduced the cost of product innovation for SMEs. 
Before the FSMC, one private firm specialized in manufacturing fabric
samples for other enterprises. But its new products were sold at higher
prices. For example, one piece of new sample fabric made by the private
company sold for RMB 1,000, which was beyond what the SMEs could
afford. Now, with FSMC, a sample similar to that made by the private firm
sold for only RMB 300.10 Those who had bought new samples to weave
new fabrics could earn more profit from the new product. Such a move
encouraged local enterprises to innovate either through setting up their
own R&D departments or through buying new products from FSMC. 
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At the end of 1999, encouraged by the example of Xiqiao’s FSMC,
Guangdong Provincial Science and Technology Bureau began to construct
technology innovation platforms in all selected towns for innovation
piloting. Since 2000, on the basis of the FSMC and with the support of
the provincial government and the Nanhai government, Xiqiao Town
established the Southern Technology Innovation Center (TIC), with a
total investment of RMB 0.2 billion. Since its completion in 2001, the
TIC has attracted more professional technological institutions and inter-
mediary agencies to provide comprehensive services. By 2007, there were
11 agencies specializing in or related to technology innovation services.
By providing enterprises with newly designed products, the FSMC
stimulated their innovation activities and helped clusters make significant
progress from “weaving cloth by scissors,” which means imitating other
enterprises’ cloth through cutting their new cloth with scissors to “weav-
ing cloth by computers,” which means Xiqiao enterprises can weave cloth
based on technology innovation through CAD and CAM. Meanwhile, the
TIC provided not only new products, but also innovation services,
including information, technical consultation, professional textile train-
ing, testing and certification, and so on. To supply all these services in a
market-based way, all departments and agencies inside the TIC are now
owned and operated privately as independent legal entities. After its with-
drawal, local government has acted solely as an administrator. The TIC has
now become a platform for cooperation among government, industry, and
research institutes and a facilitator for enterprise innovations. 
Giving impetus to cluster upgrading. To upgrade the local cluster, Xiqiao
Town has focused on five goals, called the “five ones”: 
• One system. To construct a textile industrial system by introducing
textile machinery enterprises upstream and garment enterprises
downstream to build a complete textile industry chain 
• One platform. To strengthen the functions and efficiency of the TIC,
the public innovation platform, to offer better services 
• One base: To further improve the infrastructure of the local textile
 industrial base
• One market. To build a Xiqiao Textile City to provide a communica-
tion bridge and an interactive link between the textile enterprises and
the trade market (China Economic Weekly 2006) 
• One brand. To establish one regional brand, Xiqiao Fabrics, under the
guidance of the Nanhai district government11
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Local government has also hosted fairs and public activities on sev-
eral occasions to promote the reputation of Xiqiao Fabrics and has set
up relevant testing institutes to ensure the quality of the fabrics.
Following are details of two of the policy instruments that have been
implemented. 
Investment attraction activities. To extend the textile industry chain by
attracting more upstream and downstream enterprises into the Xiqiao
Textile Industrial Base, the local government has carried out a new round
of investment attraction activities since 2002. The Foshan and Nanhai
governments have implemented a series of preferential policies. For
example, for the high-tech enterprises established in the industrial park,
according to the Nanhai government, enterprise income tax can be
exempted in the first two years and paid at a reduced rate of 15 percent
in the following three years. 
Meanwhile, the government is now setting up entry barriers to for-
eign direct investment, so that only those high-tech enterprises and
textile enterprises that are in accord with requirements can be admit-
ted, in an attempt to emphasize the quality and efficiency of the
investment. Due to increasingly heated competition among districts
and the shortages of land and electricity resources, local government
needs to increase the output value of investment per unit of area
while decreasing potential pollution problems. According to the 2006
policy, the minimum investment intensity has to be more than RMB
1 million for an area of about 670 square meters, and all newly
invested projects have to be set up inside the industrial park. To
attract the new enterprises it needs, Xiqiao Town has created an award
to encourage those who successfully introduce an enterprise accepted
by the government. 
Within this first eco-industrial park, the Xiqiao government has tried
to supply complete infrastructure and quality services to foster a better
development environment, and has taken the lead in unifying the sup-
plies of water, steam, and sewage treatment for enterprises in the park.
Here, sewage can be recycled through a thorough treatment in the plant
and further deep treatment in a stretch of artificial wetland. In this way,
enterprises do not have to invest separately in building their own boilers,
sewage treatment facilities, and sewage pipeline. Furthermore, an effective
system of sewage treatment enables printing and dyeing enterprises to be
licensed to operate in the park, businesses that have been subject to sanc-
tions in Xiqiao because of heavy pollution.
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“One platform, five pillars.” To promote the upgrading of the local tex-
tile cluster, the Xiqiao textile TIC has now been extended further, with its
“one platform, and five pillars” (see figure 6.2) (Wang and Yue 2008). The
five pillars of the TIC are meant to supply product innovation and techni-
cal services for those local enterprises that have their own R&D depart-
ments and mainly supply new products to local and regional SMEs. Many
of these are large local enterprises that occasionally buy new products
from the TIC but mainly have a need for technical services, such as prod-
uct testing and certification and professional training in textiles. Operated
by the Information Department of the TIAC, the Textile Industry
(Southern) Fabric Testing Center with the TIC has been accredited by
the China National Accreditation Board for Laboratories under its test-
ing and quality authentication system. Its functions cover normal testing,
eco-testing, and functional testing for guaranteeing the quality of textile
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Figure 6.2  Public Platform of “One Platform and Five Pillars” for Upgrading the
Innovation of the Textile Cluster
Source: Authors’ research.
products for sale in both domestic and overseas markets. Fabrics with test
certificates issued by this center are accepted by more than 40 countries
and regions including Europe, the United States, the Republic of Korea,
Japan, and Southeast Asia. To introduce this system, early in 2003, Nanhai
District and Xiqiao Town governments reached an agreement with TIAC
that they would invest in physical assets, such as equipment and offices,
while TIAC would supply human resources and other intangible assets. It
is the first testing and quality authentication system to be located in a
town in China and has played an important role in raising the image of
Xiqiao Fabrics. 
For local SMEs, the town government requires that all R&D and serv-
ice organizations supply them services at a 70–80 percent discount as a
kind of support measure, and, as compensation, their rents are set at a
much lower price of RMB 10–15 per square meter, while the rent is RMB
20–28 per square meter for other companies inside the TIC building. As
the administrator of the TIC, the Xiqiao Textile City Administrative
Committee acts only as a building property manager and a monitor to
ensure that these privately owned and operated organizations perform
their public service functions. 
Evaluation of Government Policy and the 
Xiqiao Textile Cluster
Through the constant efforts of local enterprises and with the support of
local government and the TIC, the innovation ability and competitive-
ness of Xiqiao’s textile cluster are continuously increasing. One survey
shows that more than 60 percent of the total of 56 enterprises have
accepted product design and R&D services, nearly 20 percent of the
enterprises have accepted services on patents, and about 34 percent have
used information services from the TIC (see table 6.6) (Wang et al.
Cluster Development and Government: The Case of Xiqiao Textile Cluster, Guangdong 209
Table 6.6  Technical Services Accepted by Textile Enterprises from Xiqiao’s 
Technology Innovation Center, 2004
Product 
design
Service 
for patent
Process 
improvement
Quality
control
Information
service
Training
service Others
Enterprises 34 11 13 10 19 16 14
Percentage 60.7 19.6 23.2 17.9 33.9 28.6 25
Ranking 1 6 5 7 2 3 4
Source: Sun Yat-Sen University 2008.
Note: N = 56.
2008). The Xiqiao TIC has greatly reduced the production cost of enter-
prises and has facilitated local innovation.
Effectiveness of the Technology Innovation Center
Among the 153 public innovation platforms in Guangdong’s specialized
towns, by 2007 not all of them operated smoothly, some had already dis-
appeared, and some had been replaced by a local innovation network
dominated by a large enterprise in the cluster. So far, however, Xiqiao’s
Technology Innovation Center is working well and playing a critical role in
cluster upgrading. Since 2008, TIAC has begun to replicate its experiences
in 133 textile cluster pilots throughout China. Xiqiao’s TIC has now been
designated the Guangdong Provincial Textile Fabrics Engineering and
R&D Center and has become the first textile technology and engineering
center in China.
Table 6.7 shows the changes from before the establishment of the TIC
in 1998 up to 2003, in which we can see that the sales value of textiles
rose from US$342.2 million in 1998 to US$788.8 million in 2003,
although the number of enterprises fell from 1,590 to 1,380; the average
R&D investment of enterprises increased from US$140 to US$4,280; and
the total number of patents rose from zero to 188, while the number of
employees increased by more than 10,000. 
Fabrics made in the Xiqiao cluster already have a certain competitive
advantage. Up to 2007, more than 20,000 new products were developed
by the TIC, more than 20 new fabrics were qualified as “China Popular
Fabrics,” and more than 70 new products developed by more than 30
enterprises shared the title “China Popular Fabrics.” So far the Xiqiao
cluster has obtained more than 300 national patents for the appearance
and practical design of its products and owns 24 provincial and national
brands. The regional brand, Xiqiao Fabrics, has already been established
(Nanhai District Government 2006). 
With the support of the TIC and through the efforts of the large enter-
prises themselves, the development cycle of new fabrics in Xiqiao has
been shortened from 20–30 days to 1–5 days, while development costs
have dropped more than 50 percent. Inside Xiqiao Textile City, some
30–40 percent of new products were developed by the TIC, and about 30
percent were independently developed by local enterprises. Although the
average unit price of new fabrics made in Xiqiao is 15–20 percent higher
than those made in other regions, their better quality has won an increas-
ing market share. For example, one meter of jean cloth made in Xiqiao
can be sold for RMB 23, while the same sells for RMB 16–17 when made
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Table 6.7  Xiqiao’s Clusters Before and After the Establishment of the Technology Innovation Center, 1998 and 2003 
Employees
1998 2003
Firms Employees
Output 
(US$ millions) 
R&D 
(US$ thousands) Patents Firms Employees
Output 
(US$ millions)
R&D 
(US$ thousands) Patents
<10 795 7,055 44.6 0 0 465 3,715 31.9 0 0
11–50 583 26,235 130.1 0 0 534 25,299 94.5 0 0
51–100 205 19,475 106.1 0 0 359 33,387 323.2 2,256.7 22
>100 7 1,094 61.5 230 0 22 6,445 339.2 3,648.2 166
Total 1,590 53,859 342.3 230 0 1,380 68,846 788.8 5,904.9 188
Firm average 32.28 0.21 0.14 0 49.86 0.58 4.28 0.14
Source: Sun Yat-Sen University 2008.
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in Zhejiang. Some large enterprises have also supported their suppliers in
making innovations in raw materials distributed in other provinces.
Nowadays, the fabrics of many nationally known garment brands are
made in Xiqiao, including Jaquer, HuBao, Shanshan, Baoxiniao, Hongdou,
and Busen.12
Through the TIC’s promotion, local textile enterprises have begun to
use information technology more widely. According to local government
statistics, 10 percent of the enterprises have already applied CAD and
CAM systems; 25 percent of the enterprises have used office automatic
systems; and about 15 percent of the local enterprises have established
Management Information Systems (MIS) and Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) systems, which have greatly improved management, effi-
ciency, and productivity.
Achievements in Implementing Cluster Upgrades
In its innovation and upgrading policy, the Xiqiao cluster has achieved
great success. The good local development environment has attracted
both upstream and downstream enterprises. Since 2003, more than 100
textile enterprises have been established in Xiqiao’s textile industrial
base. The scale of enterprise has been expanded, although the number has
been reduced from 1,259 in 2003 to 741 in 2008. The larger local enter-
prises own 200–300 weaving machines, while the number of weaving
machines owned by the typical smaller enterprises has increased from 4
up to at least 30, illustrating that these smaller enterprises are growing,
too. By 2008, there were more than 20,000 spinning machines, about half
of them shuttleless, which is a much higher percentage than the corre-
sponding 10 percent average countrywide. Private enterprises account for
more than 90 percent; 9 enterprises have an annual output of RMB 100
million, and more than 50 have an annual output of RMB 5 million. With
a more complete industry chain, the Xiqiao textile industrial cluster will
have an even greater agglomeration effect.
In 2007, the transaction amount of Xiqiao Textile City reached RMB
25 billion, an increase of RMB 7.2 billion over 2006. More than 5,000 new
products are released into the market every year, and many of them lead
new fashions. Specialized cowboy cloth, casual fabrics, and fabrics for
household decor have become the most competitive products. Xiqiao fab-
rics are not only sold in the domestic market, but also in Japan, Canada,
the Russian Federation, Europe, and other countries and regions. It is esti-
mated that the value of Xiqiao’s trade accounts for 10 percent of China’s
total and 40 percent of Guangdong’s total. Even during the 2008 global
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crisis, the output value of the textile industry still reached RMB 7.885 bil-
lion, an increase of about 40 percent from 2003. With about 60,000 employ-
ees, the textile industry is still an important pillar of the local economy.
Key Success Factors of the Xiqiao Cluster
Several key factors are responsible for the success of Xiqiao’s endogenous
textile cluster. The cluster’s spirit of entrepreneurship, its social network,
its capacity for innovation, and the role of government are the primary
reasons for its continued prosperity.
The spirit of entrepreneurship and social networks. The informal insti-
tutional environment created by the social culture and local customs—
namely, entrepreneurship, the probusiness atmosphere, and the industrial
foundation—provided the necessary soil for enterprise growth. In Xiqiao
Town, with its long history of the textile industry, its traditional entrepre-
neurial culture, and its venturing spirit, drove local farmers one by one to
stop farming and set up enterprises in the early 1980s. At that time, the
sound of looms could be heard everywhere in the villages. Xiqiao’s peo-
ple have had an innovative spirit ever since ancient times. Early in 1872
in the Qing Dynasty, for example, Chen Qiyuan, a citizen of Xiqiao,
opened a new era of reeling silk by machine. A daring spirit of venturing
and an atmosphere encouraging innovation shaped the necessary environ-
ment for Xiqiao’s textile industry. 
With the emergence of the private economy, more and more skilled
workers left local state-operated silk enterprises and set up their own fac-
tories or worked for private enterprises. Through a network of colleagues,
friends, relatives, and people from the same village, the techniques, raw
materials, and market information formerly in the state-owned enter-
prises were transferred to private enterprises. Within a village or town, the
demonstration effect is strong, and it is very easy for residents to learn
from each other. In addition, many officials in town government had close
connections with local firms. When these private enterprises met difficul-
ties in raw material purchasing or sale of products, for example, local gov-
ernment was willing to actively help them to resolve the problem. This
kind of social network facilitated local cluster formation and develop-
ment as well.
Innovative capability and the role of government. After cluster forma-
tion, innovation is a very important source of competitiveness for sustain-
ing cluster development. To increase the added value of products and to
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upgrade local clusters from the low end to the high end of the value
chain, clustering enterprises must have innovation capability. And even
under dual challenges, internal and external, only about 30 enterprises
disappeared from the Xiqiao cluster in 2008. One important reason is
that Xiqiao enterprises have obtained certain innovation capabilities. 
Another factor is that the enterprises have benefited from the services
of local government. In addition to the measures mentioned above, includ-
ing the TIC, in 2008, the Nanhai government implemented a scheme
called the Eagle Plan to upgrade eight local clusters and strengthen the
competitiveness of local enterprises through financing, technology innova-
tion, and regional brand support. Local government supplied RMB 80 mil-
lion in credit guarantees so that local enterprises could apply for bank
loans. These funds were to go toward helping them obtain loans from local
commercial banks worth 10 times the loan guarantees. In the first batch of
more than 70 enterprises selected in this scheme, more than 20 were from
the Xiqiao cluster. At the same time, the costs of raw material and energy
had dropped because of the crisis. Therefore, for those enterprises that
were competitive, the opportunity for development outweighed the chal-
lenges caused by the crisis. In any case, however, the drop in market
demand at home and abroad was really a great challenge in general, and
only those with innovation capability could come out winners in such
fierce competition.
Main Challenges for Cluster Sustainability
Despite its great success, given the current worldwide financial crisis, the
Xiqiao textile cluster continues to confront both external and internal
challenges, the former coming from weak demand from the global mar-
ket and enhanced competition. Meanwhile, with the appreciation of the
RMB, garment exporters’ profits have been greatly reduced; as their fab-
ric suppliers, Xiqiao producers are directly affected, although not as seri-
ously as other regions. In addition, domestic and overseas competition is
becoming increasingly stronger. This situation is especially difficult for
small enterprises. 
Inside the cluster, despite many successful firms, a number of textile
enterprises are still not competitive, have low innovation capability and
low managerial skills, and lack any well-known brands. In addition, hori-
zontal linkages between similar textile enterprises are missing, which low-
ers the collective efficiency of the cluster. 
From the global perspective, the Xiqiao cluster, along with most
clusters in China, is still counting on low costs for its competitive
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advantage rather than R&D, innovation, and branding. Without suffi-
cient technical and managerial personnel in the cluster, some develop-
ment opportunities might be missed, such as new applications of
textile materials in agriculture, medicine, building, aerospace, and state
defense, among others. 
In addition, as an accelerator of cluster development, the efficiency of
the TIC, the public innovation platform, needs to be enhanced as well.
Most important, the innovation ability of each design department needs
to be improved. More specialized R&D and technical personnel also need
to be hired. Some particular training services required by the enterprises
cannot be supplied by the TIC, which now offers only the generalized
training required by the industry.
Discussion, Conclusion, and Policy Implications
Hereinafter are the discussion, conclusion, and policy implications of the
role of government and technology service organizations in clusters, espe-
cially in traditional industrial cluster development.
The Role of Government in Cluster Development
In conclusion, some policy implications can be drawn about the develop-
ment experience of Guangdong and Xiqiao:
• The role of policy is different at different phases of cluster develop-
ment and should be adjusted accordingly as the cluster develops. At
the stage of cluster formation, policy needs to focus more on strategic
sectors. A strategic industry plan involving the whole province should
be in place before specific cluster policies are issued. Otherwise, in-
tense competition among local governments will cause duplication of
efforts and waste of resources, as well as a high level of fragmentation. 
• After the cluster has come into being, support for the cluster should
focus on helping build its innovation ability. Most SMEs in a tradition-
al industry cluster do not have enough innovative resources, such as
technical and R&D personnel, or funds to carry out product and
process innovations. In such a situation, the establishment of public
innovation platforms by local governments is a viable choice. 
• A production service industry is critical for cluster upgrading, includ-
ing technology service institutes, logistical services, and intellectual
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property protection services that can support enterprises’ innovation
activities. 
• Human resources are very important for cluster development at any
time, especially during the process of upgrading. The education, train-
ing, and recruitment of personnel are quasi-public responsibilities
from the perspective of knowledge and technology spillover. Each dif-
ferent level of government can play its own role, such as working out
policies for attracting R&D talent and setting up colleges and schools
to educate and train technicians and professional personnel for local
cluster development. Moreover, local government should supply com-
plete infrastructure and good living and commercial environments to
attract talent and investment. 
• A cluster needs to keep innovating and upgrading; otherwise, it will go
into decline and may eventually disappear and become an empty shell.
Enterprises should enhance their technology innovation capabilities
and try to upgrade their competitiveness through R&D and branding.
A single internationally famous regional brand is helpful in raising the
added value of the product and enhancing the competitiveness of the
cluster. 
• Local government must support enterprises in setting up their profes-
sional associations to enable the enterprises to be self-governed and at
the same time to build a bridge between government and market.
Generally speaking, the role of government is indispensable in clus-
ter development. However, government should only do what it needs
to do to avoid market failure. On the stage of a market-oriented econ-
omy, enterprises are the main actors. As the regulator of the market,
however, the government must intervene appropriately and offer
 necessary support. It is difficult for government to know when and
how to intervene, but to build a good institutional environment and to
provide sound public or quasi-public services are always the top prior-
ity of government. 
Technology Services in the Cluster
The view that an industry cluster is helpful for enterprise innovation is
widely accepted, but clusters alone are no guarantee that such innovation
will happen naturally. Many scholars point out that SMEs in clusters have
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difficulties in innovation for many reasons (Bellandi 1994; Glasmeier
2005), which are difficult for SMEs to overcome by relying on their own
technology and funds. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce an innova-
tion-support organization as a way of breaking out of this plight (Bianchi
1996). Guangdong’s cluster development experiences and those of other
counties in Zhejiang and other provinces show the necessity for local gov-
ernment’s provision of support for SME innovations in clusters, such as
working out a subsidy policy, building an industry innovation fund, estab-
lishing an innovation service organization, and the like. (Brusco 1990;
Asheim et al. 2003; Wang and Yue 2008). However, even when technology
service organizations (TSOs) are set up under quite similar situations, the
results may differ. Some of them are successful in leading and supporting
local cluster innovations (for example, the TIC in Xiqiao), while others
have disappeared or been run with lower efficiency in the development
process or have been replaced by an innovation network established by
local core enterprises. Why? Wang and Yue (2008) point out that a TSO’s
success is critically dependent on whether it can adapt to the demands of
enterprise innovation in the cluster.
In the Xiqiao experience, the TIC ensured that most SMEs would have
innovation capability, thus bolstering the sustainability of the local clus-
ter. While engaged in this process, the roles of both the TIC and the local
government have had to evolve to adapt to changing demands. Through
an analysis of the successful experience of Xiqiao’s TIC, four conclusions
can be drawn on ways that a TSO can work more effectively: 
• In the process of cluster development, a TSO, as an innovation service
platform, needs to be built. Because of its quasi-public nature and the
technology and knowledge spillovers generated from it, it is necessary
and reasonable that the TSO be sponsored by local government. 
• The function of a TSO depends on the innovation ability of the enter-
prises it serves. In developed countries, the enterprises in a cluster
 already have their own innovation capability; therefore, the TSO’s main
function is to supply technical consultation, product testing, informa-
tion, training, and other technical services. In developing countries,
though, because most of the enterprises in traditional industrial clusters
lack innovation ability, the TSO needs to focus on specialized functions
first, such as introducing new designs, materials, and products. With the
development of a cluster, the function of a TSO will inevitably evolve
and will need to adapt constantly to the needs of the enterprises.
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• For a TSO to supply better innovation services, it is necessary to
 mobilize social resources and, at a certain point, to transform the TSO
into a market-oriented operation. Local government should not with-
draw from supporting the TSO until many enterprises can make new
products by themselves instead of buying from the TSO. To ensure
that the public innovation platform operates in a market-oriented way
and can effectively provide public functions, local government needs
to provide guiding regulations and to work out some evaluation indi-
cators to measure its services.
• The interactive innovation mechanism between a TSO (which is located
at the TIC) and the enterprises it serves is based on the transaction, that
is, on the commercialized operation. The enterprises are to buy the new
products or innovation services supplied by the TSO, even though the
initial equipment and facilities for innovation in the TSO are financed
 totally or partially by the government. For that reason, it is critical, even
mandatory, for the TSO to be operated effectively and efficiently. As for
the process of interactive innovation, besides the evolution of the TIC’s
function, the interactive patterns of innovation have evolved from the
beginning when the enterprise’s innovation capability derived mainly
from the TSO itself to the point at which innovation has become a coop-
erative activity between the TSO and the enterprise in two ways: one in
which SMEs supply the sample and the TSO assists them in improving
and designing new ones and the another in which the SMEs describe
their ideas and concepts for the new product and the TSO helps them
develop it into a tangible new product (Yue 2009). 
Notes
1. Yangtze River Delta refers to Zhejiang Province, Jiangsu Province, and Shanghai.
2. The historical name Hong Kong refers to the period before July 1, 1997, when
the former British colony was restored to China; Hong Kong, China refers to
any time after that date.
3. Jun Wang (2005) points out that three kinds of clusters can be observed in
China, that is, endogenous, FDI-driven, and market derivative, according to
the forming mechanism. Yuan and Li (2008) divided China’s clusters into six
types: resource-driven, trade-driven, science-tech resource driven, large enter-
prise-hatching cluster, industry transferring-driven, and FDI-driven clusters.
Here, we merge the former five types into the endogenous, and regard the
FDI-driven one as the exogenous cluster.
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4. The eastern China region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan. The central
part includes Shanxi, Jilin, Helongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and
Hunan Provinces. The others belong to western China. 
5. The Pearl River Delta includes nine cities: Zhuhai, Zhongshan, Guangzhou,
Foshan, Dongguan, Huizhou, Shenzhen, Zhaoqing, and Jiangmen, in which
there are 42 counties. The industrial and agricultural output value of clus-
ters in the former six cities accounted for 70.6 percent of the total clusters
in 2007.
6. This concept of “specialized town” was proposed by several experts: Jun
Wang, Ping Lu, Xinchun Li, et al., August 1999, GD with Its New Economic
Development Pattern. This was also proposed in their report entitled The
Specialization Town Innovation Pilot in GD, which was approved by the
provincial Science and Technology Committee.
In 2005, there were a total of 1,117 towns in Guangdong, out of which 159
were specialized towns. There are two main indicators for measuring a spe-
cialized town: the first is that the output value of the local dominant industry
and its related industries accounts for more than 30 percent of the town’s
total output; the second is that more than 30 percent of the employees are
from this industry (Wang 1999).
7. In 2007, the number of textile enterprises was less than 800; in 2008, it was
741. Although the number of enterprises is falling, the size of the remaining
enterprises and the output value of this cluster have grown (see table 6.3). 
8. The production mode refers to the use of silkworm excrement to feed fish
and pond mud to fertilize mulberry trees. Mulberry trees, silkworms, and fish
are linked together in an eco-production circle. 
9. Local government in this case refers mainly to Nanhai District and Xiqiao
Town. Nanhai County has been one of the districts of Foshan City since 2003. 
10. The data are based on a research interview with the Xiqiao government on
August 15, 2002.
11. Based on an interview with Nanhai District government, September 2007.
12. Data and materials are supplied by the TIC. 
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This book reveals fascinating insights into the two remarkable engines fueling China's
economic success: special economic zones (SEZs) and industrial clusters. Douglas Zeng
provides an excellent overview of China's SEZs and clusters, their background, success
factors, challenges, and possible solutions. The five well-written case studies delve into
the rich detail of the evolution and success of SEZs and clusters in key growth regions of
China. The views on the distinctions and convergence of SEZs and clusters are fresh and
in-depth. 
As China celebrates the 30th anniversary of its SEZ policy, the publication of this book
could not have been more timely. With growing interest in China’s experience, this book is
a must-read for policy makers, development practitioners, business leaders, and scholars
worldwide who are eager to learn from China's success.  
—Eric Rolf Hansen
President of Economic Transformations Group, Inc.
China’s economic rise continues to amaze. This book provides important new insights into
two dimensions that, when combined, are emblematic of the nature of China’s economic
transformation. The creation of special economic zones (SEZs) has been a core element of
the government’s strategy to drive growth through a process of selective reforms in specific
regions. The emergence of clusters has been a market-driven response to the new 
opportunities opening up in China. 
The case studies in this book suggest that Chinese SEZs and clusters have often been
successful precisely because pragmatic policies allow them to become mutually reinforcing.
This book will help researchers and policy makers better understand China’s growth, past
and current, as well as the lessons the country holds for the effective use of SEZs and
clusters in organizing economic policies.  
—Christian Ketels
Principal Associate of the Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness at Harvard Business School
and Director of The Competitiveness Institute (TCI)
